Radical Conventionalism and Hinge Epistemology

Adam Grobler

doi:10.18290/rf24721.4

Published : 2024-03-27

Vol. 72 No. 1 (2024)

Radical Conventionalism and Hinge Epistemology

Adam Grobler

https://orcid.org/0000-0002-3400-4494

DOI: https://doi.org/10.18290/rf24721.4

Abstract

In the paper I explore some hints one can find in an updated version of Ajdukiewicz’s radical conventionalism that may help to resolve some controversies within hinge epistemology, i.e. a family of positions that invoke Wittgenstein’s idea of groundless grounds of knowledge. In particular I put into doubt whether there is a real difference between pragmatic and transcendental justification of hinges, I reject epistemological disjunctivism, and I argue for anti-realistic reading of truth in a context determined by particular hinges while retaining the classical notion of truth as a regulative idea of knowledge that governs the possible revisions of hinges.

Keywords:

epistemological disjunctivism, hinge epistemology, radical conventionalism, pragmatic justification, transcendental justification, truth as a regulative idea, truth in a context

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