Objections to Computationalism: A Survey

Marcin Miłkowski

doi:10.18290/rf.2018.66.3-3

Published : 2018-09-24

Vol. 66 No. 3 (2018)

Objections to Computationalism: A Survey

Marcin Miłkowski

DOI: https://doi.org/10.18290/rf.2018.66.3-3

Abstract

In this paper, the Author reviewed the typical objections against the claim that brains are computers, or, to be more precise, information-processing mechanisms. By showing that practically all the popular objections are based on uncharitable (or simply incorrect) interpretations of the claim, he argues that the claim is likely to be true, relevant to contemporary cognitive (neuro) science, and non-trivial.

Keywords:

computationalism, computational theory of mind, representation, computation, modeling

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Miłkowski, M. (2018). Objections to Computationalism: A Survey. Roczniki Filozoficzne, 66(3), 57–75. https://doi.org/10.18290/rf.2018.66.3-3

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