Bóg a wiedza moralna. W odpowiedzi Profesorowi Stanisławowi Judyckiemu

Artur Szutta

doi:10.18290/rf24722.7

Published : 2024-06-28

Vol. 72 No. 2 (2024)

God and Moral Knowledge: In Reply to Professor Stanisław Judycki

Artur Szutta

https://orcid.org/0000-0002-1062-4808

DOI: https://doi.org/10.18290/rf24722.7

Abstract

The paper is a response to Stanisław Judycki’s argument from the inverted axiological spectrum for the necessity of invoking Divine commands in the justification of our moral beliefs. It consists of three parts. In the first part, I present Judycki’s argument from the inverted axiological spectrum and his reference to God’s commands to justify our moral beliefs. In the second part, I formulate the objection that Judycki commits to the fallacy of circularity. In the third part, I offer an alternative theistic justification of our moral beliefs, according to which we can refer to God as the one who created us in a way that allows us to use a reliable faculty of moral cognition.

Keywords:

God, moral knowledge, argument from the inverted axiological spectrum, God’s commands, theism, moral skepticism, alternative theistic justification of our moral beliefs

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