Wilhelm Ockham przeciw species, czyli o genezie nierelacyjnej teorii intencjonalności

Magdalena Płotka

doi:10.18290/rf26742.4

Published : 2026-06-29

Vol. 74 No. 2 (2026)

William Ockham against Species: On The Genesis of the Non-Relational Theory of Intentionality

Magdalena Płotka

https://orcid.org/0000-0002-6993-2178

DOI: https://doi.org/10.18290/rf26742.4

Abstract

The article examines the evolution of Ockham’s epistemology and his radical rejection of intermediary cognitive forms (species), tracing how this move led to the development of a direct, non-relational model of cognition. The author argues that Ockham’s critique of species is not merely an outcome of nominalistic ontological economy but an integral part of a coherent epistemological project aimed at redefining the problem of intentionality. Rejecting the notion of “intentional existence” as a middle category, Ockham eliminates the notions species sensibilis and intelligibilis, replacing them with the concept of habitus—a lasting cognitive disposition that enables thinking about absent objects. The first part of the paper analyses Ockham’s ontological and methodological objections to species, particularly the contradiction between their material and spiritual status and his application of the principle of ontological economy. The second part presents a positive alternative: the theory of cognitive acts and habitus, which explains cognition without invoking intermediary entities. Habitus functions as a form of intellectual memory and abstraction, preserving the structure of cognitive acts. The third part reconstructs Ockham’s transformation of intentionality—from a Thomistic, relational model of directionality toward objects, to a non-relational, immanent conception of the act as the bearer of aboutness. Ultimately, Ockham develops a unified theory of cognition in which the act itself is intrinsically intentional, while habitus provides continuity and the capacity for abstract thought without representational intermediaries. The article situates this shift as a foundational moment for later modern theories of mind and cognitive representation.

Keywords:

William Ockham, species, intentionality, habitus

Details

References

Statistics

Authors

Download files

pdf (Język Polski)

Citation rules

Płotka, M. (2026). William Ockham against Species: On The Genesis of the Non-Relational Theory of Intentionality. Roczniki Filozoficzne, 74(2), 79–101. https://doi.org/10.18290/rf26742.4

Altmetric indicators

Cited by / Share

Licence

This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License.

References

Arystoteles. 2003. Kategorie. Tłum. Kazimierz Leśniak. W: Arystoteles. Dzieła wszystkie. T. 1, 32–63. Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Naukowe PWN.

Augustinus. 1968. De Trinitate, Libri XIII–XV. Red. William J. Mountain i François Glorie. CCSL 50A. Turnhout: Brepols.

Brower-Toland, Susan. 2007. „Ockham on Judgment, Concepts, and the Problem of Intentionality”. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 37 (1): 67–109. https://doi.org/10.1353/cjp.2007.0008.

Brower-Toland, Susan. 2015. „How Chatton Changed Ockham’s Mind: William Ockham and Walter Chatton on Objects and Acts of Judgment”. W: Intentionality, Cognition, and Mental Representation in Medieval Philosophy, red. Gyula Klima, 204–234. New York: Fordham University Press.

Cory, Therese. 2020. „Aquinas’s Intelligible Species as Formal Constituents”. Documenti e Studi sulla Tradizione Filosofica Medievale 31: 261–309.

Henniger, Mark G. 1989. Relations: Medieval Theories 1250–1325. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Kelley, Francis E. 1981. „Walter Chatton vs. Aureoli and Ockham Regarding the Universal Concept”. Franciscan Studies 41: 222–249.

Kirchhoff, Michael D. 2011. „Anti-representationalism: Not a Well-founded Theory of Cognition”. Res Cogitans: Journal of Philosophy 8 (2): 1–34.

Krokos, Jan. 2013. Odsłanianie intencjonalności. Stare Kościeliska: Liberi Libri.

Locatelli, Roberta i Keith A. Wilson. „Introduction: Perception Without Representation”. Topoi 36 (2): 197–212. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11245-017-9460-1.

Łagosz, Marek. 2000. „Pewne ockhamowskie sposoby wykazywania nieistnienia”. Przegląd Filozoficzny 9 (4): 87–103.

Martin, Gottfried. 1968. General Metaphysics: Its Problems and Methods. Tłum. Daniel J. O’Connor. London: George Allen & Unwin.

Ockham, Guillelmus de 1980. Quodlibeta Septem. W: Opera Theologica. T. 4, red. Gedeon Gál, 1-782. St. Bonaventure, NY: The Franciscan Institute.

Ockham, Guillelmus de. 1967–1988. Opera Philosophica et Theologica. T. 1–17, red. Philotheus Boehner, Gedeon Gál i in. St. Bonaventure, NY: The Franciscan Institute.

Ockham, Guillelmus de. 1970. Quaestiones in Librum Secundum Sententiarum. Reportatio. W: Opera Theologica. T. 2, red. Gedeon Gál i Rega Wood, 3–482. St. Bonaventure, NY: The Franciscan Institute.

Ockham, Guillelmus de. 1977. Quaestiones in Librum Tertium Sententiarum. Reportatio. W: Opera Theologica. T. 3, red. Gedeon Gál i Rega Wood, 3–428. St. Bonaventure, NY: The Franciscan Institute.

Ockham, Guillelmus de. 1978. Expositio in Libros Praedicamentorum Aristotelis. W: Opera Philosophica. T. 2, red. Gedeon Gál i Stephen Brown, 135–339. St. Bonaventure, NY: The Franciscan Institute.

Ockham, Guillelmus de. 1984. Quaestiones Variae. W: Opera Philosophica. T. 8, red. Gedeon Gál i Rega Wood, 3–450. St. Bonaventure, NY: The Franciscan Institute.

Ockham, Wilhelm. 1971. Suma logiczna. Tłum. Tadeusz Włodarczyk. Red. Irena Tarnowska. Warszawa: PWN.

Ockham, William. 1957. Summa Logicae. Red. Philotheus Boehner. St. Bonaventure, NY: The Franciscan Institute.

Olivi, Petrus Ioannis. 1922. Quaestiones in secundum librum Sententiarum. W: Opera omnia. T. 3, red. Bernhard Jansen, 1–764. Quaracchi: Collegium S. Bonaventurae.

Panaccio, Claude. 2004. Ockham on Concepts. Aldershot: Ashgate.

Panaccio, Claude. 2017. Mental Language: From Plato to William of Ockham. New York: Fordham University Press.

Panaccio, Claude i Jenny Pelletier, red. 2025. Ockham’s «Summa Logicae»: A Critical Guide. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Pasnau, Robert. 1997. Theories of Cognition in the Later Middle Ages. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Perler, Dominik. 2002. Theorien der Intentionalität im Mittelalter. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann.

Perler, Dominik. 2022. „Ockham on Memory and Double Intentionality”. Topoi 41: 133–142. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11245-020-09728-9.

Spruit, Leen. 1994. Species intelligibilis: From Perception to Knowledge. T. 1: Classical Roots and Medieval Discussions. Leiden: Brill.

Steiner, Pierre. 2014. „Enacting Anti-representationalism: The Scope and the Limits of Enactive Critiques of Representationalism”. Avant 5 (2): 43–86.

Thomas Aquinas. 1888–1906. Summa Theologiae. Roma: Commissio Leonina.