Czy phrónēsis jest jedną z wielu praktycznych umiejętności?

Natasza Szutta

doi:10.18290/rf24722.25

Published : 2024-06-28

Vol. 72 No. 2 (2024)

Is Phrónēsis One of Many Practical Skills?

Natasza Szutta

https://orcid.org/0000-0002-4114-927X

DOI: https://doi.org/10.18290/rf24722.25

Abstract

This article contributes to the currently lively debate over the existence of practical wisdom. From the beginning of ethics, phrónêsis has been understood as one of the most important virtues. In contemporary ethics, due to situationists’ critique (ethicists strongly inspired by the findings in the field of social psychology), the existence of virtues, including phrónêsis, has been questioned. One of the strategies to overcome the situationist criticism is to perceive virtues as practical skills at an expert level (such as virtuosic skills in playing a musical instrument), the existence of which no one questions.

The autor demonstrates similarities and differences between practical skills and virtues. She refers to the conception of phrónêsis as a specific virtue that serves many different functions. She wonders whether the strategy of defending traditionally understood virtue as a practical skill at an expert level is sufficiently justified and whether it is not a kind of hard to accept reductionism.

Keywords:

moral wisdom, phrónêsis, skills, virtues, moral experts

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