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    Published : 2023-12-28
    Vol. 71 No. 4 (2023)

    Jacek Wojtysiak’s Probabilistic Criticism of Argument From Evil for the Non-Existence Of God

    Dariusz Łukasiewicz

    https://orcid.org/0000-0003-4442-6372

    DOI: https://doi.org/10.18290/rf23714.10

    Abstract

    In the article, I consider Jacek Wojtysiak’s critique of the probabilistic argument from the existence of a great fact of evil for the non-existence of God. I suggest that J. Wojtysiak’s critique of this argument should be modified in such a way that it does not lead to the conclusion that God is the cause of evil. I suggest to change the concept of God’s causality. I also point to a different way of weakening the probabilistic argument from evil than the one chosen by J. Wojtysiak. I propose to undermine the premise that evil exists, given naturalism. Next, I briefly refer to the difficulties of naturalistic moral realism and point to evolutionary arguments that debunk moral realism. In the context of these difficulties, I consider the position of Paul Draper, the pioneer of the probabilistic (Bayesian) argument from evil for atheism, and try to show some of the weaknesses of his views. I then formulate a theistic deductive argument from the existence of evil and suggest that, for reasons of simplicity, deductive over probabilistic arguments should be preferred by defenders of theism.

    Keywords:

    Jacek Wotysiak, probabilistic argument from the existence of evil for the non-existence of God, criticism of the argument from the existence of evil, theistic deductive argument from the existence of evil in favor of theism



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    Roczniki Filozoficzne · ISSN 0035-7685 | eISSN 2450-002X
    © Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL & Katolicki Uniwersytet Lubelski Jana Pawła II


    Articles are licensed under a Creative Commons  Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International (CC BY-NC-ND 4.0)