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THE IMPACT OF ANTI-RUSSIAN SANCTIONS ON  
THE SOCIO-ECONOMIC SITUATION IN TAJIKISTAN  
(THE FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR)\*

**Abstract.** Since the invasion of Ukraine on 24th February 2022, Russia has faced unprecedented economic sanctions imposed by the West. The EU has implemented nine sanction packages against the aggressor since the beginning of the war, with the aim of destabilising the Russian financial sector, its trading system, logistics and energy cooperation agreements. Not only the EU, but also the USA have imposed a number of economic restrictions against Russia. As long as the Western sanctions are in place, the macroeconomic indicators in the Russian Federation are expected to fall yearly and the country will slide into a long-term crisis. The poorest countries of Central Asia, critically reliant on Russian support, have found themselves in dire straits. This article analyses the impact of anti-Russian sanctions on the socio-economic situation in the Republic of Tajikistan.

**Keywords:** anti-Russian sanctions; Tajikistan; economy; poverty level.

INTRODUCTION

Since the invasion of Ukraine on 24th February 2022, Russia has faced unprecedented economic sanctions imposed by the West. The EU has since implemented nine sanction packages against the aggressor then, with the aim of destabilising the Russian financial sector, its trading system, logistics and energy cooperation agreements. Apart from the EU, the USA, United Kingdom,

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Canada and other countries have also imposed economic restrictions on Russia. Russia's economic isolation from the international markets has forced many companies to suspend their operations and disrupted supply chains from the first days of the war. The insecurity of global trading businesses has also increased dramatically.

The poorest countries of Central Asia, critically reliant on Russian support, have found themselves in a very difficult economic situation. This article analyses the impact of the Russia–Ukraine war on the socio-economic situation in the Republic of Tajikistan.

The article employs a case study methodology. In the economic analysis, we used the case study method to analyze documents, which involved using information gathered previously for social and economic policy purposes (reports, studies) and by institutions specializing in their collection and production for scientific purposes – reports, studies, analyses. We focused on whether the collected documents were reliable from a scientific point of view, whether the information contained therein was up-to-date, and whether it was complete. The documents we used are from the National Bank of Tajikistan, numerous reports from the World Bank, the Asian Development Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and rating agencies. Both in Poland and worldwide, it is difficult to find scientific materials analysing the impact of the 2022 anti-Russian sanctions on the socio-economic situation of Tajikistan. This article aims to fill this gap.

## 1. THE CONDITION OF THE RUSSIAN ECONOMY UNDER THE WESTERN SANCTIONS

The Western sanctions imposed on the Russian Federation after its invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 (CoE, 2022) have led to a number of disruptions in the country's economy. As a result of the restrictions, the following areas have been affected:

- The financial sector: Russia's access to the international financial market was limited, which caused problems with refinancing its international debts (Bankier, 2022); as a result of Russia's drop in investment credibility (Moody's, 2022a) foreign investors lost confidence in the Russian financial market. In only the first stage of the war over a thousand companies with a global reach decided to exit or temporarily limit their operations in Russia (Yale School of Management, 2022).
- The energy sector: cutting off the supply of western equipment and technology in the case of the oil and gas industry, withdrawal of international energy corporations from projects being carried out in Russia before the war (BP, 2022), and

the USA and EU import bans on Russian energy resources (Kulovic, 2022) will have serious consequences for the Russian economy, which is based on raw materials. The fall in the extraction and export of oil will rock the federal budget, 60% of which has in the past years consisted of revenues from oil and gas.

- The import and manufacturing of high-tech equipment (electronics, microelectronics, telecommunication, IT, automotive and mechanical engineering technology). The dependence of Russian companies on imported software was estimated at 68% (*Cifrovaja transformacija*, 2022).

In 2022, disruptions to the supply chains were the biggest issue for small and medium-sized companies in Russia. According to the assessments in the report *Monitoring the Current State of Russian Business*, 86.8% of Russian companies were sanctioned. Representatives of the small and medium-sized businesses evaluate the current situation negatively, as it forces the employers to reduce the size of enterprises and the number of employees (*Bol'she poloviny biznesmenov schitajut*, 2022). Only in the first month of the war, 98 thousand people lost their jobs with uncertain prospects of ever returning to work (*Golikova soobshhila o roste chisla*, 2022). The situation is further complicated by the low unemployment benefits in Russia (from 1.5 to 12 thousand roubles per month) (Diduh, 2023), and the fact that most people have no savings (Starostina, 2022). The state, which controls around 70% of the Russian economy, will not allow mass redundancies because they could become a catalyst for social protest as living conditions worsen. However, it is likely that the government will attempt to reduce salaries, offer part-time employment or unpaid leave. In November 2022, after 10 months of the sanction shock, the concern over Western restrictions diminished among Russian citizens. According to the reports of the Levada Centre, 19% of Russians express "serious concern" about the sanctions, while 20% are "worried about the Western sanctions" (Levada-Centr, 2022). The respondents say the most severe result of the sanctions is the high inflation rate (32%) and the lack of access to some imported products or spare parts (Levada-Centr, 2022).

As long as the western sanctions are in place, the macroeconomic indicators in the Russian Federation are expected to fall yearly. If they are extended further, the country will certainly slide into a long-term crisis. The withdrawal of foreign companies and capital is already paralysing the country's economy. Under the sanctions, the condition of the Russian energy sector will also worsen dramatically and, as a result, Moscow will lose its current position on the EU's energy resources market along with the lion's share of export revenues, which have so far been fuelling the federal budget.

## 2. TAJIKISTAN'S ECONOMIC CONDITIONS

Tajikistan is the southernmost post-Soviet republic, bordering Afghanistan, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan. 93% of its territory is mountainous. Tajikistan is one of the poorest countries among the former USSR republics, with underdeveloped industry and GDP at the level of 8.2 billion USD (data for 2020) (World Bank, 2022). Unresolved socio-economic problems, which the country has been struggling with for the past three decades, mean that today 26.3% (World Bank, 2020), out of 9.5 million citizens (World Bank, 2023) live in conditions below poverty level. Tajikistan is an agricultural country, relying mainly on cotton cultivation. Water resources from glaciers, rivers, lakes and groundwater reservoirs play a key role in the country's economy. Abundant water resources are also the main source of energy in Tajikistan – over 95% of electricity is produced in hydro-power stations (Ministerstvo jenergetiki, 2023).


After the collapse of the USSR, Tajikistan entered a stage of deep economic crisis, as a result of breaking ties with the former Soviet republics and a couple of years of bloody civil war (1992–1997). In these circumstances, it was necessary for Tajikistan to seek protection from a stronger country, which would save it from a political and economic downfall. The obvious choice was Russia, which has since made Tajikistan more and more dependent on it. Tajikistan in its current state (economy, political institutions) is the result of Russian policy in the region of Central Asia. Tajikistan's dependency on Russia for the last three decades has, on the one hand, saved it from a total collapse, but on the other, has not allowed economic and political development of this middle-Asian republic (Lang, 2016). The reasons for Russia's involvement in Tajikistan are mainly geopolitical, not economic. Tajikistan's dependence on Russia is to some extent limited by the increasing, mainly economic engagement of China. Its influences in Tajikistan are not at variance with Russian interests, and in many cases they even complement them. Russia offers the citizens of Tajikistan the opportunity for labour migration and provides energy security guarantees. Unlike Russia, China offers Tajikistan loans and investments, i.e. creates positive impulses for cooperation (Lang, 2016).

Tajikistan's small and underdeveloped economy, authoritarian government, lack of incentives for modernisation, serious social problems and civilization decline are the main issues that the country has not been able to resolve since it regained its independence. Its economy is controlled by an authoritarian government led by Emomali Rahmon (since 1994) and his family. Rahmon's many relatives took complete control over the country and monopolised all sectors

of the economy, gaining profits from the enterprises under their supervision. Being in charge of 80% of the country's economic resources, Rahmon's regime also managed to take control of the law-enforcement bodies. Direct involvement of Rahmon's entourage and law enforcement agencies in drug transits from Afghanistan through Tajikistan as well as high levels of corruption are additional factors preventing the government from embarking on an economic and political transformation of the country (*Semejnaja imperija narkotrafika*, 2021).

As a result of the poorly developed economy, living conditions, particularly in the countryside, are very poor. According to the World Bank data (2020), at the turn of the century 83% of Tajiks lived in conditions below poverty level (World Bank 2020, October 15). Even now, this indicator is still quite high – at the level of 26.5% (CABAR, 2019). In recent years, Tajikistan was the poorest country in the Commonwealth of Independent States with 47% of citizens getting by on 1.33 USD per day and 17% on less than 0.85 USD per day (Republic of Tajikistan, 2018). According to independent Tajik experts, the poverty level in the republic reaches 62% (CABAR, 2019). Undernourishment among children and women remains a serious issue. Tajikistan has the highest percentage of children under five years of age with growth suppression (18%) in Europe and Central Asia (Sevimli and Jungbluth, 2022). The indicators of non-monetary poverty also remain high. The main reason for this is limited access to education, heating and sanitary facilities (World Bank, 2016).

Fig. 1. Poverty level in Tajikistan between 2013 and 2021




Source: World Bank, 2021a.

The income of Tajikistan's citizens comes mainly from external sources – labour migration and money transfers. Russia is the main destination for labour migrants from Tajikistan. Shared history, geographical proximity, knowledge of the language and simplified administration procedures make Russia particularly attractive for Central Asian citizens looking for work. The cities and regions with the most Tajik labour migrants are Moscow and the Moscow region, Sankt-Petersburg, Khanty-Mansi Autonomous Region and the following districts: Sverdlovsk, Kaluga, Samara, Novosibirsk, Tyumen and Volgograd (Rjazancev, 2016).

According to World Bank data, the percentage of labour migrants from Tajikistan reaches 10–12% of the whole population and 20–25% of working age citizens (from 18 to 40 years old), i.e. every fourth citizen of Tajikistan is a labour migrant. Among Tajiks under 30 years of age, around 40% or every second person seeks employment abroad. Recent data suggests that one out of eight citizens of Tajikistan lives and works in Russia (Hurrarov, 2021). In Russia, labour migrants from Tajikistan work mainly in the services sector (around 40%) and in the construction sector (30–40%) (Rjazancev, 2016) as well as in transport and agriculture. In the last decade, money transfers from labour migrants contributed from 50% (in 2012) (Kozlovskij, 2012) to 30% (in 2021) (Dadabaev, 2023) to Tajikistan's GDP, placing the republic among the top four countries in the world most dependent on such income (Chorshanbiev and Nadirov, 2019).

Fig. 2. Countries most dependent on migrant labour money transfers (GDP percentage in 2021)



Source: World Bank, 2021.

Some economists suggest that the data is highly understated, as the governmental data are based merely on official bank transfers, which make up a maximum of a third of all the incoming money transfers in the country. Most of the money gets into the country unofficially without being registered in any way (CABAR, 2022).

Money transferred by labour migrants is spent by 74% of households in Tajikistan on food (Rjazancev, 2016), thus solving the issue of family food supplies. Money transfers are the main source of income for Tajik society and allows a reduction in the risk of potential social unrest in the context of demographic growth. The high level of Tajikistan's economic dependency on labour migrants money transfers leads to a direct projection of Russia's economic crisis onto the republic – the weak condition of the Russian economy correlates with lower financial input from labour migrants. The effects of Russian economic crises in 2008, 2014 and 2020 (and the ensuing world economic crisis, drop in oil prices and structural economic problems in Russia as well as the COVID-19 pandemic) were extremely noticeable in Tajikistan's economy. In the first months of the pandemic, temporary job loss among the labour migrants were very common (World Bank, 2021b). As a consequence of the reduction in money transfers from Russia to Tajikistan by 80 million USD, i.e. by 50% between March and mid-April 2020 (Chorshanбиеv and Jemomali, 2020) food consumption by the Tajiks fell two-fold. According the Russian Central Bank, in 2020 Tajik labour migrants sent 1.741 billion USD to the country, i.e. 759 million USD less than in 2019 (Bank of Russia, 2023).

### 3. SOCIO-ECONOMIC SITUATION IN TAJIKISTAN IN 2022

#### **3.1 Tajikistan's society under the anti-Russian sanctions**


Three decades after regaining independence, Tajikistan is still economically dependent on Russia. Over a million Tajik migrants live and work in Russia and their money transfers remain the foundation of the country's economy. "As all previous financial crises have shown, including the last two years of COVID 19-related recession, any shocks affecting the Russian labour market have an after-shock in Tajikistan" (Kluczewska, 2022). The first sanctions against Russia, particularly the exclusion of Russian banks from the SWIFT system, led to delays in money transfers, a dramatic drop in the value of the Russian rouble on the currency market and equally dramatic rises in the prices of basic products. What is more, in the second half of February 2022 some regions in Russia introduced new laws for migrants, banning them from working in trade, gastronomy

and public transport. From March 5th, the Russian Central Bank limited money transfers for residents to 5 thousand roubles per month (*Chto izmenilos'*, 2022). At the end of March, a massive depreciation of the rouble against the somoni occurred, which had a negative impact on the situation of the migrants' families, already struggling with employment issues. As a result, in the first quarter of 2022, over 60 thousand Tajik migrants left Russia, i.e. 2.6 times more than in the same period of 2021 (Dzhuma, 2022). More and more Tajiks chose different destinations (*Tajikistan: Migrant Laborers*, 2023), rather than the traditional Russia for labour migration, with Germany, Turkey, Poland, Kazakhstan and United Arab Emirates among the most popular target countries (Shodiev, 2022).

Currency shocks had an even bigger impact on money transfers. The percentage of Tajik households receiving money transfers dropped by 23% in March as compared to January. The average transfer value also decreased. Taking inflation and currency exchange rates into account the value dropped by 57% in two months (*Kak sil'no*, 2022). Exact data on money transfers for 2022 is difficult to obtain, as both sides – Tajikistan (since 2014) and Russia (since the beginning of the armed conflict with Ukraine) – have stopped publishing any reports on the issue. The latest available data comes from the Russian Central Bank for 2021. That year, the total amount of individual money transfers from Russia to Tajikistan reached 1.8 billion USD, i.e. 3.4% more than in 2020. Over 76% of the transfers were made by Tajikistani citizens and around one quarter by Russian citizens or people living in Russia with a permit to stay (Bank of Russia, 2023). Another factor which makes it difficult to estimate the actual value of money transfers from labour migrants working in Russia is mass mobilisation announced in the third quarter of 2022, as a result of which millions of Russians left the country. The number of Russians who entered Tajikistan in 2022 rose by 212% year on year (*Potok rossijan*, 2023). Between July and September Russian citizens entered Tajikistan 103 thousand times (Zlobin, 2022). Analysts from the Asian Development Bank report a drop in money transfers by Armenian migrants in Russia in the first half of the year (Asian Development Bank, 2022a). They justify similar forecasts for the rest of 2022 by redundancies in those sectors of the Russian economy where Tajik migrants traditionally seek employment – in services and construction (Asian Development Bank, 2022b). In November 2022 (after the Russian mobilisation), the World Bank presented different data, forecasting that, in all likelihood, Tajikistan received record high money transfers in 2022 (KNOMAD, 2022). According to the authors of the report, the influx of money transfers into Tajikistan in 2022 could reach 3.2 billion USD, which moved the republic into the first place among countries with the highest percentage of money transfer in GDP (32% of GDP) (KNOMAD, 2022).



Fig. 3. Countries most dependent on money transfers from labour migrants  
(GDP percentage of money transfers in 2022)




Source: KNOMAD, 2022, p. 33.

In reaction to the changes in the international surroundings of Tajikistan, on October 17, 2022 the Moody's rating agency changed the rating perspectives for the republic to "negative". The decision complements a review, started on March 30, 2022, which indicated that a sudden and long-term deterioration of economic circumstances in Russia might lead to a permanent drop in Tajikistan's growth potential, particularly as a consequence of a significant decrease in money transfers, which will put pressure on external balances and financial stability. Moody's analysts point out that from the beginning of the review Tajikistan's economy has been somewhat resilient. At the same time, however, threats linked to the ongoing Russian-Ukrainian conflict remain the same, which reinforces the negative prognosis (Moody's, 2022b). In response to threats linked to the sanctions imposed on Russia, Tajikistan's government adopted and implemented a five-part anti-crisis programme, without revealing its details (Firuz, 2022).

### 3.2 Tajikistan's economy under the anti-Russian sanctions

In 2022, Tajikistan's GDP rose by 8% to 11.4 billion USD (*Rasshirenoe zasedanie*, 2023), which makes for the biggest growth indicator among the Central Asian countries (see Fig. 4).

Fig. 4. GDP for Central Asian countries in 2022




Source: Chorshanbiev, 2023a.

Tajikistan's government describes it as efforts to maintain stable macroeconomic indicators, decreasing the impact of potential threats on the country's economy, undisturbed functioning of the banking system, rise in the manufacturing of industrial and agricultural products, better investment climate and support for entrepreneurship (*Poslanie Prezidenta*, 2022). The International Monetary Fund attributes Tajikistan's unexpected economic growth to a huge growth in the industrial, agriculture and construction sectors (International Monetary Fund, 2023). Economists from the Eurasian Development Bank added positive export and money transfer dynamics to the main growth factors (Chorshanbiev, 2023a). The stabilisation of Tajikistan's economy in 2022 no doubt resulted from the relocation of Russian citizens due to the Ukrainian conflict and mass mobilisation (Olive, 2024). Such growth became possible due to more money transfers from Russia as well as a rise in internal demand, resulting from the mass influx of people. It was also the consequence of a low base, as Tajikistan's economy gained a high number of new consumers with a relatively good financial status by local standards.

From the economic point of view, Russia is one of Tajikistan's main trade partners – in recent years 20% of the country's external trade was with, and 30% of its imports came from, the Russian Federation. Eighty five percent of petroleum products are delivered from Russia on a preferential basis – without export duties. Russian assets make up for around 15% (1.7 billion USD) of the total value of foreign investment in Tajikistan's economy (Chorshanbiev, 2022a).

In 2022, trade cooperation between Tajikistan and Russia got more intense. According to Tajikistan's Central Bank, exports increased by 45% year on year, while imports rose by 35%. Nonetheless, the trade deficit with Russia reached over 1 billion USD. Official data shows that the total value of exports year on year increased only by 5.3%, which proves that Tajikistan did not re-export Russian goods onto the markets subjected to anti-Russian sanctions (National Bank of Tajikistan, 2023). The main markets for Tajikistan's products in 2022 were the following countries: Kazakhstan, (22.7% of total exports), China (18%) and Switzerland (17%). Imported goods came mainly from Russia (30.6%), Kazakhstan (17.5%) and China (17.7%), which means that Tajikistan became a key recipient of products that Russia could not sell on the European markets due to sanctions (National Bank of Tajikistan, 2023).

Fig. 5. Tajikistan's import structure by country 2022



Source: National Bank of Tajikistan 2023.

Exported goods included mineral products (cement, electricity, ore, concentrates, etc.) that made up about 41.8%; metals, precious and semiprecious stones – 24.7%; base metals (aluminium – 14.9%, textiles and textile products) – 13%. Main imported goods in 2022 included mineral products (petroleum products, liquified gas, coal, etc.) – 19.3%, machinery and equipment – 11.9%, base metals – 9.8%, chemical industry products – 9.6%, plant products – 9.3%, and ready-made food products – 8.9% (*Tadzhikistan uvelichil*, 2023)

Since the beginning of Russia's invasion of Ukraine, a couple of Eurasian Economic Union countries introduced seasonal limits on exporting some food products to countries outside the union, such as Tajikistan. Kazakhstan, a key wheat provider, reduced the deliveries to this mid-Asian republic, disrupting

its food security. Additionally, the average price of imported Kazakh wheat in Tajikistan rose by 39% in comparison with the previous year (Karaev, 2022). Although agriculture is the main sector of Tajikistan's economy (22% GDP), it is still poorly developed and the country depends on imported goods, which meet 75% of its nutritional needs. Tajikistan also imports over 50% of agricultural inputs, such as seeds, seedlings, thoroughbred animals, fertilisers and agricultural machinery. As a result of import limits and the increase in prices on the global markets, the cost of basic food products, mainly imported, rose in the first quarter of 2022, which had a particularly severe impact on the poor. Over the year consumer prices in 2022 increased in Tajikistan by 4.2%. Prices of food products rose by 5.2%, while non-food products increased in price by 4.0% in 2022. Prices of food products that increased the most were as follows: eggs (by 43.1%), vegetables (by 27.1%), milk (by 20.4%), poultry (by 6.3%) and bread (by 6.2%) (Chorshanbiev, 2023b). The level of real wages (considering the changes of prices indicator) dropped by 10.6%. Minimum wage, on the other hand, is 600 somoni (59 USD) (Chorshanbiev, 2022 b).

The National Bank of Tajikistan pointed out a number of factors, which might lead to significant rises in consumer prices in 2023. A 2023 financial policy forecast for Tajikistan states that the factors will arise mainly from external shocks – increase in global food and petrol prices. Around 60% of the Tajik consumer basket comprises imported products (National Bank of Tajikistan, 2022). The aforementioned factors, such as increase in food production prices, problems with importing food products, decrease in real wages and their already low level, will lead to increased poverty, particularly in the countryside, inhabited by 73% of the Tajikistan population. As a result, the unemployment rate might rise from 2.4% to 6%, while the poverty level might increase from 26.5% (2020) to 30% due to the external shock caused by the Russian invasion of Ukraine (Asian Development Bank, 2022b).

In the last 15 years Tajikistan has received around 11 billion USD in foreign investment, with almost 5 billion USD of direct investment. The assets came from 65 countries in the world, with the biggest shares from China, Russia, UK, USA and Kazakhstan. Almost one third of foreign investment flowing into Tajikistan between 2007–2021 came from China. According to the State Committee on Investment and State Property Management of Tajikistan (Goscominvest) Chinese assets were invested in such sectors of Tajikistan's economy as telecommunication, construction, financial services, geological and mining research, installation of technological equipment, industry and other services (Nadirov and Chorshanbiev, 2022). Apart from direct investment, China provides Tajikistan with loans for the implementation of various projects and offers financial

support free of charge in the form of grants. Russian investment activity in Tajikistan was high at the beginning of the 2000s, when some big projects were carried out. However, after that Russian investors started to gradually leave the country, despite the potential for cooperation. The reasons included corruption, poor rule of law, high taxes and an unfavourable business environment (*Pochemu inostrannye*, 2019). In the first half of 2022, the main investors in Tajikistan's economy were China, Luxembourg, Switzerland and UK (Panfilova, 2022). Lower Russian investment activity might be caused by its economic problems stemming from western sanctions. However, the investment forum between Russia and Tajikistan organised in Dushanbe in September 2022 might indicate that Moscow intends to compete for Tajikistan's market. The forum gave incentives for cooperation between the two countries on three promising investment projects (*Rossija i Tadžikistan*, 2022).

The anti-Russian sanctions had a negative impact on several sectors of Tajikistan's economy – mainly on the supply of petroleum products, vegetable oil and partially on the delivery of wheat. The restrictions were mostly felt by companies processing resources imported from Russia (AVESTA, 2022). The effects of the trade sanctions forced Tajikistan's government to diversify the delivery system – e.g. the import of sugar from Russia was replaced by deliveries from India. Potential new trade markets include Pakistan, Egypt, United Arab Emirates and Turkey (OZODI, 2022). Companies doing business with Russia often face difficulties with financial affairs, problems with logistics, supplies and interactions with their partners as well as disruptions in the functioning of their firms. Companies whose activity is not linked to Russia, point out issues related to consumer demands of Tajikistan's population (Chorshanbiev 2022c).

## CONCLUSIONS

In the first year of the Russian-Ukrainian war and the implementation of the anti-Russian sanctions, Tajikistan's economy showed resilience to external shocks. Despite international financial organisations' initial pessimistic forecasts on Tajikistan's macroeconomic indicators, the country recorded economic growth and kept inflation at a relatively low level. What is more, the country's trade turnover increased year on year. Russia remained the main supplier of goods and services to Tajikistan's market with a share of over 30%. The amount of money transfers flowing into the country most likely increased, too, but due to the lack of solid data it is impossible to estimate their value. It is also difficult to assume what percentage of the money transfers from Russia to Tajikistan can be assigned

to Russian citizens. The negative impacts of the anti-Russian sanctions were seen mainly in the dramatic rise in prices of basic food products, which was acutely felt by the poorest citizens. The import of vegetable oil and wheat was limited.

Although the negative consequences of anti-Russian sanctions have not been clearly noticeable in Tajikistan, it is difficult to say to what extent the country will be protected from the weakening of economic activity in Russia. As indicated by the experiences to date, economic crises in Russia have had a negative impact on the condition of Tajikistan's economy. Money transfers from Russia are closely correlated with Russian GDP – the higher the GDP, the higher the amounts of money transfers into Tajikistan. Prolonged sanctions against Russia might change the migration pattern and reduce money transfers from labour migrants in the medium and long-term, which will lead to a fall in living standards for Tajiks. “The government in Tajikistan will be anxious that their citizens continue to go to Russia for work as there are no jobs available at home and swelling numbers of unemployed bring the risk of social unrest. These governments cannot handle having all of their nationals returning from Russia” (Pannier, 2022).

In order to solve Tajikistan's social and economic issues, high levels of poverty and low competitiveness of its economy it is necessary to implement a range of political and economic changes, which the republic's government is not currently ready for.

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## WPLYW ANTYROSYJSKICH SANKCJI NA TADŻYKISTAN (W PIERWSZYM ROKU WOJNY)

### Streszczenie

Po inwazji na Ukrainę 24 lutego 2022 roku Rosja mierzy się z bezprecedensowymi sankcjami gospodarczymi nałożonymi przez Zachód. Od początku wojny UE wprowadziła przeciwko agresorowi dziewięć pakietów sankcyjnych, licząc na wywołanie zawirowań w rosyjskim sektorze finansowy, w obrębie wymiany handlowej, logistyki czy współpracy energetycznej. Obok UE, również USA wprowadziły szereg restrykcji gospodarczych wobec Rosji. W sytuacji obowiązywania i przedłużania zachodnich sankcji gospodarczych możemy spodziewać się, iż wskaźniki makroekonomiczne Federacji Rosyjskiej z roku na rok będą się pogarszać, zaś kraj pogrąży się w wieloletnim kryzysie. W trudnej sytuacji gospodarczej znalazły się najbiedniejsze państwa Azji Centralnej uzależnione w stopniu krytycznym od rosyjskiego wsparcia ekonomicznego. Niniejszy artykuł analizuje wpływ antyrosyjskich sankcji na społeczno-gospodarczą sytuację Republiki Tadżykistanu.

**Słowa kluczowe:** antyrosyjskie sankcje; Tadżykistan; gospodarka; poziom ubóstwa.