The article discusses the issue of the origins of insight with reference to the classical ideas of insight in Gestalt psychology and the related philosophical concept of insight by Bernard J.F. Lonergan. They accept the view that insight is conditioned by the unconscious processes that prepare it. The thesis about the significant role of the unconscious in the emergence of insight requires a response to important problems raised by Stanisław Judycki in the context of epistemology when characterizing the unconscious: 1) does it make sense to assume the existence of unconscious mental states, inaccessible through introspection, which are nevertheless equipped with certain intentional content?; 2) does the operation of the unconscious as a mechanism of insight generation invalidate the self (autonomy) of the cognizer? The article presents arguments for such answers to the questions posed, which allow to maintain the theses on the genesis of insight presented by the classical conceptions of insight, i.e. it defends the intentionality of unconscious processes preparing insight and the non-destructive nature of unconscious insight-generating processes in relation to the self of the knower.
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Roczniki Filozoficzne · ISSN 0035-7685 | eISSN 2450-002X
© Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL & Katolicki Uniwersytet Lubelski Jana Pawła II
Articles are licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International (CC BY-NC-ND 4.0)