Założenia teoretyczne w intuicjach problemu świadomości

Mikołaj Kotuła

doi:10.18290/rf26742.6

Published : 2026-06-29

Vol. 74 No. 2 (2026)

Theoretical Assumptions in Intuitions about Consciousness

Mikołaj Kotuła

https://orcid.org/0000-0002-4798-2625

DOI: https://doi.org/10.18290/rf26742.6

Abstract

How do intuitions about the existence of a problem with consciousness and attempts to explain it in physical terms arise? In literature, intuitions of this type are divided into inferential, i.e. those resulting from philosophical arguments, and non-inferential, i.e. those preceding philosophical arguments. Non-inferential intuitions are very important because, due to their generic nature, they are supposed to be in a causal relationship with some universal cognitive mechanism. Explaining the process generating them could shed some light on the causal role of consciousness and the nature of consciousness itself. My main thesis is that the very existence of non-inferential intuitions is questionable. I believe that judgments problematizing consciousness (called problem intuitions) are strongly entangled in theoretical concepts and are burdened with lexical polysemy (ambiguity), which is why they are either inferential intuitions or not problem intuitions per se. I justify the above statements by analyzing concepts such as phenomenal consciousness, impossibility and physicality. I demonstrate that there is a large theoretical gap between everyday and philosophical concepts, and that some everyday concepts are characterized by a low degree of semantic isolation, i.e.: they are not isolated from philosophically irrelevant meanings, which means they are prone to polysemy and misunderstanding by the layman of the object of reference of intuition. Therefore, for a lay person to understand and correctly relate the intuition of a problem, they must be acquainted with the appropriate theoretical context, which violates the condition of non-inferentiality.

Keywords:

meta-problem, problem intuitions, phenomenal consciousness, Chalmers, philosophy, explanatory gap, illusionism

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Kotuła, M. (2026). Theoretical Assumptions in Intuitions about Consciousness. Roczniki Filozoficzne, 74(2), 133–149. https://doi.org/10.18290/rf26742.6

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