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HISTORICAL FOLK SOCIOLINGUISTICS

1. WHAT IS HISTORICAL SOCIOLINGUISTICS (HS)?

A reputable source for HS targets and methodologies is the introductory article in the first number of the *Journal of Historical Sociolinguistics*, which declares "that historical sociolinguistics par excellence aims to study language use" (Auer et al., 2015, p. 9) and directs the reader to Weinreich, Labov, and Herzog (1968) and its concern with problems for sociolinguistics in general: "Weinreich et al.'s (1968) seminal paper … especially the problems of transition, embedding and evaluation have gained most attention within the discipline" [i.e., HS] (Auer et al., 2015, p. 5).

Weinreich et al. (1968) is a good place to look for direction, and these three concerns are good choices for HS, although some might dislike the omission of the problems of actuation and constraints, the former perhaps especially for historical concerns. HS recognition of these problems implies that they should be applied whenever they can to older data, recognizing the difficulties presented by bad data (Nevalainen, 1999) and misgivings about the uniformitarian principle (Bergs, 2012). The best-practices aim of HS, however, appears to favor studies of language use that devalue some approaches: "[HS is] also most often combined with a qualitative approach, which in this particular field is often of a philological nature and entails close reading and paying attention to a great amount of detail" (Auer et al., 2015, p. 6). Weinreich et al., however, assert the following:

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> The theory of language change must establish empirically the subjective correlates of the several layers and variables in a heterogeneous structure. Such subjective correlates of evaluation cannot be deduced from the place of the variables within the linguistic structure. (1968, p. 186)

Given this understanding, uncovering the subtleties of variable language use will, therefore, not answer the evaluation problem; the subjective correlates must be established independently and empirically.[1] If that is a good rule for sociolinguistics in general, it should also be true for HS. Such research is usually done experimentally, by using matched-guise tests, implicit association tests (IATs), map-drawing and labeling tasks, variety identification and structured evaluation protocols, electroencephalogram studies with event-related potential components, etc., and it has also been done by examining interview and conversational data with pragmatic and discourse/conversation analytic tools (e.g., Preston, 2019). Since these first approaches can be done only with living persons, HS data must be found that matches that obtained from conversations and sociolinguistic interviews. The HS manifesto suggests that these data are suspect and that the attention paid to them in "close reading" is like those approaches taken in literary criticism and cultural studies and cannot qualify as empirically based HS par excellence studies of language use.[2]

Perhaps more empirically based determinations of subjective correlates are often realized in historical pragmatics, whose objectives often overlap with those of HS.

Burnley's historical pragmatic account of Chaucer's *ye/thou* variability (Figure 1) has many categories that would please sociolinguists (genre, age, intimacy, status, familiarity, and even code-switching opportunities based on affective, rhetorical, and genre variation).[3] Like the optimal HS data described above, however, language regard facts can only be inferred from language use data in this study. Historical pragmatics specialists are also focused on a limited notion of language use and exclude the kind of independent characterization of the subjective correlates recommended by Weinreich et al. (1968). As Jacobs and Jucker (1975, p. 5) put it, "If we add a historical dimension to pragmatics, we try to investigate language use over time." Although pragmatic tools will play a role in the suggestions made here,

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[1] Milroy and Milroy, however, make a contrary claim that supports the Auer et al. emphasis on use: "[S]tatistical counts of variants actually used are probably the best way of assessing attitudes" (1985, p. 19).

[2] These close readings have been suspect in sociolinguistic analyses for some time; in Niedzielski and Preston (2003, p. vii), for example, they are labelled "ostensive analysis," i.e., ones in which the conversational or interview data are shown and commented on but not subjected to any variety of linguistic analysis. In some recent proposals for a citizen sociolinguistics, however, that sort of analysis is prized over linguistically based ones (e.g., Rymes, 2020, p. 153).

[3] In fact, although identified as pragmatic, the system Burnley used was modeled on one proposed in a sociolinguistic article by Ervin-Tripp (1986).

Figure 1

Chaucer's Use of 2nd Person Pronouns (Burnley, 2003, p. 29)

historical pragmatics does not seem to add the components of speaker intention and hearer uptake that would more completely describe language use. This exclusionary approach is especially odd in the general field of pragmatics, often defined most succinctly as the "study of language use."

2. HISTORICAL FOLK SOCIOLINGUISTICS (HFS)

Folk linguistics (FL) and the application of pragmatic/semantic tools to the data is explored in what follows.[4] When the content investigated reveals specifically sociolinguistic concerns, the subfield may be called folk sociolinguistics (FS), and historical folk sociolinguistics (HFS), therefore, studies such matters from the past.

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[4] Although it referred to pragmatic analysis, Niedzielski and Preston (2003) paid more attention to discourse/conversation analytic tools as ways to extract meaning from FL interviews. In fact, however, many scholars would include such studies within the framework of pragmatics (e.g., Levinson, 1983, Chapter 6).

3. HFS FOLK METALANGUAGE

Anything not said or written by a linguistic professional about language is FL data, which, unlike folk etymology, implies no negative assessment of validity, and its socio-cultural, ideological importance is well established. Any FL description that is of sociolinguistic interest, therefore, might help satisfy the search for those pesky but essential subjective correlates. Where might such evidence for HFS arise? One obvious source is *metalanguage* (Preston, 2004), and, of two types, one is rich and the other unrevealing for the purposes explored here.

> Metalanguage 2 (M2): Refers to language (but is not about it):
>   When Amelia said we should leave, I was surprised.
>   is only about what Amelia said—not how it was said.

> Metalanguage 1 (M1): Focuses on (is about) language:
>   When Andrew said *walkin'*, I lost all respect for him.
>   is about evaluation of -in(g).[5]

In the M1 example, the FL interest lies in the evaluation of *walkin'*. It does not just refer *to* language but is *about* language, in this particular case, an evaluation, one that surely qualifies as a subjective correlate. Unrevealing M2s are easy to find in the historical record. In all of Shakespeare, for example, there are 2,540 occurrences of *say* (the lexeme), but the vast majority refer to language use, i.e., are examples of ordinary M2.

1,726 say	247 says	1 say's
32 sayest	51 say'st	2 sayst
408 said	2 say'd	3 say't
3 said'st	1 saidst	
59 saying	5 sayings (proverbialisms)	

(data derived from Open Source Shakespeare, Dec. 21, 2022)

Here are examples of two unremarkable M2's from Hamlet.

MARCELLUS
Horatio *says* 'tis but our fantasy,
And will not let belief take hold of him
Touching this dreaded sight, twice seen of us:

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[5] Unfortunately, Metalanguage 1, 2, and 3 are used differently in Niedzielski and Preston (2003); the uses here follow Preston (2004).

Therefore I have entreated[6] him along
With us to watch the minutes of this night;
That if again this apparition come,
He may approve our eyes and *speak* to it. (italics mine)

What Horatio has done is to *say* and may do is to *speak*, but there is no linguistic *aboutness*, only the mention of language. But there are many M1's in Shakespeare. Here is an exemplary interaction from *As You Like It* between Rosalind, a young noblewoman disguised as a man, and Orlando, a young man also of the court and deeply in love with her, but unaware of her similar feelings for him. They encounter each other in a forest, well away from the court, where Rosalind's disguise is that of a young man and as a forest local.

AS YOU LIKE IT III.ii
Orlando: Are you native of this place?
Rosalind: As the cony that you see dwell where she is kindled.
Orlando: Your accent is something finer than you
Could purchase in so removed a dwelling.
Rosalind: I have been told so of many. But indeed an
old religious uncle of mine taught me to speak,
who was in his youth an inland man…

This is the first OED (1971) reference to *accent* in the broader sense of "way of talking." Other M1 references to ways of speaking include *removed* (rural), *finer* (more elevated than *removed*), and *inland* (of a manor house). All these are of HFS interest and may be taken to show that Shakespeare's portrays his characters as believing the following:

1) Accents can be identified by location (*this place*).
2) Accents can be identified by location-based status, e.g., rural (*removed*) and urbane (*inland*)
3) Accents can be valued; *inland* is finer than *removed*.
4) Accents can be learned from a single caregiver (*uncle … taught me to speak*)

One objection to the use of historical drama, rich as it may be in interaction, is that it might not realistically represent actual talk of the era. That may be, but it holds only for the limited definition of language use outlined above for most HS and historical pragmatics. What Shakespeare's speakers meant requires audience understandings of

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[6] It is possible that *entreated* might be an M1. That association is historically appropriate here since the meanings "plead," "beseech," and "implore" were established by the early 15th Century (OED), and there are certainly stereotypical linguistic correlates (e.g., "whining").

such beliefs as intelligible and common parts of the subjective correlates available to speakers of Elizabethan English. That is, such interactions depend on the audience's understanding of what justifies the M1 commentary in what is asserted as well as an understanding of what is presupposed and implicated in what is said as well as the variationist account of how it is said.

4. THE SEMANTO-PRAGMATIC FOUNDATION

What follows employs a more linguistically oriented (semanto-pragmatic) approach to such historical, dramatic interactive data.[7] Especially relevant here is the commonplace pragmatic idea that utterances have meanings that cannot be directly derived from their structures. They are not just locutionary but illocutionary and perlocutionary and involve implication and presupposition. As such they are parallel to the implicit measures sought by social psychologists of language, whose techniques (matched-guise, IATs, etc.) have been widely adopted by sociolinguists (e.g., Campbell-Kibler, 2012) in their studies of living persons. These unasserted beliefs about and attitudes towards language have been labelled "metalanguage 3" (Preston, 2004).

Potts (2015) believes that such matters constitute the most significant recent advances in semantics and pragmatics: "[P]re-supposition and implicature … are now among the most trusted and widely explored sources of insight into how language and context interact, the role of social cognition in shaping linguistic behavior, and the nature of linguistic meaning itself" (p. 168). The linguistic anthropological view of language ideology mirrors this claim: "As Silverstein (1979 and elsewhere) has suggested, the best place to look for language ideology may lie in the terms and presuppositions of metapragmatic discourse, not just in its assertions" (Irvine, 2001, p. 25).

I will rely here in large part on Potts (2015), as outlined in Table 1. Although more detail will arise in the sample analyses, the above four-part distinction will provide a guide.[8] How might these semanto/pragmatic sophistications add to the above off-the-cuff (but close) reading of the interaction between Rosalind and Orlando (repeated here for convenience)?

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[7] The following does not exploit other approaches to or even understandings of pragmatics. In particular it does not make use of the interpretive opportunities of *metapragmatics* as outlined in Chapter 6 of Verschueren (1999), an approach that clearly recognizes that a more complete study of language use includes the concerns of language regard. The focus here is more associated with Anglo-American tradition (Levinson, 1983, p. 5).

[8] Arguments in favor of this four-way distinction are given in Potts (2015), and a summary of features of the categories is given there in Table 3.

Table 1
Pragmatic and Semantic Presupposition and Implicature (Potts, 2015)

Presupposition	Implicature
Pragmatic (conversational, speaker) Shared knowledee (common ground) *Iszol meg kavet?* Presupposes you speak Hungarian.	*Pragmatic (conversational)* Cooperative Principle, Maxims *Do you have some coffee?* Implicates a request for coffee.
Semantic (lexical, conventional) Lexically/structurally triggered *Do you still drink coffee?* Presupposes you once drank coffee.	*Semantic (conventional)* Lexically/structurally triggered *He drinks coffee but sleeps well.* Implicates contrast between drinking coffee and sleeping well.

5. A SHAKESPEARIAN EXAMPLE

AS YOU LIKE IT III.ii
Orlando: Are you native of this place?
Rosalind: As the cony that you see dwell where she is kindled.
Orlando: Your accent is something finer than you
Could purchase in so removed a dwelling.
Rosalind: I have been told so of many. But indeed an
old religious uncle of mine taught me to speak,
who was in his youth an inland man…

When Orlando asks if Rosalind is from the setting where he has encountered her, his utterance is a yes/no interrogative locution but is a request for information at the illocutionary level. Rosalind exhibits the correct uptake of these acts, for she responds to the yes/no interrogative, although with an elaborate response that counts as a *yes*, one that has the illocutionary identity of an assertive, which correctly responds to the interpretation that the question has the illocutionary identity of a request for information.

More pragmatic complexity arises, however, in both utterances. Just preceding this interaction, Orlando and the disguised Rosalind have participated in extensive, witty banter, the sort one would expect in a courtly setting, not a rural area. That, and as later parts of the interaction confirm, indicates that Orlando's request for information is based on his suspicion that his interlocutor cannot be an inhabitant of such a rural place. What are the pragmatics of a speaker suspicion and hearer uptake of it?

Orlando's question might be revealed as suspicious on the basis of its breaking Grice's maxim of quantity, the first part of which is to "make you contribution as

informative as is required for the current purposes of the exchange" (1975, p. 45). To suggest that such an obligation is a necessary part of his understanding of the "current purposes of the exchange" might require Orlando to say something such as "Are you *really* native of this place?", which would conventionally implicate that the speaker has doubt about Rosalind's presumed rural identity. But he provides no such lexical clue.

Orlando's illocutionary request for information may also partially violate one of the preparatory felicity conditions on questions: that the asker does not have the information sought (Searle, 1969, p. 66). Orlando suspects that he might have the answer, but any question that seeks an answer because of a suspicion would probably not make it infelicitous since the asker still sincerely wants to know the answer.

When Rosalind engages in courtly banter with Orlando, she inadvertently allows him to make use of a pragmatic presupposition: People who use language X are members of group X. This has allowed Orlando to register a perlocutionary effect of suspicion, although Rosalind had no such intent. The pragmatic reasoning goes as follows:

1) Rosalind inadvertently implicates conversationally a courtly identity.
2) Orlando understands this implication on the basis of the pragmatic presupposition that use of a language variety will expose identity and a further pragmatic presupposition that identity will predict usual environments (courtly persons should not be in a forest).
3) Taken together, this implication and the presuppositions associated with it have given Orlando a perlocutionary effect of suspicion.

Perlocutions are overwhelmingly hearer-dependent such that perlocutionary effects may arise in hearers when the speaker has not intended them. As outlined above, it is not clear at all that Orlando intended to give any clue to his suspicion.

The search fails here, however, to identify any evidence that would ensure that Orlando's question offers a clue to his suspicion, an example of the "bad data" of historical sociolinguistics. Figure 2 shows the typical pitch and amplitude characteristics that accompany a neutral question, but Figure 3 displays a marked performance that could only suggest a perlocutionary intent of suspicion.[9] The search for any content that implicates Orlando's suspicion cannot go this far, although it suggests

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[9] See Jeong and Potts (2016) for an example of an experimental study of pitch in the identification of perlocutionary effects.

that such detailed analyses might empirically supplement literary analysis, a position explicitly made in studies of pragmatics in literature (e.g., Chapman & Clark, 2019).

Figure 2
*Neutral Pitch Accent Contours of a Yes/No Interrogative*

Figure 3
Marked (Suspicious) Pitch and Amplitude Contours for a Yes/No Interrogative

Are you na tive to this place?

Leaving Orlando's question behind, is there anything is Rosalind's response to indicate that she is aware of this suspicion? Perhaps the answer lies in another maxim, that of relation: "make your contributions relevant, and says things that are pertinent to the discussion" (Grice, 1975, p. 46). Satisfying his curiosity about what he suspects is surely relevant to Orlando, but is there evidence in her response that it has been communicated to Rosalind? In scanning the array of assumptions made available to her by Orlando's utterance, Rosalind is aware that engaging in linguistic banter of the sort just completed before this exchange has had the possible effect of blowing her cover. It was courtly not country talk. In short, her understanding of the relevance of Orlando's question is not limited to a confirmation or denial of the proposition but implicates that his request exhibits a suspicion.

Even if we do not believe Orlando's utterance carried a perlocutionary intent of suspicion (whether or not he intended the uptake to include that meaning), then the knowledge Rosalind has of her disguise (including the fact that disguises can fail) and her error in engaging in courtly banter (manner of speaking may betray a disguise) will allow her to have that uptake, one that implicates Orlando's suspicion. In this case, whatever the domain and identity of suspicion, the uptake of it relies on pragmatic presuppositions about such real-world matters as disguise and its risks and the revealing nature of one's linguistic identity all contributing to her understanding of the at-that-moment relevance of the question.

Rosalind's response, although a richly detailed simile, can count as a *yes* to the question Orlando posed, a lie, necessary for her to continue the deception that she is a rural inhabitant. Lies break another of Grice's (1975) maxims, that of *quality*, the first part of which is "do not say what you believe to be false" (p. 46). This lie at least partially implicates that she is aware of his suspicion.

Her lengthy response is similar to such codified ones as the snappy comebacks to yes/no questions when the addressee thinks the answer should be obvious (Does a wild bear shit in the woods?). The indirectness of her response, however, does not lie in the sly use of presupposition in which the speaker subtly attempts to get the hearer to agree with her. Orlando is not likely to deny the presupposition required here to ascertain that the response is affirmative: namely that the wild animals of a region are native to the areas where they are found. Nor is the main presupposition associated with the comparison *as* subtle, for the presupposition of her claim that she is as native to the forest as a wild animal is, quite simply, that she is native to the forest (e.g. Levinson, 1983, p. 183).

More recent characterizations of implicated meaning pay more attention to hearer uptake, both from Neo-Gricean (e.g., Horn, 1984; Levinson, 1987, 1995, 2000) and relevance theory (e.g., Sperber & Wilson, 1995) perspectives. Levinson (1995, p. 97), for example, suggests there are three heuristics: Q ("what is not said is not the

case"), I ("what is simply described is stereotypically identified"), and M ("marked descriptions warn 'marked situations'"). He explains these as follows:

> Under the first heuristic if I say "The flag is white", I will implicate (and you will understand) that 'The flag is only white, not red, white, and blue'. Under the second heuristic, if I say "He opened the door", I will suggest that he entered in the normal way, not using a crowbar or dynamite. Under the third heuristic, if I say "He turned the handle and pushed open the door" I will suggest that he opened the door in some non-stereotypical manner (e.g. with extra force or speed). (pp. 97–98)

Although Levinson does not repeat his parenthetical "(and you will understand)" for each heuristic, it is clear he intends it to apply. The I-principle, in which a hearer is able to expand or enrich the speaker's utterance to an unasserted meaning based on stereotypical world knowledge seems especially relevant here. But what of the details of Rosalind's meaning?

Levinson's M-principle ("marked descriptions warn 'marked situations'") offers another interpretive device in uncovering any implications in Rosalind's response. Her comparison of her forest identity to that of a rabbit is, just as Levinson's elaborate door-opening cited above, a marked alternative to "yes" and indicative of Levinson's suggestion that such marked expressions "warn 'marked situations'." Potts' references to expressive language go further in noting their special status for interpretation, suggesting that, like insults, appositives, and nonrestrictives, they hold independently interpretable meanings, ones that are not a part of the propositional core of an utterance (2005, pp. 16–22). This allows even a conventional (semantic) interpretation of that part of Rosalind's utterance that is elaborate, and, as Levinson suggests, the implicature that something in the situation is amiss. In summary, if one questions whether Orlando's question has somehow revealed his suspicion to Rosalind, her exaggerated or colorful answer suggests that it has and that his perlocutionary suspicion is now a part of the interaction.

The colorful language ploy does not work, however, for Orlando challenges her asserted and presupposed forest nativeness: "Your accent is something finer than you could purchase in so removed a dwelling" — the first metalanguage 1 occurrence in the exchange, but not one with immediately transparent meaning. Shakespeare appears to be a leader in the use of *something* as a modifier of comparatives. The first *OED* appearance is dated ?1592, but listed under a definition that refers "to some extent" or "a little." The *OED* also admits that many such uses before adjectives and comparatives could be interpreted as nouns. If that's the case here, Rosalind's accent is simply some finer thing than one would expect of a rural dweller.

Perhaps the pragmatics of comparatives will shed more light on the sort of language regard at play here. No discussion of comparatives can do without the idea that scales are involved. One NeoGricean position (Horn, 1984) is in part built around

the idea of scalar implicatures. The details of this proposal, however, depend in part on the rather well-codified existence of a *Horn scale*, such that, for example, on the scale of intelligence, *brilliant* is a stronger then *intelligent* near the top while *idiotic* seems stronger than *dumb* near the bottom. Since Orlando claims that Rosalind's accent is *finer,* perhaps a *Horn-scale* for accent fineness can be created for Elizabethan English. Puttenham's 1589 (1936) comments make it clear what the top end of the scale is in his recommendation for a model of best usage: "ye shall therfore take the vsual speach of the Court" (p. 144). The other end of the scale follows a long list of varieties not to be imitated, but after "finally" he cautions those who would use good language to avoid using as a model "any vuplanndish village or corner of a Realme, where is no resort but of poore rusticall or vnciuill people" (p. 144). Whether Eliza-bethan or modern, it seems difficult to construct a Horn-scale that involves so many sidetracks along the way; pedantic talk, merchant class talk, dialectal diversity, are all mentioned by Puttenham as language varieties to be eschewed.

In the case at hand, however, there is a suggestion of a bounded scale with *fine* (of the court) at the top and *removed* (i.e., removed from the court) at the bottom, and that may pave the way to distinguishing between the OED's suggestion that *something* may mean either "to a certain extent" and "a little." If that scale is large, then the "a little" interpretation appears to be out, and Orlando may be accused of flouting the maxim of quantity by not making his utterance as informative as it might have been with a more specific measure word. The *so* in "the immediately following "so removed" does not allow for a "little" interpretation and suggests the endpoints of a scale that might be referred to as the courtly-rustic one.

On the other hand, if Shakespeare is capable of irony (and even the broad comic indulgences that might accompany it), then this "something" could indeed mean "a little" or at least not a great amount. There is ample indication throughout his plays that just such indulgence is often there, and one may imagine a nudge-nudge wink-wink display to the audience. If so, the *something* continues the marked lan-guage described just above in Rosalind's comparison of her abode to that of the native rabbit and keeps the implication of suspicion alive.

This continued challenging no doubt confirms Rosalind's right to be suspicious; later it is revealed that Orlando was not immune to the resemblance between Gan-ymede (as the male-disguised Rosalind calls herself) and the real female Rosalind. Near the end of the play, but before Orlando is made aware of Ganymede's real identity, he speaks to the Duke (Rosalind's father):

> AS YOU LIKE IT V.iv
> Orlando: My lord, the first time that I ever saw him
> Methought he was a brother to your daughter.
> But, my good lord, this boy is forest-born

And hath been tutored in the rudiments
Of many desperate studies by his uncle,
Whom he reports to be a great magician
Obscurèd in the circle of this forest.

But even with all these clues, Orlando has apparently fallen for Rosalind's disguise, and his citing here of the uncle leads to the last part of this interaction. Rosalind has refuted this last accusation of her having "finer speech" by referring to her language (or style) acquisition:

I have been told so of many. But indeed an
old religious uncle of mine taught me to speak,
who was in his youth an inland man….

The first part of this may seem to be a simple (but elliptical) assertion that her speech is widely recognized by many, but is also contains a conversational implication that the ability to identify the "fineness" of her speech of her speech was widely available ("many"), a move that recognizes awareness of the initial suspicion of Orlando's a reasonable one and is based on the pragmatic presupposition that kinds of speech are recognizable, although that may be finely tuned or simply sensitive to the dichotomous "inland" (courtly) versus "removed" (rural) classification discussed above.

The maxim of relevance also rather directly explains a conversational implicature: that the language which she was "taught … to speak" is in fact the finer variety that lies behind her error in using it and the suspicion it provoked. It also suggests further pragmatic presuppositions: 1) One may speak the language that one was "taught" as well as or rather than the one that was "acquired." 2) A language that one has "learned" (as in 1)) may be uncontrollable, even if it is at one's disadvantage to use it. Niedzielski and Preston (2000, p. 310) report a respondent's claim that an added (learned) variety may be uncontrollable: "it just slips out."

Contrary to her own taught acquisition of her finer speech, she reveals a presupposition that one acquires the language of their environment when she suggests that her uncle was "an inland man" and therefore acquired the court's finer speech. That presupposition is necessary to make her claim that he taught her relevant to the issue at hand. "In his youth" also strongly implicates that her old uncle was not always a man of the court but presupposes that his finer language was brought back to the forest, again suggesting that control of language in its appropriate environment may not be possible.

6. SUMMARY

The semanto-pragmatic analysis of this very short interaction suggests the following:

Pragmatic use: Nothing in the pragmatic analyses of the interaction studied here would call into question the uniformitarian hypothesis. The contrastive points between Elizabethan and Present-day English lie in the area of detailed sociolinguistic characteristics of power, network, style, and many other features — not in the ability of formal pragmatic devices to classify the sorts of acts performed.

Pragmatic Metalanguage 1 (explicit) & 3 (implicit):
    People speak the language variety of their environment
    The varieties of language people speak are identifiable
    People are identified by their language variety
    Language variety inappropriate to an environment is noticeable
    Language varieties are ranked on a value scale
    Language variety values are related to status-oriented venues (aristocratic versus rural)
    Environmental effects on language variety may be overcome by teaching

Many of the above conclusions are based on the derivation of perlocutionary effects (speaker output and hearer uptake, neither necessarily intended nor conscious). Although it will not be pursued here, some of these might be called perlocutionary long components (with apologies to Zelig Harris). Unfortunately, speech act analyses categories, in spite of their contextual sensitivity, do not seem to have formal mechanisms to carry identities such as "suspicion" across utterances. The border between such long components and genres or speech events might be very difficult to formulate. *Flirting*, *trash-talking*, *ribbing*, and many others, however, look very much like perlocutions but are hardly utterance-limited. In fact, their identity might not be established until several utterances point in such a direction. Hymes' notion of *Key* (from his SPEAKING mnemonic, 1972, p. 62) defines them as "tone, manner, or spirit," items that may cover more than one utterance but can hardly be called speech genres and have an odor of perlocutionality about them. As he goes on to say, "A great deal of empirical work will be needed to satisfy the interrelations of genres, events, acts, and other components" (p. 65).

The relatively formal semanto-pragmatic tools used here make up only one way of doing HS and should be used in conjunction with other pragmatic and sociolinguistic tools to approach a more complete accounts of language use in the past. I hope to have shown, however, that at least in historical dramatic interaction one

may overcome the bad data problem so long as the data are treated as historical folk sociolinguistics and not necessarily as authentic representations of structural linguistic properties of the day.

However unartfully I have done it, I hope this all leads advertently to a concluding scientific postscript (with apologies to Kierkegaard). However he has approached data and characterizations of it, Peter Trudgill has always shown himself to be the linguist's linguist, a scholar whose deep knowledge and innovative applications of the science are always at the forefront of his work, from linking specific phonological changes in the speech of his East Anglian home to linguistically characterizable influences, to utilizing phonetic detail in his enhancement of the founder principle in New Zealand English, to finding previously unstudied phonological facts in the Spanish of Murcia, to his advancement of linguistic theory in putting forth a theory of typological complexity rooted in social and cognitive facts. I hope my little excursion here in trying to exhibit the relationship between historical sociolinguistics and a more linguistically oriented pragmatics reflects (something) of Peter's own devotion to things linguistic.

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HISTORICAL FOLK SOCIOLINGUISTICS

S u m m a r y

This paper shows how the canonical definition of historical sociolinguistics as the study of language use fails to consider independent evidence for language attitudes, beliefs, and ideologies (i.e., language regard).[10] One approach to avoiding this limited understanding of use might lie in a historical folk sociolinguistics, in which particular attention is paid to the nonasserted (i.e., indirect, presuppositional, implicational, perlocutionary) meanings, described in Preston (2004) as "metalanguage 3." Interactions in drama are first justified as "good data," and analyses of such nonasserted elements of utterances show that they approach both the social psychological goal of uncovering implicit language regard behaviors and the variationist goal of determining the subjective correlates of variation and change.

Keywords: folk linguistics; historical sociolinguistics; pragmatics; Shakespeare.

HISTORYCZNA SOCJOLINGWISTYKA LUDOWA

S t r e s z c z e n i e

Niniejszy artykuł pokazuje, że kanoniczna definicja socjolingwistyki historycznej jako badania praktyk językowych nie uwzględnia niezależnych dowodów na istnienie postaw językowych, przekonań i ideologii (tzw. czynniki językowe). Jednym ze sposobów uniknięcia takiego zawężenia definicji socjolingwistyki może być objęcie jej zakresem historycznej socjolingwistyki ludowej, w której na szczególną uwagę zasługują znaczenia niesformalizowane (tj. pośrednie, presupozycyjne, implikacyjne, perlokucyjne), opisane w Preston (2004) jako „metajęzyk 3". Interakcjom w układach illokucyjnych należy najpierw przyznać status „pełnoprawnych danych językowych". Analiza takich niesformalizowanych elementów wypowiedzi pokazuje, że blisko im jest zarówno do psychologicznego i społecznego odkrywania nieuświadamianych aspektów wrażliwości językowej, jak i do wariacyjnego celu określenia subiektywnych korelatów wariacji i zmian.

Słowa kluczowe: językoznawstwo ludowe; socjolingwistyka historyczna; pragmatyka; Szekspir.

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[10] Language regard groups together social psychological (chiefly experimental, e.g., matched guise), anthropological (e.g., studies in language ideology), and sociolinguistic (e.g., folk linguistic and "third wave") approaches to beliefs about and reactions to language use and language varieties. Preston (2018) reviews established and emerging relationships between these areas. The label is used throughout this paper to refer to all three areas as well as research methods derived from and combining them.