Aristotle on the Real Object of Philia and Aretē

Maciej Smolak

doi:10.18290/rf24721.7

Published : 2024-03-27

Vol. 72 No. 1 (2024)

Aristotle on the Real Object of Philia and Aretē

Maciej Smolak

https://orcid.org/0000-0002-4595-5068

DOI: https://doi.org/10.18290/rf24721.7

Abstract

In the opening remark of Nicomachean Ethics VIII 1 Aristotle notices that the next step would be a discussion of philia, since it is a certain aretē or is associated with aretē (NE VIII 1 1155a 1–2). This article is an attempt to determine how the real object of philia and aretē are related from Aristotle’s point of view. The author performs a study into two sections. The first section is focused on the analysis of aretē and its various types, in particular the human one. The second section is concentrated on the typology of philia, namely friendship and its particular kinds. The author shows that the relation between philia and aretē can be described in two ways: if both philia and aretē play the crucial role in leading a eudaimonic life, then philia is the aretological friendship and aretē—the human one, namely the whole consists of the aretē of character in the full sense and the practical wisdom on condition that the aretological friends equate eudaimonia with life focused on the political or practical activity, or even of the theoretical wisdom, providing that they identify it with the highest form of eudaimonic life, that is, the theoretical one. If, however, philia is to be a term said in many ways (pleonachōs legetai) and aretē is to be understood in a broad sense, that is, as “being good at something”, then philia can signify every kind of friendship, namely the aretological, the hedonistic and the utilitarian one, whereas aretē—qualification or skill that makes these friendships perform their functions well. The first possibility is that the relation between philia and aretē is limited to the aretological friendship at the expense of narrowing the meaning of aretē to the human one. The second possibility is that every kind of friendship is considered as the functional thing and, in consequence, defined by their proper function. From this point of view, all friendships are accompanied by appropriate aretai, namely by qualifications or skills that guarantee the perfect fulfillment of their proper function and, therefore, the achievement of the set goal by two persons in question.

Keywords:

Aristotle, aretē, eudaimonia, philia, friendship, person of excellence

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