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WOJTYŁA AND KRĄPIEC: TWO WAYS OF RE-EMPIRIZING THOMISTIC ANTHROPOLOGY

A particular challenge was posed to Thomistic anthropology by the studies and reflections on the first-person experience which took place in 20th-century phenomenology, thanks to thinkers such as Edmund Husserl, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Max Scheler, Edith Stein, and Martin Heidegger. As was the case with other fields of philosophical anthropology, not only did Thomistic anthropology have to contend with the development of the exact sciences of man, but it also required re-empirization. Although this anthropology had an empirical basis, it was not obvious with what experience it begins and on what experience it bases its cognition of man. The shortcomings of the in-depth analysis of the inner experience clearly pointed to the need to build a new bridge between the ready-made anthropological system and experience. The thinkers who took up this challenge included two existential Thomists from the Lublin Philosophical School in Poland who were keenly interested in man: Karol Wojtyła¹ and Mieczysław Albert Krąpiec.²

1. THE SPECIFICITY OF THOMISTIC ANTHROPOLOGY

Thomism as a philosophical school has a long tradition dating back to the Middle Ages; at the same time, it is firmly rooted in even older Aristotelianism. Nowadays, it has several variations: traditional, Leuven, transcendental, exi-

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¹ Karol Wojtyła (1920–2005)—a Polish philosopher, theologian, ethicist and pedagogue, Catholic priest, Pope of the Catholic Church—John Paul II. See HOLUB et al. 2017.

² Mieczysław Albert Krąpiec (1921–2008)—a Polish philosopher, theologian, humanist, a priest, Dominican. See CZACHOROWSKI et al. 2020.

stantial, and analytical. Developed in the Lublin Philosophical School, existential Thomism was treated as a school of autonomous philosophy which was independent of theology and the exact sciences in cognizing reality; at the same time, it was a maximalist school whose aim was to discover the first and ultimate causes of the whole of reality (see MARYNIARCZYK and KRAPIEC 2010, 9–10). The center of the Thomistic system is occupied by metaphysics, the object of which is the whole of the existing reality and which provides the basis not only for understanding detailed problems and ways of cognizing but also for solving important problems. Various disciplines of philosophy that are treated as parts of metaphysics differ in terms of the content they are attempting to explain.

[...] Metaphysical cognition into the theory of being splits into particular disciplines only with regard to separate points of departure (separate types of the object of experiential data), and not with regard to the way of the ultimate explanation (and the formal object of the most theoretical theses). (KAMIŃSKI 2018, 219)

With regard to the point of departure, metaphysics is divided into the following disciplines: general metaphysics, the philosophy of nature, the philosophy of man, the philosophy of morality, and the philosophy of other areas of culture.

With this approach, the philosophy of man (like other philosophical disciplines) can be treated as a part of general metaphysics (see KAMIŃSKI 2000, 198–199). At the same time, anthropology is not solely its particularization because it begins its cognition of man with ‘experiential data’ that is proper to human existence, such as anxiety, existential conflict, freedom, activity of the mind, and personal dialogue (see KAMIŃSKI 1989, 20). By applying metaphysical cognition, anthropology aims to explain these facts and—through this cognition—to explain man, who is the subject of these facts.

By applying intellectual intuition to anthropological facts understood as certain ontic states, metaphysical cognition searches for the principle of sufficient reason. Anthropological facts are explained by means of reductive reasoning, which consists in indicating those of their ontic reasons in which negation leads to contradiction of these facts (see KAMIŃSKI 2018, 198). Ultimately, they can be explained by man’s inner ontic structure, which is analogous but not identical to the structures of other beings. These structures are usually inner or outer reasons indicated by metaphysics.

Philosophical anthropology explains human phenomena, their ontic structure and, consequently, their existential position among other beings. Metaphysical claims about the ontic composition of act and potency, properties of beings, and the hierarchy of beings are needed for this [explanation]. (KAMIŃSKI 1989, 261)

This means that anthropology presupposes metaphysics and the philosophy of nature; it also precedes psychology, ethics, aesthetics, and the philosophy of culture. Anthropology also depends on metaphysics for its approach to explaining experiential data and draws on its method and way of conceptualizing cognition. In the crucial aspects of explanation, it also makes use of metaphysical claims, since everything that concerns being also concerns man as a being. At the same time, in its cognition of man, anthropology is independent from claims formulated within theology and the exact sciences (see KAMIŃSKI 2000, 206–208). It has at its disposal a way of approaching anthropological facts that is autonomous to both.

Thomistic anthropology is universalistic. It proposes a comprehensive concept of the study of the cognition of man and a comprehensive concept of understanding man, which—despite all the changes it has undergone—preserves the fundamental claims of St. Thomas' system. It also proposes solutions for each of man's essential problems, or at least the method of their investigation. It strives to capture man's being in the essential ontic aspects of his existence by pointing to his internal and external determinants, the source of his existence, and the aim of his existence. The universalistic character of this anthropology is connected with its centuries-long tradition and its moderate position on many issues, which allows it to make use of the anthropological achievements of other philosophical traditions. The metaphysical character of this anthropology makes it capable of assimilating various approaches and cognitive concepts while preserving its specificity. In our times, however, the question of the universalism of anthropology seems neglected because the conviction that philosophy can provide a holistic picture of man's being has declined.

Thomistic anthropology is metaphysical in character. It would not be an exaggeration to say that “the Thomistic image of man is integrally linked with the image of the world” (MARYNIARCZYK 2008, 505). Man is considered a being which is an integral part of material reality. All transcendental properties refer to man: properties such as being, a thing, unity, separateness, truth, goodness, beauty, as well as all ontic composition, i.e., essence-existence, act-potency, matter-form, substance-accident. As a contingent being, man also remains in a necessary and transcendental relationship to God in the following causes: efficient (existence), final, and formal (extrinsic). Thus, both the ontic structure and the ontic determinants of man make him a being that is analogous but not identical to other material beings. Anthropological facts point to the specificity of inner ontic compositions and to the position of man in reality. Man manifests himself as a being similar to other material beings but, at the same time, distinct from them in every way, which allows recognition of his personal status.

Thomistic anthropology is realistic in character. Its cognitive realism rests on basing cognition on both outer and inner experience. Thus, it makes use of the whole spectrum of human experience. Thanks to its connection with metaphysics, Thomistic anthropology refers to outer experience in solving the most important anthropological problems, such as man's ontic status, his nature, and his place in reality. At the same time, it analyzes basic anthropological facts captured within inner experience, such as consciousness, human cognition, and freedom. Thus, it considers both the first-person and the third-person experience as reliable sources of cognition. An important role is also played by referring to common sense, which is based on everyday cognition, although there is also a tradition of associating this anthropology with scientific cognition.

2. WHAT DID THOMISM LACK?

At the threshold of the 20th century, philosophical reflection on man faced a crisis. This reflection was conducted from the perspective of idealism on the one hand and anti-metaphysical naturalism (advocated by successive waves of positivism and Marxism) on the other. Development of the empirical sciences which were focused on man, e.g., sociology and psychology, questioned the possibility and sense of practicing philosophical anthropology. The German phenomenologist Max Scheler (see SCHELER 2009) attempted to make the specifics of the philosophy of man more precise and to situate it among other anthropologies. As a result, empirical data provided by the exact sciences (biology, physiology, and genetics) were increasingly used in describing man; at the same time, there was a tendency to capture the contents of consciousness—and thus also inner experiences—in an increasingly precise manner. Philosophers of this period linked anthropology with a given type of third- or first-person human experience, which put metaphysical anthropology in a paradoxical situation. Although this anthropology, referring to the whole spectrum of human experience—both outer and inner—was empirically oriented, its empiricism was of an everyday rather than a scientific cognition; moreover, because of its interest in explaining man, it failed to provide a sufficiently precise, complete, or correct description of man's inner experience. With time, the results obtained by empirically oriented non-philosophical and philosophical anthropologies (the philosophy of consciousness) increasingly exposed the lack of empirical basis for a metaphysical image of man. Against the background of marked tendencies in science and philosophy to demonstrate a connection between the empirical basis of knowledge and general claims

(logical empiricism), metaphysical anthropology was in danger of becoming an explanation without foundations. For a long time, the Thomistic system was incapable of indicating any specific experience with which the cognition of man begins or the method of moving from this experience to a whole system, although this connection was clearly visible in various places within the system.

Due to the deficiencies of its empirical foundations, the difficulties encountered by Thomistic anthropology resounded strongly in the thought of the Polish ethicist and personalist, Karol Wojtyła, who would later on become Pope John Paul II. In his *Considerations on the Essence of Man*, published for the first time in 1949, in which he explained the philosophical (Thomistic) and theological understanding of man, he referred to the importance of inner experience for the first time (see WOJTYŁA 2016). Opting for cognitive realism, he emphasized that cognition reaches reality, including the reality that man is, and is revealed in experience. Man is the closest object of experiential cognition and knows this object best. “Each one of us therefore possesses a certain experiential knowledge of man through his own ‘I’ as well as through comparative observation of other people” (ibid., 21). This orientation towards the necessity of taking the human experience into account in the analysis of man found expression in his habilitation dissertation (see WOJTYŁA 1959), which was published a decade later. Wojtyła evaluated Scheler’s ideas from a Thomistic perspective. It is significant that although he considered Scheler’s ethical system generally unsuitable for the construction of Christian ethics (thesis I) (ibid., 118), at the same time he believed that it can be helpful in researching Christian ethics because it facilitates the analysis of ethical facts from the perspective of experience (thesis II) (ibid., 122). Wojtyła explained: “Our intention is to study ethical facts in an experiential way; for we find that they—being a special form of human experience—constitute the object of inner experience” (ibid.).³

It is difficult to say to what extent this analysis of Scheler’s thought consolidated Wojtyła’s conviction that it is necessary to complement classical anthropology with a more thorough analysis of the first-person experience. Undoubtedly, Scheler’s thought helped him to develop the cognitive tools necessary for such analyses. Nevertheless, in his habilitation thesis, while evaluating Scheler’s thought, Wojtyła clearly outlined his own research program, which was the “study of ethical facts from the perspective of experience”. He realized this program in his *Person and Act* (1968).

³ Most probably, Wojtyła’s interest in inner experience resulted from a far-reaching discrepancy between the image of man given in everyday experience, on which Thomism is based, and the scientific image, which has a reductionist and naturalistic bias.

The wealth and diversity of experience, so to speak, provoke the mind, so that it tries to grasp the already-understood reality of the person and act in the most comprehensive way and to explain this reality most fully. This, however, can be accomplished only by way of an increasingly deep entry into experience, into its content. Thanks to this, the person and act are in a sense brought out of darkness. Standing before the mind that cognizes them, they appear more and more fully and more and more comprehensively. Interpretation, or reductive understanding, constitutes, so to speak, an exploration of experience (WOJTYŁA 2021b, 108–109).

Wojtyła did not intend to revolutionize scholastic approaches to understanding the relationship between the existing subject and his action. On the contrary, he explicitly referred to the scholastic *agere sequitur esse* principle in order to demonstrate that action follows existence. Furthermore, because of what the subject is, action manifests both the nature of the acting subject and his existence. Wojtyła's intention was to delve into this relationship, first in the area of experience and then in its interpretation. Because of this relationship, he conducted an in-depth analysis of the person and the act, as well as of their mutual relationship, using the tools developed within both metaphysical anthropology and phenomenology. Wojtyła's attempt to 'bring experience out of darkness' was an expression of his conviction that the Aristotelian-Thomistic image of man is incomplete precisely because of its treatment of experience. Because anthropological facts are not thoroughly captured—in this case, the fact of man's experiencing himself as a subject and the cause of his actions—it is impossible to explain man properly or understand him clearly or fully. Thus, referring to experience is an acknowledgement of the need to complement the image of man as an acting subject with experience, particularly the first-person experience.

Wojtyła questioned neither the empirical foundations of Thomistic anthropology nor this anthropology as a system. However, he clearly showed its limitations, including its 'hiding' of the conscious, first-person experience of being, and he himself strove to unveil this dimension of the experience of being a man. Moreover, for him, it is precisely this inner experience that is the primary source of knowledge about man.

When the traditional approach concerned man as a person, the aspect of consciousness was, on the one hand, contained (hidden, as it were) in 'rationality' [...] and, on the other hand, contained in the will (understood as *appetitus rationalis*) and expressed in *voluntarium*. Our task in this study, however, is the 'explication' of aspects of consciousness—the exposition of consciousness as the essential and constitutive aspect of the entire dynamic structure that is the person and act. (Ibid., 127)

However, the conviction that Thomistic anthropology needed to be supplemented with data from the first-person experience did not solve the problem. It was necessary to re-empirize the Thomistic system in its entirety and to indicate such human experience that would serve as a universal key to the whole anthropology. For Wojtyła, this key was to be found in an act.

3. WOJTYŁA: FROM *AGERE* TO *ESSE* OF HUMAN PERSON

The fundamental foundation of Wojtyła's *Person and Act* was the scholastic principle that action follows existence (*agere/operari sequitur esse*) (see MAZUR 2022, 119–137). According to this principle, action is an expression of what a given being is and how it exists. Based on analysis of an action, this relationship makes it possible to describe the nature and mode of existence of the subject who is the source of the action. Without going into the details of this multi-faceted text, it should be emphasized that Wojtyła did not intend to systematically reveal the person through the analysis of an act. However, assuming the truth of the anthropological cognition of man that is based on this principle, he thoroughly analyzed the nature and mode of existence of the subject of action, the action (act) itself, as well as its moral determinants. At the same time, he tried to clarify the relationship between the subject as the performer of an act and the act itself. “The act is a particular moment of the vision—that is, the experience—of the person” (WOJTYŁA 2021b, 102). Through the act (conscious and voluntary action), which is different from what happens in the person or what happens to the person, the subject manifests itself as the conscious and free performer of his action. The act is the culminating moment in the constitution of man's freedom. Personal self-determination of the subject takes place in the act of decision in which the subject's self-possession and self-governance are revealed (ibid., 208–209), which is why Wojtyła considered the analysis of the act as the key to the anthropological cognition of man.

Wojtyła openly emphasized the need to refer to the whole spectrum of experience in order to cognize man. This experience covers both what is given from the outside and from the inside. The importance he attached to the anthropological role of experience in *Person and Act* was clearly explained in his *Afterword on Person and Act*:

It seems that if we agree to the experiential basis of philosophical anthropology, we must at the same time realize this duality of experience and the fact of its incom-

mensurability, which was also underscored in 'Person and Act'. We must realize all this if only because we use this dual experience *de facto* in the philosophical concept of man or in the theory of man. (WOJTYŁA 2021a, 441)

An important aspect of Wojtyła's systematic analyses of the relationship between the subject and his action was capturing them from the first-person perspective. For him, inner experience, despite its limitations, was inalienable in the anthropological cognition of man. To avoid difficulties stemming from the subjectivity of this experience, he differentiated between subjectivity and subjectivism (see WOJTYŁA 2021b, 157–160). He also pointed to the need to objectivize the contents of inner experience by stabilizing it (i.e., repeatability in time), intersubjectivizing it (i.e., referring to analogous experiences of other subjects), and comparing it with outer experience (see HOŁUB and MAZUR 2017, 81).

Wojtyła's analyses of the person and his action resulted from the need to expand Thomistic anthropology, primarily in the area of understanding man as a subject of action perceived from the inside. In *Person and Act*, Wojtyła repeated the views he had expressed in *Considerations on the Essence of Man*, although he also substantially developed his ideas on anthropology and ethics. Most importantly, he moved beyond postulates concerning the role of the first-person experience in the anthropological cognition of man, trying to take it into consideration wherever possible in concrete analyses of agency as well as in the treatment of man's inner life (action and being affected), in the workings of the mind, and in feelings.

The concept that Wojtyła presented in *Person and Act* initially met with a rather cool reception in the scientific community and was subjected to multifaceted criticism, primarily—though not only—from the Thomistic thinkers. The discussion held on 16 December 1970 at the Catholic University of Lublin (Poland) was an example of the criticism levied at Wojtyła's study. The materials from this discussion were published in the journal *Analecta Cracoviensia* (vol. 5–6, 1973–1974). Some thinkers (GOGACZ 1973–1974, 125–138) questioned the legitimacy of linking metaphysical anthropology with experience and the phenomenological approach, but there were also thinkers who defended Wojtyła's concept (STYCZEŃ 1973–1974, 107–115; JAWORSKI 1973–1974, 91–106). Krąpiec also voiced some moderate criticism of Wojtyła's proposal but supported his suggestion to make action the point of reference for the anthropological cognition of nature, existence and, ultimately, the person as the subject of action. He also appreciated Wojtyła's postulate to take the first-person perspective into account when analyzing acts, although he objected to Wojtyła's focus on the subjective side of these acts, i.e., how they are emanated by the subject, but not their objective side, i.e., towards

what (i.e., what particular objects) they are directed. According to Krąpiec, Wojtyła's study, while emphasizing the existential moment and the actuality of the person, does not adequately address the theory of the person or human nature. Moreover, in Krąpiec's opinion, Wojtyła limited his analyses to moral acts, thus his concept does not meet the requirements of anthropology in the metaphysical sense since it does not constitute the decontradictionification of fundamental human acts.⁴ "It is, however, an aspectual anthropology—an anthropology for the use of the ethicist, the moralist—and therefore an anthropology which allows a deeper understanding of man as the subject of morality" (KRĄPIEC 1973–1974, 57–58).

Krąpiec did not question the foundations on which Wojtyła based his analyses as he agreed with the claim that the analysis of acts leads to anthropological cognition of the subject who performs them. "Analysis of various spiritual, conscious, and primarily (but not only!) cognitive acts can become a tool for developing an anthropological philosophical theory" (ibid., 60). Although Krąpiec acknowledged the validity of the scholastic *agere sequitur esse* principle in the anthropological cognition of man, he demanded that a broader spectrum of personal acts be taken into account, and he openly advocated practicing anthropology in a metaphysical way.

After the aforementioned discussion devoted to *Person and Act*, Wojtyła himself responded to the accusations. Defending his study and position, he once again pointed to experience. He questioned the polarization between the metaphysical and phenomenological approaches to the anthropological cognition of man. He disagreed with the accusation that he separated anthropology from metaphysics and explained that experience, apart from other elements, is the foundation of metaphysics and that metaphysics can be applied to the theory of the person only if it refers to the specific experience of man.

The point in 'Person and Act' was not to deny the connection of the theory of the person with the general theory of being, but to manifest that the 'proper categories of human being' [...] have their own basis in experience—we could say, in their own proper experience. Understanding the specificity of the human being as personal is, in this way, possible and at the same time less 'theoretical'—that is, less threatened by the danger of pure rationalism. The person is a reality far more visual than it might seem through the prism of pure speculation. What can otherwise be a result of 'laborious analyses' in the field of metaphysics has its realness in the experience of man. The path of philosophical anthropology itself proceeds from this experience, and it proceeds 'in the perspective of the philosophy of being'. (WOJTYŁA 2001a, 438)

⁴ On the concept of metaphysical decontradictionification see KAMIŃSKI 2018, 197–199.

Thus, it is clear that Wojtyła primarily wanted to tie classical anthropology with experience rather than detach it from its metaphysical core. There is no doubt, however, that it was precisely through his concept of linking this anthropology with experience and with the experience of act and agency that he gave this universalist anthropology its own face. It was an anthropology limited in scope but—within its scope—deeper and more penetrating. Moreover, it allowed Wojtyła to positively verify the correctness of the classical image of man and to make it more detailed (see HOŁUB 2022, 145–161).

4. KRAPIEC: FROM THE EXPERIENCE OF EXISTENCE TO THE EXISTENCE OF THE PERSON

Around the same time that Polish philosophers were discussing *Person and Act*, Mieczysław Krąpiec published a short article entitled “Idee przewodnie we współczesnej filozofii człowieka [Leading ideas in the contemporary philosophy of man]” (KRAPIEC 1970, 21–33). In this article, he voiced his opposition to the tendencies that were dominant in anthropology at that time, i.e., naturalist-objectivist structuralism and existentialism, which grew out of the philosophy of the subject. Krąpiec treated Heidegger’s existentialism as a continuation of the Orphic-Platonic tradition, which is based on directly captured inner experiences, especially higher experiences, which manifest themselves in man’s transcendence of nature. Claude Lévi-Strauss’s structuralism, on the other hand, was for him a continuation of the Aristotelian tradition, which treated man as part of nature and thus as an integral part of rational reality. Against the background of his analysis of the concepts of these two thinkers, Krąpiec outlined his own interpretation of the Thomistic image of man, which he developed in his later work *I-man* (first published in 1974; KRAPIEC 1983). “Idee przewodnie we współczesnej filozofii człowieka” can be regarded as a continuation of Krąpiec’s debate with Wojtyła concerning experience, which should be the starting point for the anthropological cognition of man.

In developing his anthropological concept, Krąpiec (like Wojtyła) turned to experience, to which he gave primacy over all forms of interpretation (both philosophical and scientific). In his opinion, interpretations which are not in accordance with experiential data should be rejected, because—as interpretations—they are mediated through the process of thinking. Instead, experiential data should be explained in terms of the ultimate (and therefore metaphysical) aspect of explanation. The fundamental question, however, is what kind of human

experience Krapiec had in mind. Like Wojtyła, Krapiec analyzed the content of inner experience. For him, the fundamental element of inner experience was experiencing oneself as 'I'—the subject who directly cognizes his existence (*that he is*) but does not directly cognize his nature (*what he is*).

We possess direct inner experience of the presence of 'I', of the existence of 'I', but we do not know his (I) nature. The self is directly given as performing various 'my'-acts; it is given only from the side of existence and not from the side of nature. (KRAPIEC 1970, 30)

Therefore, while knowing that we are, we do not know who we are. Instead, man captures himself visually as a subject who emanates and causes various 'my'-acts. Hence, analysis of the acts that manifest in experience makes the anthropological cognition of man's nature possible thanks to correspondence between the subject and his action. In relation to these acts, the 'I' at the same time experiences *immanence*, i.e., his real presence in every 'my'-act, and *transcendence* over each performed act and over the totality of 'my'-acts (see *ibid.*, 32).

At the starting point of his anthropology, Krapiec, like Wojtyła, referred to the experience of man's subjective activity, but he placed it at a more fundamental level, which constitutes the basis for performing personal acts. He also referred to the 'I' as a real subject that is also the source of all acts cognitively captured in the act of their emanation.

In all our conscious experiences, we experience that it is 'I' who performs actions and acts of the most varied content: both material and immaterial. 'My'-acts, which are experientially linked with matter (e.g., physiological activities such as headache, stomach ache, heart ache, etc.) and acts that turn out to be immaterial in their structure (such as acts of conceptual and assertive cognition, acts of reasoning, acts of reflection, love, etc.), have a diverse structure. (*Ibid.*, 29–30)

Krapiec enriches this approach to the subject as the 'I' that performs heterogeneous 'my'-acts by analyzing the nature and object of these acts in their multiplicity and diversity. Anthropological cognition of who man is requires analysis of the specificity of 'my'-acts. Experience demonstrates that 'my'-acts have different natures: material, inner, and spiritual. Since there is adequacy between acts and the subject who performs them, only an immaterial subject can ultimately be the explanation of immaterial acts. On the other hand, this subject also performs material acts; hence, the subjective 'I' must also be material (see *ibid.*, 30–31). According to Krapiec, the experience of both the immanence and transcendence of the self in 'my'-acts as well as the multiplicity and heterogeneity

of acts require systemic explanation. For this purpose, he reaches back into the history of philosophy. Plato's concept of man as a spirit imprisoned in a body can well explain the experience of the self's transcendence over 'my'-acts, but it does not explain the experience of immanence in relation to them. In Aristotle, it is the opposite: according to him, a soul (understood as the form of a body) well explains the experience of immanence but is not sufficient to explain the experience of transcendence of the self over 'my'-acts. However, the experience of the immanence and transcendence of the self in relation to 'my'-acts is well explained by Thomas Aquinas' concept, according to which a soul is a spiritual subject and at the same time a form that organizes for itself a human body out of matter. The soul gives the body its subjective existence and forms a psychophysical unity with it, thanks to which, together with the body and through the body, it can actualize its potencies (see *ibid.*, 31). In this way, Krapiec points to the bridge which leads him from experience and its interpretation to the Thomistic system. He emphasizes that Aquinas' solution, while avoiding the shortcomings and one-sidedness of Plato's and Aristotle's positions, brings to the surface their personal aspect of existence, in which it resembles both existentialists' analyses and the issue of a self-contained soul organizing a body, which was understood one-sidedly by Aristotle and contemporary structuralists (see *ibid.*, 32).

Referring to the experience of one's existence stretched between the 'I' and the 'my'-acts emanated by the 'I' is probably the most original element of Krapiec's anthropology. As a result, he not only touches the experiential foundations of Thomistic anthropology but also proposes a completely new—in comparison with the Aristotelian-Thomistic tradition—starting point. The point where they meet is the transition from the immanence and transcendence of the self in 'my'-acts to the concept of the soul. Krapiec believes that the soul is the reason for experiencing the subjective unity of man and the multiplicity and heterogeneity of his acts, because "The essential unity in multiplicity is non-contradictory only when it is connected in the relations of act to potency, when a single act has the potentiality of being expressed in multiple 'structures' actualized finally by a single act" (KRAPIEC 1983, 100). He explains the experience of the immanence and transcendence of the self in relation to 'my'-acts by referring to the spiritual nature of the soul, understood as an act and a form which organizes a body for itself to which it gives its own act of existence (see *ibid.*, 103–104). It can be said that here a metaphysical leap is made: from the order of describing the contents of experience to a systemic order.

In his interpretation of inner experience, Krapiec brings out the moment of transcendence of the self:

Having the direct—always present in all inner and conscious acts—provable existence of our own ‘I’, which is the fulfiller of the contents of our acts, we immediately perceive the transcendence of this ‘I’ in relation to all experienced content. These contents are ‘threaded’ onto the being of the ‘I’. They are ‘mine’ because ‘I’ give them life; ‘I’ give them my being. It is true that they also ‘build’ me in a specific way, ultimately enriching the nature of this ‘I’, but it is ‘I’ who called them into being. (KRAPIEC 1970, 32)

According to Krapiec, this special relation of the subject to his acts indicates the personal mode of existence of man as a subject who does not receive this existence by virtue of nature (i.e., the fact that he is a specimen of the species) but who exists by virtue of the soul, which organizes its nature for itself. Thus, Krapiec acknowledges that the experience of subjective existence and the performance of acts, whilst not covering the whole area of human experience, constitute a sufficient basis both for the consolidation of the Thomistic version of hylomorphism and for recognition of the personal status of man (see *ibid.*, 32–33).

CONCLUSIONS

Wojtyła and Krapiec were not the only twentieth-century Thomists who understood the need to complement Thomistic anthropology with experience. Despite its realistic character, Thomistic anthropology was unable to demonstrate how to move from experience to a system. Its re-empirization entailed assimilating cognitive tools developed in the modern philosophy of the subject, especially the phenomenological description of inner experience. This assimilation was not merely the application of the phenomenological method and its assumptions to metaphysical solutions: it used some of these elements to capture and describe detailed anthropological facts. In their interpretations, Wojtyła and Krapiec searched for their ‘own’ anthropological facts which could constitute a starting point for the Thomistic system. Both looked for such facts in the first-person experience of the subjectification of personal acts.

As an ethicist, Wojtyła was inspired by the scholastic *agere sequitur esse* formula, according to which a being manifests itself through action. He based his main work on man’s experience of agency (act) contrasted with what happens within man. A thorough analysis of this experience from the first-person perspective (phenomenological reduction) as well as from the third-person perspective (metaphysical reduction) allowed him to more fully show both the person as the subject of action and the relation that exists between the person and his act.

By referring to first-person experience, Wojtyła not only enriched the system of Thomistic anthropology, which was primarily based on third-person experience, but also clarified the issue of the mutual relation between inner and outer experience in the anthropological cognition of man. In this way, he took advantage of the possibilities created by the modern philosophy of the subject to re-empirize and thus renew Thomistic anthropology.

Krapiec shared Wojtyła's view on the necessity of re-empirizing Thomistic anthropology. However, because he took a critical approach to Wojtyła's concept, he had to propose an alternative starting point for the philosophy of man. He turned to the direct experience of human existence as the 'I' which emanates a multitude of heterogeneous 'my'-acts, which he analyzed from a wider perspective than Wojtyła. He captured this experience as descriptively as possible and separated it from interpretation and explanation. Moreover, he analyzed it not as an ethicist, who directs his attention to the act and the application of the act to the rational nature of being which a person is, but as a metaphysician, who searches for the principle of sufficient reason and finds it in the subject which is spiritual and corporeal. In contrast to Wojtyła, Krapiec used the data from the first-person experience to first show human ontic structure and then justify man's personal status.

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WOJTYŁA AND KRĄPIEC: TWO WAYS OF RE-EMPIRIZING THOMISTIC ANTHROPOLOGY

S u m m a r y

The development of studies on the first- and third-person human experience which took place in the 20th century revealed the need to re-empirize Thomistic anthropology. Among the thinkers who undertook this task were Karol Wojtyła and Mieczysław Krąpiec. This re-empirization was linked with adapting the cognitive tools developed within the modern philosophy of the subject to descriptions of the first-person experience. Wojtyła assumed that the starting point of the cognition of the personal subject was the experience of performing an act, in opposition to what happens within a man. Krąpiec criticized this concept and proposed basing Thomistic anthropology on the subjective experience of existence, in which the 'I' manifests itself through 'my'-acts. The experience of the act, on the one hand, and the immanence and transcendence of the self in relation

to 'my'-acts, on the other hand, allowed these philosophers to build an anthropological bridge to the Thomistic system.

Keywords: Karol Wojtyła; Mieczysław Krąpiec; Thomistic anthropology; first-person experience; empirization; re-empirization

WOJTYŁA I KRĄPIEC: DWA SPOSOBY REEMPIRYZACJI ANTROPOLOGII TOMISTYCZNEJ

Streszczenie

Rozwój studiów nad pierwszo- i trzecioosobowym doświadczeniem ludzkim, jaki nastąpił w XX wieku, ujawnił potrzebę reempiryzacji antropologii tomistycznej. Wśród myślicieli, którzy podjęli się tego zadania, byli Karol Wojtyła i Mieczysław Krąpiec. Reempiryzacja ta była związana z dostosowaniem narzędzi poznawczych wypracowanych w ramach nowożytnej filozofii podmiotu do opisu doświadczenia pierwszoosobowego. Wojtyła zakładał, że punktem wyjścia poznania osobowego podmiotu jest doświadczenie spełniania aktu, w opozycji do tego, co dzieje się w człowieku. Krąpiec poddał krytyce tę koncepcję i zaproponował oparcie antropologii tomistycznej na podmiotowym doświadczeniu istnienia, w którym „ja” przejawia się poprzez „moje”-akty. Z jednej strony doświadczenie aktu, a z drugiej – immanencja i transcendencja „ja” w odniesieniu do „moich”-aktów pozwoliły tym filozofom zbudować antropologiczny pomost do systemu tomistycznego.

Słowa kluczowe: Karol Wojtyła; Mieczysław Krąpiec; antropologia tomistyczna; doświadczenie pierwszoosobowe; empiryzacja; reempiryzacja

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