The Presence of Roman Ingarden in Analytic Philosophy

Abstract

Roman Ingarden is widely regarded as a truly outstanding phenomenologist, although the path leading to his full international recognition was difficult and tortuous. Even more intricate and complicated were the paths leading to the recognition of his exceptional achievements by analytic philosophers, treated by him with reluctance. Four such paths are presented in the article: (1) the early reception of Ingarden’s work (A. C. Ewing and G. Ryle); (2) the comparative attempts of G. Küng in the central period of the dominance of analytic philosophy; (3) the multiple efforts of P. Simons and B. Smith to introduce Ingarden’s thought into analytic ontological debates; (4) A. Thomasson’s deployment of Ingarden’s work in her ontology of fiction, as well as in her cultural and social ontology. Attempts to ensure Ingarden’s greater recognition within the analytic tradition have admittedly had some effect, facilitated by the turn of the analytic tradition toward ontological and metaphysical issues, and a growing openness to other philosophical movements. Nevertheless, it will probably never come to a situation in which the achievements of Ingarden will be placed in this tradition on a par with the achievements of G. Frege, G. E. Moore, B. Russell, L. Wittgenstein, W. V. Quine, J. L. Austin, or W. Sellars. He will remain there simply a disciple of Husserl, who strongly opposed his master’s idealistic tendencies and contributed a few ingenious ideas to aesthetics and ontology.

Keywords:

phenomenology, analytic philosophy, Roman Ingarden, Gilbert Ryle, Peter Simons, Barry Smith, Amie L. Thomasson



Details

References

Statistics

Authors

Download files

pdf (Język Polski)

Altmetric indicators


Cited by / Share


Roczniki Humanistyczne · ISSN 0035-7707 | eISSN 2544-5200 | DOI: 10.18290/rh
© The Learned Society of the John Paul II Catholic University of Lublin & The John Paul II Catholic University of Lublin, Faculty of Humanities

Articles are licensed under a Creative Commons  Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International (CC BY-NC-ND 4.0)