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LINCOLN CANNON'S TRANSHUMANIST ARGUMENT FOR FAITH IN GOD

The typical associations with transhumanism are far removed from religious issues. Proclaiming the ideas of cyborgization, radical life extension or mind uploading is, it seems, rather consistent with naturalism and atheism. However, spiritual and strictly religious aspects are strongly present in both the origins of transhumanism and its current form. Figures considered to be the progenitors of this trend include the agnostic Julian Huxley, to no lesser extent than the Jesuit Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, while the most significant circles developing and popularizing the thesis of inevitable human evolution include the Mormon Transhumanist Association and the Christian Transhumanist Association.

Acceptance of the assumptions of transhumanism allows religion-oriented thinkers to reflect in a new way on the traditional issues of the philosophy of religion, including the question of the existence of God. One such proposition, intended to justify the rationality of religious attitudes, is the New God Argument. This argument will first be presented as precisely as possible, and then analyzed successively in terms of logical correctness (in its formal dimension) and substantive validity (in its material dimension).

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1. NEW GOD ARGUMENT

The author of the argument is Lincoln Cannon, an American technologist and philosopher, and a member of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, the largest Mormon denomination. The New God Argument (NGA) was presented in 2010 on the author's website and then first published as a chapter in a collective work in 2012 (CANNON and WEST 2012). Since then, Cannon has subtly modified his reasoning several times. The subject of further analysis will be the version included in the volume entitled *Religious Transhumanism and Its Critics* (CANNON 2022, 64–67)[1].

Cannon precedes his presentation of the argument with definitions of key terms. Three of them are worth mentioning: "Superintelligence: intelligence that is greater than that of its evolutionary ancestors in every way…; Posthumanity: evolutionary descendant of humanity; Superhumanity: superintelligent posthumanity" (64). They are in line with transhumanism's signature prediction of the imminent transformation of humans—through technological developments—to fully happy posthumans endowed with exceptional intelligence and creativity.

It is worth indicating the reasons why Cannon included the adjective "new" in the name of his argument. First and foremost, the proposed reasoning captures the issue of God's existence in an original manner: "Most philosophical arguments for the existence of God have been retrospective or analytical, like the fine-tuning and ontological arguments. In contrast, this is prospective and empirical" (CANNON n.d.). It is only to be regretted that the American philosopher did not specify how this empiricism should be construed; this issue is not addressed explicitly in the argument. Moreover, the argument includes a new concept of God (New God), which, among other things, implies the creation of other Gods by God and the possibility of decentralization of God. This understanding, although definitely non-standard, is nevertheless, according to Cannon, consistent with the message of the Bible.

The NGA is divided into four parts: Faith Assumption (FA), Compassion Argument (CO), Creation Argument (CR), and God Conclusion (GC). Previous versions of the NGA included other structural elements (Faith Position, Angel Argument, and Benevolence Argument), but this did not significantly affect the content of the argument. The respective parts of the NGA will be presented successively.

[1] I use parenthetical numbers 64–67 to refer specifically to Cannon (2022).

The first part, FA, consists of a single F1 sentence, which acts as an assumption (65):

> F1. Humanity will not become extinct before evolving into superhumanity.

The subsequent part of the NGA is CO. It includes two other assumptions: CO1 and CO2. The former takes the form of a disjunction, while the latter is in the form of a single sentence that differs from the middle segment of the first assumption solely by the absence of the negative particle "not." CO is surmounted by the result of deduction from all the assumptions made (CO1, CO2 and F1).The conclusion CO3 is identical to the last segment of assumption CO1 (65).

> CO1. EITHER humanity probably will become extinct before evolving into superhumanity OR superhumanity probably would not have more decentralized destructive capacity than humanity has OR superhumanity probably would be more compassionate than we are.
> CO2. Superhumanity probably would have more decentralized destructive capacity than humanity has.
> CO3. Superhumanity probably would be more compassionate than we are.

The structure of the third part of the NGA, CR, is analogous to the former part. It begins with two more assumptions and leads (based on deductions from CR1, CR2 and F1) to another conclusion, CR3. Just as is the case with CO, CR2 differs from the middle segment of CR1 solely by the absence of the negative particle "not," while CR3 is identical to the last segment of CR1 (66).

> CR1. EITHER humanity probably will become extinct before evolving into superhumanity OR superhumanity probably would not create many worlds emulating its evolutionary history OR superhumanity probably created our world.
> CR2. Superhumanity probably would create many worlds emulating its evolutionary history.
> CR3. Superhumanity probably created our world.

GC, the last part of the NGA, is the conclusion G1 that is the result of deduction from CO (from the conclusion CO3) and CR (from the conclusion CR3) (66).

> G1. Superhumanity probably would be more compassionate than we are AND superhumanity probably created our world.

Cannon argues that an individual who accepts the conclusion G1 should consequently believe in God. On the other hand, an atheistic attitude turns out, by virtue of the NGA, to contradict the fundamental transhumanist belief in the real prospects of the comprehensive improvement of humans.

2. THE FORMAL DIMENSION OF THE NGA

In his description of the NGA, Cannon repeatedly emphasizes the logical reliability of the proposed line of thought. He is convinced that accepting the respective assumptions (F1, CO1, CO2, CR1 and CR2) as true and using them as premises makes it possible to formulate the relevant conclusions (CO3, CR3 and G1), which are, of necessity, true (65–66). This opinion will be verified through an analysis of the formal correctness of the subsequent stages of the argument. It should be noted at this point that Cannon presents his argument in a brief manner—by enumerating the premises and conclusions, but omitting the detailed course of inference, and not using logical notation.

FA, which is the first part of the NGA, should not raise any doubts from a logical point of view. An author of an argument can, and usually even has to, acknowledge certain sentences—in this case F1—without proving them. The unambiguous indication of the assumptions preceding the reasoning process should even be considered the right thing to do, which acts for the benefit of clarity of the argument.

CO, which is the second part of the NGA, features a complex structure. Analyzing its logical sense requires additional designations to be introduced for the segments of the assumption CO1:

> CO1a. Humanity probably will become extinct before evolving into superhumanity.
> CO1b. Superhumanity probably would not have more decentralized destructive capacity than humanity has.
> CO1c. Superhumanity probably would be more compassionate than we are.

CO1 takes the logical form of a disjunction consisting of three components. It is hard to determine whether this is a logical disjunction or an exclusive disjunction, since the grammatical form of “Either … or …” can express both types of disjunction. Cannon assumes that CO1 is true, which means that at

least one (in the case of a logical disjunction) or exactly one (in the case of an exclusive disjunction) of its components is true. In the subsequent analysis, CO1 will be treated as an exclusive disjunction (in the argument under consideration, the choice of the type of disjunction is insignificant).

After assuming that the premises CO2 and F1 are true, the logical notation of CO is as follows:

$$[(CO1a \veebar CO1b \veebar CO1c) \wedge CO2 \wedge F1] \Rightarrow CO3$$

The inference scheme used in CO can also be represented graphically (figure 1).



Figure 1. The Compassion Argument.

Cannon does not prove the correctness of CO step by step, but only settles for stating it instead (65). It is therefore necessary to reconstruct the line of thought of the NGA's author. It is rather easy to guess he is convinced that two implications are true. The first follows from the CO2 assumption:

$$CO2 \Rightarrow \neg CO1b$$

and the second stems from making the F1 assumption:

$$F1 \Rightarrow \neg CO1a$$

If both of these implications are correct, then we get the following:

$$[(CO1a \veebar CO1b \veebar CO1c) \wedge \neg CO1b \wedge \neg CO1a] \Rightarrow CO1c$$

This result is undoubtedly correct, since if two components in a three-component disjunction are proven to be false, then the third component must be a

true sentence. Moreover, if we consider that the sentences CO3 and CO1c are identical and equivalent

$$CO1c \Leftrightarrow CO3$$

then ultimately:

$$[(CO1a \dot{\vee} CO1b \dot{\vee} CO1c) \wedge \neg CO1b \wedge \neg CO1a] \Rightarrow CO3$$

It only remains now to examine whether the implications $CO2 \Rightarrow \neg CO1b$ and $F1 \Rightarrow \neg CO1a$ are indeed true. The analysis of the former should begin with noting the difference between CO1b and CO2, which comes down to the presence of the negative particle "not" in CO1b ("would not" vs "would"). Thus, it seems that the negation of CO1b ($\neg CO1b$) should—according to the law of double negation: $\alpha \Leftrightarrow \neg(\neg\alpha)$—lead to the equivalence of $CO2 \Leftrightarrow \neg CO1b$ and, consequently, to the veracity of $CO2 \Rightarrow \neg CO1b$.

However, this explanation cannot be considered complete due to the presence of the adverb of degree "probably" in CO2 as well as in CO1b. This entails some serious consequences. CO2 and CO1b are not sentences that state or negate a certain state of affairs, but instead determine the probability of certain events. It is therefore necessary to change the field of analysis from the existing traditional propositional calculus to the logic of probability. This change requires the use of a notation in which capital letters denote events, and P(N) denotes the probability of event N [$0 \leq P(N) \leq 1$]:

> B: Superhumanity would have more decentralized destructive capacity than humanity has.
> CO2: Probably B.
>
> ¬B: Superhumanity would not have more decentralized destructive capacity than humanity has.
> CO1b: Probably ¬B.

B and ¬B are opposite events; therefore, in accordance with the rules of probability calculus, the following equality exists between the numbers P(B) and P(¬B):

$$P(\neg B) = 1 - P(B)$$

The analysis of the logical relationship between the sentences CO2 and CO1b ought to be transformed into an analysis of the logical relationship between the events B and ¬B.

$$CO2 \Rightarrow \neg CO1b$$
$$\text{Probably } B \Rightarrow \neg(\text{Probably } \neg B)$$

Examining the veracity of this implication requires the presentation of the expressions Probably B and Probably ¬B in algebraic terms. Thus, it is necessary to specify the degree of certainty of the event, which is defined by the adverb "probably."

This imposes an interpretation that identifies "probably" with a high probability in excess of 50%.

> If "probably" means high probability, then $0.5 < P(B) < 1$
> and since $P(\neg B) = 1 - P(B)$, then $0 < P(\neg B) < 0.5$
> But since $0 < P(\neg B) < 0.5$, then Probably ¬B is false because ¬B is not highly probable.
> In accordance with this interpretation of "probably":
> Probably $B \Rightarrow \neg$(Probably ¬B), therefore $CO2 \Rightarrow \neg CO1b$, which is consistent with Cannon's intention.

However, another interpretation of "probably" is possible as well, being in line with the results of survey research on the relationship between words denoting probability and their numerical representation. The results show that while most respondents assigned a value between 0.75 and 0.8 to "probably," the entire range of responses included values between 0.45 and 0.85 (MAUBOUSSIN and MAUBOUSSIN 2018).

> If $0.45 \leq P(B) \leq 0.85$, then $0.15 \leq P(\neg B) \leq 0.55$

On this interpretation of "probably," ¬(Probably ¬B) does not necessarily eventuate from Probably B, since P(¬B) can be as high as 0.55, so both Probably B and Probably ¬B can be true. In view of this, the implication $CO2 \Rightarrow \neg CO1b$ may not be true as well, which falsifies CO.

The prerequisite for the veracity of the implication $CO2 \Rightarrow \neg CO1b$ is therefore an additional assumption specifying "probably" as a probability greater than 50%.

What remains is to consider the second implication, namely $F1 \Rightarrow \neg CO1a$. This time, there are two differences between the sentences F1 and CO1a. The

first one—just as is the case with the difference between CO2 and CO1b—concerns the "not" ("will not" vs "will"). The second one, on the other hand, involves the presence of the word "probably" in CO1a only. Since CO1a cannot be analyzed using the traditional propositional calculus, both CO1a and F1 must be expressed in the terminology of probability calculus:

> A: Humanity will become extinct before evolving into superhumanity.
> CO1a: Probably A.
> ¬A: Humanity will not become extinct before evolving into superhumanity.
> F1: ¬A

Events A and ¬A are opposite events. Hence, if we assume, in accordance with Cannon's intent, the veracity of the sentence F1, the probability of the event F1, P(¬A), is 1 (denoting a certain event). What follows from this is that the probability of event A, P(A), is 0 (denoting an impossible event). It suffices to assign a non-zero probability to the word "probably" to acknowledge the falsity of Probably A, and consequently the falsity of sentence CO1a. The implication F1 ⇒ ¬CO1a thus proves to be true.

In summary, CO can be considered correct under the condition of defining "probably" as a word denoting a probability in excess of 50%.

The study of the formal dimension of CR, the third part of the NGA, proceeds similarly to the analysis of CO just conducted. First and foremost, it is necessary to introduce designations for the respective segments of CR1:

> CR1a: Humanity probably will become extinct before evolving into superhumanity.
> CR1b: Superhumanity probably would not create many worlds emulating its evolutionary history.
> CR1c: Superhumanity probably created our world.

CR takes the form of the following implication:

$$[(CR1a \dot{\vee} CR1b \dot{\vee} CR1c) \wedge CR2 \wedge F1] \Rightarrow CR3$$

CR can also be represented graphically (figure 2).



Figure 2. The Creation Argument.

Cannon recognizes two implications, CR2 ⇒ ¬CR1b and F1 ⇒ ¬CR1a, to be true, which makes it possible to express CR using reliable inference:

$$[(CR1a \dot{\vee} CR1b \dot{\vee} CR1c) \wedge \neg CR1b \wedge \neg CR1a] \Rightarrow CR1c$$

But since

$$CR1c \Leftrightarrow CR3$$

then ultimately

$$[(CR1a \dot{\vee} CR1b \dot{\vee} CR1c) \wedge \neg CR1b \wedge \neg CR1a] \Rightarrow CR3$$

The consideration of the correctness of CR2 ⇒ ¬CR1b and F1 ⇒ ¬CR1a proceeds similarly to the analysis made of CO2 ⇒ ¬CO1b and F1 ⇒ ¬CO1a, respectively. The conclusions are analogous as well: the implication CR2 ⇒ ¬CR1b is true under the condition of an additional assumption assigning a probability greater than 0.5 to the meaning of "probably," while the veracity of the implication F1 ⇒ ¬CR1a only requires assigning a non-zero probability to the word "probably." Ultimately, CR can be correct provided that the probability value indicated by the adverb "probably" is adequately specified.

GC, the fourth and final part of the NGA, looks as follows in logical notation:

$$(CO3 \wedge CR3) \Rightarrow G1$$

The entirety of the NGA can be represented graphically (figure 3).



Figure 3. The New God Argument.

The prerequisite for the correctness of GC is that both CO3 and CR3 are true. Since both conclusions are only conditionally true, the veracity of G1, which is a conjunction of the two, requires acknowledging that "probably" denotes a probability greater than 50%.

Summarizing the formal dimension of the NGA, one must conclude that logical analysis has proven its ambiguity. The prerequisite for considering Cannon's argument to be correct is to make an additional probabilistic assumption.

3. THE MATERIAL DIMENSION OF THE NGA

An assessment of the formal aspect of the argument presented by Cannon makes it possible to proceed to the study of its content. The purpose of the subsequent consideration will be to critically analyze the premises acknowledged in the NGA as well as the conclusions formulated therein. An attempt will also be made to identify original and potentially valuable aspects of the American transhumanist's proposition.

The study should begin with the NGA's key notion of superhumanity, which is supposed to define the future of humans. It should be noted that transhumanists are considerably more likely to use other terms, such as: transhuman, posthuman or, referring to the philosophy of Friedrich Nietzsche in various ways (SORGNER 2009, 36–39), overhuman. Sometimes each of these terms is construed differently; for instance, the dynamics of the expected development of *homo sapiens* can be described as the following sequence: human—transhuman—posthuman. Usually, however, these terms are used to

describe the final result of human evolution accomplished through current and future technological achievements, so they can be considered synonymous.

The aforementioned definition of superhumanity, as proposed by Cannon at the beginning of the NGA, is in line with the visions of the majority of transhumanists, e.g. "The Singularity will allow us to overcome age-old human problems and vastly amplify human creativity. We will preserve and enhance the intelligence that evolution has bestowed on us while overcoming the profound limitations of biological evolution" (KURZWEIL 2005, 34); "You have just celebrated your 170th birthday and you feel stronger than ever. Each day is a joy. You have invented entirely new art forms, which exploit the new kinds of cognitive capacities and sensibilities you have developed" (BOSTROM, 111). While defining superhumanity, Cannon admittedly includes only human intellectual progress (superintelligence), but in other texts he also describes the psychological, social and spiritual aspects of a technologically enhanced human of the future (CANNON 2015, 10–12).

The NGA clarifies the pre-defined notion of superhumanity to a high degree, for it appears in all of the assumptions made and conclusions drawn by Cannon. These will be successively analyzed herein.

Assumption F1 states that humanity will not become extinct, but will certainly transform into superhumanity. However, a host of questions arise at this point. Will any all-encompassing development of human intelligence—even including a relatively small one—mean the achievement of superintelligence and superhumanity, or will only a state that fulfills certain criteria be called superintelligence? Does the fruition of the level of superhumanity put an end to human evolution? Finally, will the expected evolution of humans definitely lead to superhumanity? Should the contingent evolution of humanity into a form other than superhumanity be considered the extinction of humanity? Without resolving at least these issues, which are non-exhaustive in nature, after all, one may have legitimate hesitations concerning the proper understanding of F1. It is therefore necessary, it seems, to clarify F1 or add more assumptions about the future of humanity.

Another assumption, CO1, concerns one of the characteristics of superhumanity. Having assumed that humanity will become superhumanity (F1), which falsifies the CO1a component, Cannon presents two possibilities: either superhumanity probably would not have more decentralized destructive capacity than humanity has (CO1b) or probably would be more compassionate than we are (CO1c). Since CO1 is an exclusive disjunction, exactly one of its components must be a true sentence, and the other must be false. The problem

included in the CO is therefore the following: would superhumanity probably have more or equal decentralized destructive capacity than humanity has and probably would be more compassionate than we are, or perhaps superhumanity would probably not have more decentralized destructive capacity than humanity has and would probably be less than or equally compassionate as we are?

Cannon makes the CO2 assumption, which settles the question in favor of the first possibility—although superhumanity probably would have more decentralized destructive capacity, it probably would be more compassionate than we are at the same time. Cannon's rationale for acknowledging CO2 and, consequently, the CO3 conclusion as well, is hardly convincing: "The basic idea is that humanity probably will continue to increase in decentralized destructive capacity, so it probably will stagnate or destroy itself unless it increases in compassion. If we trust in our own superhuman potential, we should trust that superhumanity would be more compassionate than we are" (65). Apart from that, Cannon also refers to data that provide grounds for optimism: "records suggest that violence has decreased and civil liberties have improved as governments have become more powerful" (66). We should be simultaneously aware of the potential threats and actively counteract them: "some technologists believe that machine intelligence may destroy us if we do not ensure its friendliness, at least as instrumental cooperation if not as internalized compassion" (66).

But how should superhumanity's compassion be construed, then? The lexical definition of compassion, i.e. "A strong feeling of sympathy and sadness for the suffering or bad luck of others and a wish to help them,"[2] cannot be easily adapted to a superhumanity endowed with superintelligence. Cannon leaves many important questions unanswered. Toward whom should superhumanity show their sympathy and wish to help? Toward other representatives of superhumanity, or perhaps toward animals or artificial intelligence? Will the attitude of compassion have any value since, as a rule, the visions of transhumanists indicate that weakness or suffering will not affect the posthuman at all (TIROSH-SAMUELSON 2010, 35–39)?

The analysis carried out here leads one to simplify the intricate structure of CO and reduce it to a single implication instead:

$$CO2 \Rightarrow CO3$$

[2] *Cambridge Dictionary*, s.v. "compassion," accessed December 20, 2024, https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/compassion..

A substantive assessment of this implication consists of two parts: an assessment of the soundness of acknowledging CO2 as a highly probable sentence, as well as an assessment of the correctness of CO3's inference after CO2 has been acknowledged. A reliable consideration of the first part is hampered by the ambiguity of the phrase "decentralized destructive capacity" used by Cannon. One must probably assume that it means the possibility—at the disposal of either a single individual or humanity as a whole—of causing serious damage to other people, including the taking of life. Cannon assumes that this possibility will increase with the transformation of humanity into superhumanity. This is a very realistic prediction given the development of human civilization to date, the hallmark of which is the refinement of methods of destruction, including weapons of mass destruction. On the other hand, deriving a conclusion about the growth of superhumanity's compassion from CO2 is not obvious. The rather sparse justification for this inference provided by Cannon, as mentioned above, is hardly convincing.

The subsequent two assumptions made by the author of the NGA are CR1 and CR2. Together with the previously acknowledged F1, they are supposed to lead to the conclusion CR3. Cannon's idea presented in CR can yet again be clearly expressed—similarly to the previous CO analysis—by the following implication:

$$CR2 \Rightarrow CR3$$

How can the acknowledgment of CR2 be justified? Why should it be expected with a high probability that a future form of humanity—a superhumanity—would create many worlds emulating its evolutionary history? Cannon argues that it is substantiated by mathematical reasons: "The basic idea is that humanity probably would not be the only or first to create many worlds emulating its evolutionary history" (66), as well as technological reasons: "some technologists believe that computation may enable us to run many family history simulations detailed enough to consist of emulated conscious persons" (66). It is hard to deem these justifications for the veracity of CR2 as anything more than tentative futuristic visions.

What constitutes an even greater challenge to the imagination of the recipient of the NGA is the attempt to rationalize the transition from CR2 to the CR3 thesis which states that superhumanity is probably the creator of the world. According to Cannon, this inference imposes itself since, after all, humanity probably would not be the first creator of worlds emulating its

evolutionary history, "so it probably will never create many such worlds unless it is already in such a world" (66). If, on the other hand, it is known that a computer may emulate conscious persons, then "statistics would show we almost certainly are already living" (66) in a world of computer simulation. This type of argumentation cannot be denied originality, but it conforms to science fiction rather than to the standards of scientific methodology.

It is worth noting the consequences of acknowledging the CR3 conclusion that superhumanity is no longer just a future and improved form of humanity, but something that currently exists. Moreover, superhumanity turns out to be an entity that created the world, and therefore also created humanity. CR3 is in stark contrast to the F1 assumption made at the beginning of the NGA. Cannon attempts to abolish this inconsistency by crediting superhumanity with creating "our" humanity (which will also become superhumanity in the future) along the lines of its own evolutionary history. What follows from this, however, is that the current superhumanity must have evolved from some earlier humanity. Still, therefore, F1 (which states that superhumanity originates from humanity) and CR3 (which states that humanity originates from superhumanity) cannot both be true at the same time.

It is also necessary to comment on the last part of the NGA, namely the GC. The final conclusion G1 contained therein upholds the two-way characterization of superhumanity, as it merely employs the conjunction "and" to connect the thesis concerning the future of superhumanity and its secondary nature to humanity—CO3, with the other thesis concerning the past of superhumanity and its primary nature to humanity—CR3. It is only in the conclusion of the NGA that Cannon unifies both aspects of superhumanity in the concept of the compassionate creator (67).

It should be added at this point that although the notion of faith is present in the name of FA, and the notion of God is present in the names of NGA and GC, they are completely absent from the subsequent assumptions and conclusions, including the final conclusion G1. The ending itself demonstrates that the final conclusion of the entire NGA concerns faith in God: "Because a compassionate creator may qualify as God in some religions, trust in our own superhuman potential may entail faith in God, and atheism may entail distrust in our superhuman potential" (67). The idea present in the NGA of the qualities of superhumanity (compassion and being a creator) to be identical to the qualities of God is presented by Cannon with caution: "the Faith Assumption … may be consistent with the religious doctrine of theosis, also known as divinization or deification: the idea that humanity should become God" (65).

Perhaps this is because, after revealing the thesis of the sameness of superhumanity and God, he would have to face an explanation of the soundness of his assumptions: "Humanity will not become extinct before evolving into God" and "God probably would have more decentralized destructive capacity than humanity has," or the conclusion "God probably would be more compassionate than we are."

The final attribution of divine qualities to superhumanity leads to yet another serious objection to the NGA as a whole. Since, by virtue of the very first assumption (F1), we acknowledge the existence of superhumanity/God, the argumentation that leads us to believe in superhumanity/God loses all validity.

FINAL REMARKS

The analysis of the formal and material dimensions of the NGA has exposed the multifold deficiencies of Cannon's proposition. It is hard to say what should be considered the merits of the argument in question. Perhaps it is the originality of the author's take on the traditional question of God's existence, or the pioneering attempt to adapt transhumanist ideas to the format of research conducted within the realm of the philosophy of religion.

However, a more general question of assessing transhumanism as a scientific theory remains open. Is it merely a collection of subjective visions created by thinkers fascinated by technological developments, or is it an attempt to describe a completely new form of reality that the future holds for us?

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LINCOLN CANNON'S TRANSHUMANIST ARGUMENT FOR FAITH IN GOD

Summary

Transhumanists surprisingly often reflect on religious problems. Lincoln Cannon's proposal fits into the classic issues of philosophical argumentation for the existence of God. The New God Argument starts from the belief typical of transhumanists about the reality of the transformation of humanity — thanks to technological achievements — to superhumanity. According to Cannon, belief in human evolution should lead to faith in God. The article contains a possibly precise description of the argument and its formal and material analysis. The correctness of inference (moving from premises to conclusions) and the validity of Cannon's assumptions were verified.

Keywords: New God Argument; Lincoln Cannon; transhumanism; faith in God

TRANSHUMANISTYCZNY ARGUMENT LINCOLNA CANNONA ZA WIARĄ W BOGA

Streszczenie

Transhumaniści nadspodziewanie często podejmują refleksję nad zagadnieniami religijnymi. Propozycja Lincolna Cannona wpisuje się w klasyczną problematykę filozoficznej argumentacji za istnieniem Boga. New God Argument wychodzi od typowego dla transhumanistów przekonania o realności transformacji człowieczeństwa – za sprawą osiągnięć technologicznych – do nad-człowieczeństwa. Wiara w ewolucję człowieka powinna, zdaniem Cannona, skłaniać do wiary w Boga. Artykuł zawiera możliwie precyzyjny opis argumentu oraz jego analizę formalną i materialną. Zweryfikowana została poprawność wnioskowania (przechodzenia od przesłanek do wniosków) oraz zasadność przyjętych przez Cannona założeń.

Słowa kluczowe: New God Argument; Lincoln Cannon; transhumanizm; wiara w Boga