Published : 2023-12-28

An (Un)equal Arguments Exchange

Abstract

In his book Między ukryciem a jawnością. Esej z filozofii religii i teologii filozoficznej [Between Hiddenness and Openness: An Essay in the Philosophy of Religion and Philosophical Theology] Jacek Wojtysiak takes up the issue of divine hiddenness. In the opening chapters he enters into a polemic with the argument of J.L. Schellenberg, who from the existence of reasonable unbelief draws the conclusion that God does not exist. In order to neutralize this argument, Wojtysiak reverses it, constructing an argument for the existence of God from the fact of the existence of reasonable believers, and then strengthens it to an argument from the great fact of faith (and its subsequent versions). I argue that Wojtysiak’s reversed arguments (from reasonable believers and from the great fact of faith) are not symmetrical to the initial argument from reasonable non-believers, because they are weaker. I point out that some of Wojtysiak’s arguments can be reversed by an atheist. I also raise the point that the conclusion of Wojtysiak’s final arguments is not satisfactory to a theist.

Keywords:

reasonable non-believer [nonresistant nonbeliever], reasonable believer, great fact of faith, reversal of an argument, argument to the best explanation



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Roczniki Filozoficzne · ISSN 0035-7685 | eISSN 2450-002X
© Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL & Katolicki Uniwersytet Lubelski Jana Pawła II


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