Socratic Wisdom: Midwives, Mentors, and a Broader Understanding of Epistemic Goods

Dominik Jarczewski

doi:10.18290/rf26741.7

Data publikacji : 2026-03-25

Tom 74 Nr 1 (2026)

Mądrość sokratyczna. Położne, mentorzy i poszerzone rozumienie dóbr epistemicznych

Dominik Jarczewski

https://orcid.org/0000-0001-9359-620X

DOI: https://doi.org/10.18290/rf26741.7

Abstrakt

W artykule argumentuję za bardziej zniuansowanym rozumieniem dóbr epistemicznych i ich oceny poprzez analizę roli mentorów w społecznościach epistemicznych, ze szczególnym uwzględnieniem Sokratesa. Podczas gdy tradycyjne oceny epistemiczne kładą nacisk na wytwarzanie wiedzy, niektóre podmioty epistemiczne przyczyniają się do epistemicznego dobrostanu swoich społeczności w sposób, który nie prowadzi bezpośrednio do wytwarzania tych standardowych dóbr. Na przykład podstawową rolą Sokratesa nie było wytwarzanie wiedzy, lecz bycie mentorem, który prowadził i kształcił innych. Aby uchwycić epistemiczne znaczenie takich postaci, proponuję rozróżnienie między „produktowymi” dobrami epistemicznymi a dobrami zorientowanymi na osoby. Wprowadzam zniuansowane rozumienie wartości epistemicznej, wiążąc ją z epistemicznym dobrostanem społeczności oraz różnymi sposobami jego poprawy.

Słowa kluczowe:

mądrość, Sokrates, wartości epistemiczne, epistemologia nieidealna, wspólnota epistemiczna

Szczegóły

Bibliografia

Statystyki

Autorzy

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Zasady cytowania

Jarczewski, D. (2026). Mądrość sokratyczna. Położne, mentorzy i poszerzone rozumienie dóbr epistemicznych. Roczniki Filozoficzne, 74(1), 149–167. https://doi.org/10.18290/rf26741.7

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Utwór dostępny jest na licencji Creative Commons Uznanie autorstwa – Użycie niekomercyjne – Bez utworów zależnych 4.0 Międzynarodowe.

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