Published : 2024-12-30

Beyond the Dichotomy of Morality and Legalism. Habermas on Autonomy in the Democratic Rule of Law

Abstract

This article reconstructs Habermas’s idea of civic autonomy from the perspective of its relation to morality and legalism. These two points of reference imply two distinct normative orders: the first is based on personal dispositions that enable proper judgements of conscience; the second draws legitimacy from legally binding, codified norms. The theoretical context for civic autonomy is determined by the law-making procedures in the modern democratic state of law, in which traditional value orientations are no longer considered as sources of collective integration. Pointing to the basic elements of these procedures helps to identify the legitimate sources of binding law, namely people’s innate capacities for rational self-determination, both individually and collectively. These are inseparable components of civic autonomy: private and public. Habermas coordinates them in the law-making procedure and points to their co-originality.

Keywords:

morality, law, autonomy, discourse, law-making procedure, Habermas



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Roczniki Filozoficzne · ISSN 0035-7685 | eISSN 2450-002X
© Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL & Katolicki Uniwersytet Lubelski Jana Pawła II

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