Once More about Moore’s Paradox in Epistemic Logic and Belief Change Theory

Marek Lechniak

doi:10.18290/rf.2018.66.3-4

Published : 2018-09-24

Vol. 66 No. 3 (2018)

Once More about Moore’s Paradox in Epistemic Logic and Belief Change Theory

Marek Lechniak

DOI: https://doi.org/10.18290/rf.2018.66.3-4

Abstract

In this article, it was first presented Moore’s paradox per se and after the author focused on the logical perspective—at first he analyzed these considerations in the field of so-called standard epistemic logic and after on the formal theory of belief change.

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Moore’s paradox, epistemic logic, belief change theory

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Lechniak, M. (2018). Once More about Moore’s Paradox in Epistemic Logic and Belief Change Theory. Roczniki Filozoficzne, 66(3), 77–99. https://doi.org/10.18290/rf.2018.66.3-4

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