Egzystencjalizm i aktualizm w kwestii światów możliwych a dwa rodzaje prawdziwości sądów

Karol Lenart

doi:10.18290/rf26741.8

Published : 2026-03-25

Vol. 74 No. 1 (2026)

Existentialism, Actualism about Possible Worlds, and Two Notions of Truth of Propositions

Karol Lenart

https://orcid.org/0000-0002-7674-2890

DOI: https://doi.org/10.18290/rf26741.8

Abstract

In this paper, I analyze the theory of Aristotelian actualism about possible worlds, a view which conceives of possible worlds as complete and consistent sets of propositions. The theory posits that, the existence of at least some possible worlds ontologically depends on what actually exists. This is because singular propositions about contingent individuals also exist contingently. Since modal claims are analyzed in terms of possible worlds, Aristotelian actualism entails that some modal truths are themselves contingent. However, this view faces a serious problem. If an individual x does not exist, then there are no singular propositions about x, including the proposition [x does not exist]. But if that is the case, then [x does not exist] is not true when x does not exist—which is absurd. In this paper, I show that the Aristotelian actualist can solve this problem by introducing two senses of truth with respect to possible worlds: truth in a world and truth at a world. Some have argued that this distinction is not substantive, since the notion of truth at a world is not meaningful and substantive. The aim of this paper is to show that this notion is indeed substantive. I support this claim by demonstrating the indispensability of the notion of truth at a world for explaining several key features of possible worlds (and more broadly, of modality) as understood by Aristotelian actualism.

Keywords:

possible worlds, actualism, existentialism, contingent existence, necessity, propositions

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Lenart, K. (2026). Existentialism, Actualism about Possible Worlds, and Two Notions of Truth of Propositions. Roczniki Filozoficzne, 74(1), 169–192. https://doi.org/10.18290/rf26741.8

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