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Libertarianism, Individual Rights, and the Paradox of Deontology: Rejoinder to Dominiak and Wysocki on Minarchism
Abstract
Dominiak and Wysocki criticise the minarchist position as being based on the simple fallacy of trying to combine irreconcilable positions: that the violation of rights is impermissible and that the existence of the state (which by its very nature violates rights) is permissible. In this text I argue that the minarchist position should be conceptualised in terms of a deontological paradox, which makes it far from trivial. I then outline an argument suggesting that in a particular version of the deontological paradox, where the choice is between a minimal state that produces fewer violations and anarcho-capitalism that produces more violations, libertarians might be inclined to think that it is permissible to violate the non-aggression principle. In conclusion, I argue that there is no obstacle to considering minarchism as a full-fledged part of libertarianism, although this depends on theoretical-empirical arguments showing that anarcho-capitalism would produce more violations of individual rights than a minimal state.
Keywords:
libertarianism, paradox of deontology, minarchism, anarcho-capitalism, rightsDetails
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