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Is Deterministic Naturalism Compatible with Rational Belief Based on Reasoning? The Dispute between Peter Van Inwagen and C.S. Lewis
Abstract
In his book Miracles, Clive Staples Lewis formulated an antinaturalistic argument, which he called the cardinal difficulty of naturalism. This difficulty lies in the fact that if we accept naturalism with the principle of causal closure, all beliefs are facts whose existence can be fully explained by the past state of the universe and its transformations governed by the laws of physics. Naturalism is a position that consists of beliefs, and if it aspires to be evaluated as a rational position, it should be accepted based on reasoning. However, this seems to be ruled out by naturalism itself.
In 2011, Peter Van Inwagen critiqued Lewis’s argument, suggesting that it relies on an unjustified thesis that causal explanations as such and explanations through reasoning are mutually exclusive. The paper examines the arguments of both authors, closely analyzing Van Inwagen’s argument. I argue that, firstly, he did not justify the claim that the abovementioned thesis attributed to Lewis is actually a premise of his reasoning. Secondly, I present what it means to accept a particular belief both causally and through reasoning. Thirdly, I analyze Lewis’ text, showing that it supports the possibility of coherence between two different types of correct explanations. However, I argue that Lewis’ fundamental thesis is that naturalism leaves no room for insights that are part of reasoning and, therefore, excludes this coherence. Fourthly, I examine the example of Phoebe given by Van Inwagen and conclude that it is insufficient to establish the coherence of both explanations. In conclusion, Van Inwagen's article does not contain an argument challenging Lewis’ position.
Keywords:
C.S. Lewis, P. Van Inwagen, naturalism, principle of closure, cardinal difficulty of naturalism, reasoning, beliefDetails
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