Mindreading in the Animal Kingdom: Philosophical Controversies

Anna Dutkowska; Zbigniew Wróblewski

doi:10.18290/rf.2018.66.3-5

Published : 2018-09-24

Vol. 66 No. 3 (2018)

Mindreading in the Animal Kingdom: Philosophical Controversies

Anna Dutkowska

Zbigniew Wróblewski

DOI: https://doi.org/10.18290/rf.2018.66.3-5

Abstract

The central issue in the debate on animal minds is the issue of mindreading. This complicated cognitive ability belongs to the key elements of social cognition—as a form of adapting to specific circumstances connected with living in groups, it enables the reading of the mental states of other individuals, e.g. intentions, desires, and beliefs as well as the adaptation of one’s own behavior to this information. The primary purpose of the article is to present the main philosophical controversies which arise in the discussion of whether this ability can be attributed to animals; if so, then to what extent. Philosophical discussions concentrate on methodological issues: alternative interpretational models of animal behavior (mindreading vs reading behavior), anthropomorphism, experimental protocols, and gradeability of mindreading as well as the nature of the mind (thinking).

Keywords:

mindreading, animal minds, anthropomorphism

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Dutkowska, A., & Wróblewski, Z. (2018). Mindreading in the Animal Kingdom: Philosophical Controversies. Roczniki Filozoficzne, 66(3), 101–122. https://doi.org/10.18290/rf.2018.66.3-5

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Anna Dutkowska

dutkowska.anna@gmail.com

Affiliation:

John Paul II Catholic University of Lublin Poland

Zbigniew Wróblewski

zbyl.wroblewski@gmail.com

Affiliation:

John Paul II Catholic University of Lublin Poland