Moderate Ontic Structural Realism about the Nature of Spacetime: Monistic and Dualistic Approaches

Damian Luty

doi:10.18290/rf26742.7

Data publikacji : 2026-06-29

Tom 74 Nr 2 (2026)

Umiarkowany ontyczny realizm strukturalny w sprawie natury czasoprzestrzeni: podejścia monistyczne i dualistyczne

Damian Luty

https://orcid.org/0000-0002-0194-9790

DOI: https://doi.org/10.18290/rf26742.7

Abstrakt

Stanowisko umiarkowanego ontycznego realizmu strukturalnego, przedstawiające wersję strukturalizmu czasoprzestrzennego, napotyka szereg trudności. Jedną z nich jest kwestia rozróżniania punktów czasoprzestrzeni. Zostało to pokazane w argumencie sformułowanym przez Christiana Wüthricha. W obronie swojego stanowiska zwolennicy umiarkowanego ontycznego realizmu strukturalnego odwołują się do pewnego rodzaju monistycznej interpretacji swojej pozycji. Twierdzę, że interpretacja ta generuje dalsze komplikacje. Opowiadam się za dualistyczną wersją umiarkowanego ontycznego realizmu strukturalnego w odniesieniu do natury czasoprzestrzeni. Pokazuję, w jaki sposób wersja ta jest mniej problematyczna niż inne omawiane formy tego stanowiska.

Słowa kluczowe:

umiarkowany ontyczny realizm strukturalny, filozofia czasoprzestrzeni, monizm, dualizm

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Zasady cytowania

Luty, D. (2026). Umiarkowany ontyczny realizm strukturalny w sprawie natury czasoprzestrzeni: podejścia monistyczne i dualistyczne. Roczniki Filozoficzne, 74(2), 151–183. https://doi.org/10.18290/rf26742.7

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Utwór dostępny jest na licencji Creative Commons Uznanie autorstwa – Użycie niekomercyjne – Bez utworów zależnych 4.0 Międzynarodowe.

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