Transcendentalne Argumenty Roberta Lockie’go przeciw determinizmowi

Robert Koszkało

doi:10.18290/rf24722.22

Published : 2024-06-28

Vol. 72 No. 2 (2024)

Robert Lockie’s Transcendental Arguments against Determinism

Robert Koszkało

https://orcid.org/0000-0003-1248-6792

DOI: https://doi.org/10.18290/rf24722.22

Abstract

In the paper, I first discuss the main theses of R. Lockie’s epistemology, which is based on deontological internalism, doxastic anti-voluntarism and metaphysical externalism. Then I present his concept of freedom, understood in terms of self-determination, and point out a number of problems to which this concept leads. In the next section I attempt to show why his transcendental arguments for the existence of freedom from the determist critique are ineffective. One of the main conclusions of the analyzes is the metaphilosophical condition that must be met by a correct transcendental argument for a given philosophical thesis from the criticism of the opposite position

Keywords:

Robert Lockie, deontic internalism, self-determinism, determinism, freedom, transcendental arguments

Details

References

Statistics

Authors

Download files

pdf (Język Polski)

Altmetric indicators

Cited by / Share

Licence

This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License.

References

Alston, William. 1989. Epistemic Justification: Essays in the Theory of Knowledge. Ithaca, London: Cornell University Press.

Bobzien, Susanne. 2000. „Did Epicurus Discover the Free-Will Problem?” Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 19: 297–337.

Chevarie-Cossette, Simon-Pierre. 2019. „Is Free Will Scepticism Self-Defeating?”. European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 15 (2): 55–77.

Elzein, Nadine, i Tuomas K. Pernu. 2019. „ To be able to, or to be able not to? That is the Question: A Problem for the Transcendental Argument for Freedom.”. European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 15 (2): 13–2.

Honderich, Ted. 1990. A Theory of Determinism. Vol. 1: Mind and Brain. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Knaster, Stephen M. 1986. „How the Self-Defeating Argument Against Determinism Defeats Itself”. Dialogue 25: 239–244.

Lockie, Robert. 2018. Free Will and Epistemology: A Defence of the Transcendental Argument for Freedom. London, Oxford, New York: Bloomsbury Academic.

Strawson, Peter Frederick. 1962. „Freedom and Resentment”. Proceedings of the British Academy 48: 1–25.

Strawson, Peter Frederick. 1966. The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. London: Methuen.

Stroud, Barry. 1968. „Transcendental Arguments”. Journal of Philosophy 65: 241-256.

Zanetti, Luca. 2019. „Determinism and Judgment: A Critique of the Indirect Epistemic Transcendental Argument for Freedom”. European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 15 (2): 33–54.