(Pseudo)eksperckość (pseudo)filozoficzna

Piotr Paszkowski

doi:10.18290/rf25732.5

Published : 2025-06-30

Vol. 73 No. 2 (2025)

(Pseudo)Philosophical (Pseudo)Expertise

Piotr Paszkowski

https://orcid.org/0000-0002-0108-3552

DOI: https://doi.org/10.18290/rf25732.5

Abstract

Although the term “pseudophilosophy” is rarely used in subject literature, the accusation behind it – namely, the accusation of “not being a true philosopher” – is a phenomenon worth attention. In this article, I analyze three contemporary concepts of pseudophilosophy (Rescher, Merrill, and Moberger). I note that they share a common structure, and thus face similar problems, which I describe later (the problem of “bad philosophy” and the issue of uninformative criteria). I then present my own proposal for overcoming the impasse in the discussion of pseudophilosophy – namely, a shift away from classic investigations into the essence of philosophy and a focus instead on the expectations regarding the social role of a philosopher. I argue that framing the issue of pseudophilosophy in terms of (pseudo)expertise enables such explication of assumptions underlying the accusation of pseudophilosophy, which remained hidden within previous approaches.

Keywords:

pseudo-philosophy, expertise, pseudo-expertise, metaphilosophy, social role

Details

References

Statistics

Authors

Download files

pdf (Język Polski)

Altmetric indicators

Cited by / Share

Licence

This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License.

References

Coady, David. (2012). What to believe now: applying epistemology to contemporary issues. Hoboken: John Wiley & Sons.

Croce, Michel (2019). „On what it takes to be an expert”. Philosophical Quarterly 69: 1–21.

Defoort, Carine. (2001). „Is There Such a Thing as Chinese Philosophy? Arguments of an Implicit Debate”. Philosophy East and West 51 (3): 393–413.

Frankfurt, Harry G. (1988). „On Bullshit”. W: The Importance of What We Care About: Philosophical Essays, 117–133. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Fuhrer, Joffrey, Cova, Florian, Gauvrit, Nicolas, Dieguez, Sebastian. (2021). „Pseudoexpertise: A Conceptual and Theoretical Analysis”. Frontiers in Psychology 12: 1–12.

Gildea, Niall. (2019). Jacques Derrida’s Cambridge Affair: Deconstruction, Philosophy and Institutionality. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield International.

Goldman, Alvin I. (2018). „Expertise”. Topoi 37: 3–10.

Goldman, Alvin I. (2021). Wiedza a świat społeczny. Tłum. Adam Grobler. Warszawa: Państwowe Wydawnictwo Naukowe.

Hadot, Pierre (2018). Czym jest filozofia starożytna? Tłum. Piotr Domański. Warszawa: Aletheia.

Merrill, Gary H. (2021). False Wisdom: The Principles and Practice of Pseudo-philosophy. B.m.w.: Bowker.

Moberger, Victor (2020). „Bullshit, Pseudoscience and Pseudophilosophy”. Theoria 86 (5): 595–611.

Ou-Yang, Min (2012). „There is No Need for Zhongguo Zhexue to be Philosophy”. Asian Philosophy 22 (3): 199–223.

Perzanowski, Jerzy (1989). Jak filozofować? Studia z metodologii filozofii. Warszawa: Państwowe Wydawnictwo Naukowe.

Quine, Willard V.O. (1986). „List do Roberta Ostermanna”. W: Granice wiedzy i inne eseje filozoficzne, red. Willard V. O Quine, 176–179. Warszawa: Państwowy Instytut Wydawniczy.

Rescher, Nicholas (1995). „Pseudo-philosophy”. W: The Oxford Companion to Philosophy, red. Ted Honderich, 765. New York: Oxford University Press.

Rescher, Nicholas (2014). Metaphilosophy: Philosophy in Philosophical Perspective. Lanham: Lexington Books.

Schopenhauer, Arthur (1965). On the Basis of Morality. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill.

Timmenga, Friso (2024). „Academic Philosophy: A Way of Life?” Pli: The Warwick Journal of Philosophy 35: 47–72.

The Times (1992). „List otwarty przeciw nadaniu Jaquesowi Derridzie tytułu honoris causa Uniwersytetu w Cambridge”. 14.10.2024. https://ontology.buffalo.edu/smith/varia/Derrida_Letter.htm.