Published : 2026-09-30

Intuition versus Formulas. Do We Have an Intuition about the Laws of Physics?

Abstract

The aim of this article is to analyse the question of whether we have an intuitive understanding of the laws of physics, i.e. how explanations of simple physical phenomena based on common sense intuitions compare to explanations based on Newton’s laws of physics. A study was conducted on a group of 74 undergraduate students in the form of a test in which they had to solve 10 elementary physics problems concerning phenomena known from everyday experience. They had to select the correct answer and provide a brief justification. It turns out that in most cases, the answers given were grossly inconsistent with the laws of elementary physics, which, theoretically speaking, each of the respondents should have known. An attempt was made to answer the question about the reasons for the discrepancy between explanations based on common sense intuitions and explanations based on the laws of classical physics. The probable causes of misunderstanding simple physical phenomena included the use of heuristics, the use of physical terminology, especially the concept of force, in a manner inconsistent with the definitions of the relevant physical concepts and, moreover, burdened with anthropomorphism, the contextuality of interpretation, the use of mental models, and the phenomenon of the illusion of intuitiveness.

Keywords:

naive physics, Newton’s laws, heuristics, intuition



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Łukasik, A. (2026). Intuition versus Formulas. Do We Have an Intuition about the Laws of Physics?. Roczniki Filozoficzne, 74(3), 207–226. https://doi.org/10.18290/rf26743.9

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Roczniki Filozoficzne · ISSN 0035-7685 | eISSN 2450-002X
© Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL & Katolicki Uniwersytet Lubelski Jana Pawła II

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