Krytycyzm a polisemia, nieostrość i zależność kontekstowa

Joanna Odrowąż-Sypniewska

doi:10.18290/rf237102.16

Published : 2023-06-28

Vol. 71 No. 2 (2023)

Critical Thinking, Polysemy, Vagueness and Context Sensitivity

Joanna Odrowąż-Sypniewska

https://orcid.org/0000-0001-7838-5666

DOI: https://doi.org/10.18290/rf237102.16

Abstract

In the paper I draw attention to the difficulties faced by someone who wants to put into practice the demands of criticism regarding linguistic precision. According to these postulates, one should speak unambiguously and precisely, and therefore avoid expressions that are ambiguous, vague and unstable in meaning. However, these postulates are much more difficult to satisfy than one might think, since significant doubts surround the very phenomena of ambiguity, context-sensitivity or vagueness. It seems that in order to teach others to avoid, for example, ambiguous statements, we should have an adequate characterization of ambiguity and be able to diagnose it properly. Meanwhile, the situation is incredibly confusing, and in the literature, whether philosophical or linguistic, there is no single established definition, or even consensus as to which expressions are ambiguous. Significant doubts have been raised regarding the proper characteristic of different kinds of ambiguity, such as homonymy and polysemy. There is also no consensus on how to distinguish polysemy from contextual dependence. Also in doubt is the characterization of vagueness and the proper classification of borderline cases of vague expressions. On the other hand, there is no doubt that most natural language expressions are polysemous, vague and context-dependent at the same time. What’s more, in many cases, these features are not defects of our language at all, but actually improve communication and enable us to convey content quickly. The postulate to avoid such expressions completely is simply unfeasible. However, being guided by the principles of criticism allows one to more easily see and avoid defects of linguistic correctness in those situations in which such defects hinder efficient communication.

Keywords:

context sensitivity, critical thinking, polysemy, vagueness

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