Czy świadomość jest niezależna od substratu?

Robert Poczobut

doi:10.18290/rf24722.16

Published : 2024-06-28

Vol. 72 No. 2 (2024)

Is Consciousness Substrate Independent?

Robert Poczobut

https://orcid.org/0000-0003-2591-7002

DOI: https://doi.org/10.18290/rf24722.16

Abstract

The goal of the article is to present, compare, and critically analyze two contemporary versions of the principle of consciousness independence from substrate. The first one comes from David Chalmers, and the second from Max Tegmark. Both authors allow for the possibility of the existence of artificial consciousness and assume that conscious experiences can be realized on a non-biological substrate. However, Chalmers defends an anti-physicalist position, and even a certain version of panprotopsychism. Meanwhile, Tegmark advocates for a physicalist interpretation of the theory of emergence. In the final part of the article, I present and evaluate Paul Thagard’s argument against the substrate independence principle. The conclusion I formulate at the end asserts that we still lack empirical data to settle the ongoing dispute.

Keywords:

consciousness, the principle of substrate independence, machine consciousness, functionalism, computational theories of consciousness

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