

PIOTR MAZUR

TWO CONCEPTS OF UNDERSTANDING THE ACTING SUBJECT: ARENDT AND WOJTYŁA*

Hannah Arendt and Karol Wojtyła are two twentieth-century philosophers interested in understanding the dynamism of the acting subject, as demonstrated in particular by their works *The Human Condition* (1958) and *Osoba i czyn* (1969; in English as *Person and Act*, 2021), which are of our interest here. For all their differences, they share a belief that human action is a manifestation of man's mode of existence, in line with the Scholastic principle *agere sequitur esse*.¹ Wojtyła, by analysing the source of action, points to the nature of the acting subject, while Arendt, focusing on the determinants and consequences of action, highlights human condition. For Wojtyła, action is primarily an expression of man's personal status, whereas for Arendt, it serves as a public manifestation of man's unique individuality. Together, Arendt and Wojtyła offer two distinct yet complementary perspectives of the acting subject and his practical activity, which finds expression in the public sphere and in ethics. In addition to their interest in the human subject and its actions, what connects the two outstanding philosophers is the phenomenological tradition within which their thinking developed. Arendt's views were shaped by her academic teachers, Husserl, Heidegger and Jaspers, while Wojtyła's views were influenced by Scheler, whose ethical thought he analysed in his habilitation thesis (WOJTYŁA 1959). This phenomenological imprint is visible in both philosophers' approach to the human subject and its actions.

PIOTR MAZUR, PhD, Habil., Professor, Ignatianum University in Cracow, Institute of Philosophy; correspondence address: ul. Kopernika 26, 31-501 Kraków, Poland; e-mail: piotr.mazur@ignatianum.edu.pl; ORCID: <https://orcid.org/0000-0002-6399-8133>.

*The article is a continuation of my text entitled "Two Conceptions of Understanding Human Action. Hannah Arendt and Karol Wojtyła," *Ethos* 37, no. 2 (2024): 181–95, comparing the concepts of human action presented in Arendt's *The Human Condition* (1958) and Wojtyła's *Osoba i czyn* (1969).

¹ There is no reference to Arendt's work in Wojtyła's study, which suggests that the two books were written independently of each other.

1. HUMAN CONDITION

Arendt juxtaposes the human condition with nature. In doing so, according to Conovan, she deliberately abandons the use of the term “nature” in order to oppose the hubristic fantasies of totalitarianism and modernity and to emphasise that we are all subject to conditions which we cannot escape (CONOVAN 1992, 104). According to this German philosopher, there is a far-reaching discrepancy between the openness and pluralism that characterise the human race and the generic concept of “man”. In her works before *The Human Condition*, she contrasts human diversity, individuality, and spontaneity with totalitarian tendencies whose aim is to transform human nature according to an ideological pattern (ARENDR 1979). In *The Human Condition*, Arendt justifies her negative stance towards the concept of human nature not so much with her objection to totalitarianism as with epistemological and ontological considerations. In her opinion, man does not possess nature understood as the essence of things; and even if he did, he would not be capable of adequately grasping it. No set of characteristics or activities used to describe man captures his essence because this requires grasping the subjective dimension of his existence in an objective aspect, which is impossible.² In order to emphasise the impossibility of grasping human nature, she states that “only a god could know and define it” (ARENDR 1998, 10). Arendt complements her agnosticism regarding the possibility of discovering human nature with a nominalist approach regarding its existence. In her opinion, people are beings that are unlike other beings. Moreover, they are not copies of a single pattern, and their similarity essentially boils down to the fact that they are dissimilar to one another and act in individual ways (8). The ontic distinctness and uniqueness of human individuals ultimately testifies to the fact that, just as there is no generally conceived man (man as such), there is also no generally conceived nature that is common to all representatives of the human species. However, this approach does not mean that the occurrence of identical determinants for the existence of all human subjects is not possible.

Having rejected nature, Arendt (1998, 9–10) focuses her considerations on the human condition. What, however, is this condition? “The human condition is not the same as human nature, and the sum total of human activities and

² Unlike Arendt, Wojtyła (2021a, 157–60) believes that facts which manifest in the experiential (inner) sphere are objective, even though they are given in man’s subjectivity. To this end, he distinguishes subjectivity as an aspect of the subject’s objective reality accessible through consciousness from subjectivism, in which consciousness is replaced by subjectivity.

capabilities which correspond to the human condition does not constitute anything like human nature". The human condition refers to existence and indicates the way of life. In order to show the dynamism of the human condition, Arendt refers to its basic manifestations. However, in denying the existence of human nature, she encounters a problem with justifying the choice of action, work, and labour as "the most elementary articulations of the human condition" (5) and therefore something inherent and, in some sense, common to all people. Aware of the difficulty with identifying these and not other activities in order to analyse the human condition, she states that she is concerned with "those activities that traditionally, as well as according to current opinion, are within the range of every human being" (5). However, it is not clear whether she understands current opinion as common-sense convictions of community members or as the philosophical tradition dating back to Aristotle and his division of practical activities. It remains an open question as to where this tradition and current opinion come from if man has no way of discovering his nature.

The shape of the human condition depends on its various conditions to such an extent that "men, no matter what they do, are always conditioned beings" (ARENDT 1998, 9). Like it or not, this statement applies not only to the human condition but also to human nature. Some conditions are related to the totality of existence, e.g., birth and death (8), while others are related to particular dynamisms of existence or their interactions with one another. There are also conditions that affect the human condition entirely from the outside. According to Arendt, everything with which man comes into contact turns into a condition of human existence. A progressive change in conditions, like emigrating to another planet where man is not fully adapted to the living conditions there, can therefore change the meaning and the purpose of the entire human dynamism and consequently the shape of the human condition. Such a change would result in a situation in which "neither labour nor work nor action nor, indeed, thought as we know it would then make sense any longer" (10). Emphasising the significant impact of various conditions on human existence, Arendt observes that even such basic conditions as life itself, birth, death, worldliness, plurality, and the earth are not absolute. Therefore, despite their impact on the human condition, they cannot provide a sufficient basis for understanding who human beings are (10–11).³

³ Characteristically, Arendt, while rejecting human nature, points to the human subject as "someone" rather than "something". According to Wojtyła, the difference between these pronouns is not accidental as it distinguishes between personal and non-personal entities.

2. HUMAN NATURE

Unlike Arendt, Wojtyła is convinced that human nature exists and is cognisable. In his opinion, nature as the source of all human activity should not be detached from the individual subject. Therefore, advocating a Thomistic understanding of nature, he primarily tries to describe the relation between an act and nature as its source.⁴ For Wojtyła, “nature is ... the basis of the essential coherence between the one who acts (or something that acts, if the agent is not man) and his action. Speaking more broadly and more strictly, nature is the basis of the essential coherence between the subject of dynamism and the entire dynamism of this subject” (2021a, 184). According to Wojtyła, nature is the source of the entire human dynamism and manifests itself through the entire human dynamism, which consists of both “man acts” and “what happens in man”. Nature plays the role of an intermediary between the subject and the dynamism, but it also gives the dynamism a subjective hallmark and makes man emanate these and not other activities, between which there occur these and not other relations. Thus, it is thanks to his nature that the concrete human subject emanates acts that are proper to him and therefore “human” by both being an agent of his acts and by being a subject to all that happens within him. A special characteristic of human nature is that not only the general, species-related qualities of man but also his personal individuality are manifested through it. Wojtyła, contrary to Arendt’s conviction, argues that it is human nature—which is the expression of a personal mode of existence—that allows man to live and act in a way that is individual and at the same time unique (TAYLOR 2009, 452).

According to Wojtyła, individual existence is proper to human nature and thus to “humanity” (WOJTYŁA 2021a, 185); elsewhere he specified that he understands humanity not “as an abstract idea of man, but ... as a personal ‘I’, every time unique and unrepeatable” (WOJTYŁA 2021b, 488). Human nature is something that realistically exists only in the individual subject as a principle of action, although it can be cognitively abstracted and can point to the universal characteristics of each individual who belongs to the species *homo sapiens* and to his ontic status as a personal being. This fact deserves to be emphasised because Arendt undermines the possibility of such a generalisation of the way

⁴ As Taylor (2009, 449) observes in his description of human nature, “Wojtyła shifts between the phenomenological description of nature as necessity and the metaphysical definition of nature as an inherent property of man—that is, human nature. As distinct modes of existence, nature and the person are opposites. From a personalist perspective, however, free will is integral to human nature.”

in which man acts (action of an individual as man) and contrasts it with actions of concrete individuals (action of an individual as an individual) and communities.

In his works, Wojtyła does not use the term “human condition”. It seems that he would agree with Arendt that “the human condition is not the same as human nature”. As a philosopher, however, he is aware that man can differently realise the dynamisms which are inherent in his nature, including the dynamisms of action, labour, and work.⁵ For Wojtyła, the human condition would certainly not be the opposite of nature but rather the method and expression of its realisation—individual and collective—at a given time and in a given social environment. Wojtyła would agree with Arendt that no set of qualities is sufficient to fully characterise man, especially when he is conceived as the person; however, unlike her, he believes that certain qualities are inherent in man’s essence-nature (e.g. reasonableness) and that a concrete man must possess them to exist.⁶ If, for Arendt, “the most radical change in the human condition we can imagine would be an emigration of men from the earth to some other planet” (1998, 10), which would change all conditions of human existence, then for nature, as understood by Wojtyła, such a change would be virtually meaningless because a change of the human condition cannot change the reasonableness of human nature. According to Arendt, the historical changeability of the way in which basic human activities are manifested in the form of action, labour, and work is an expression of the fluidity of the human condition. The limits of this change are determined by the human condition itself, which cannot become something other than a condition. However, for Wojtyła, the very fact that human nature is manifested precisely through these and not other activities testifies to its permanence and immutability. Two different ways of looking at human practical activities and two pictures of human existence meet in Arendt’s and Wojtyła’s conceptions.

From the perspective of Arendt’s considerations, it can be said that the condition is dynamic and dependent on biologically understood nature, social life, and man’s capacity to transcend his limitations. There is no human condition outside conditions. In this sense, existence is the foundation of particular dynamisms through which it is manifested, while the condition is a derivative of these conditions. The condition relates to social life, and it changes over time, depending on the conditions that accompany human life. As such, it has a socio-cultural

⁵ Wojtyła was also interested in work and art, but he managed to reflect on them more extensively (albeit only to a limited extent from a philosophical perspective) as Pope John Paul II in his encyclical *Laborem exercens* (1981) and the *Letter to Artists* (1999).

⁶ According to the Thomistic assumption, a being cannot exist without that which constitutes it, and what constitutes him is its essence and therefore its nature.

character and is realised in correlation with reality. Taking Wojtyła's considerations into account, it can be said that nature is constant and "endows" man with dynamism. Nature cannot change because it defines the ontic limits of man's dynamism and his basic types. The changeability of the way in which this dynamism is manifested in response to various conditions does not change nature, although changeability allows nature to be realised in a slightly different way or to a slightly different extent.

Although the positions of these two philosophers can hardly be considered compatible, mainly because of Arendt's approach to human nature, this does not mean their views cannot complement each other. The condition does not replace nature because it does not reveal the first source of the human dynamism. At the same time, nature does not replace the condition because it ignores the historical-cultural dynamics of human activity and its reciprocal impact on human existence. If nature points to the source of activity and its purpose, then the condition points to how it is realised. Although the condition cannot be reduced to nature—because it has its own conditions, which are also inscribed in culture—it can be considered to be the cultural articulation of human nature. The discourse on the human condition does not replace the discourse on nature but certainly complements it, and focusing on this condition shifts the problem of the specificity of human action from the ontological or epistemological planes to the cultural plane, including its political dimension.

3. PERSONS AS SUBJECTS OF ACTION

The analyses conducted by Wojtyła and Arendt ultimately aim to provide a characterisation of man as the subject of action. Wojtyła explicitly points to the subject as the concrete source of activity, while aiming to provide the fullest possible characterisation of the relationship between an act and its personal agent. He also addresses the issue of the subject of action in the social sphere. Arendt does not pose the question of subjective agency as strongly as Wojtyła but recognises the public sphere as an expression of the presence and activity of individual subjects who create this sphere through their action. However, in her considerations, the issue of the collective subject of action is more complicated than in Wojtyła's.

Wojtyła focuses on the action and nature not of some abstract man but of a concretely existing man (WOJTYŁA 2021b, 471–72; cf. MUSCARI 1988). He treats the acting subject according to the Thomistic tradition as an ontic *suppositum*,

which “inheres at the basis of every dynamic structure, of every action and happening, of every efficacy and subjectivity” (WOJTYŁA 2021a, 175; on the *suppositum* see TAYLOR 2009, 421–29). Traditionally, the *suppositum* was treated as an existing and acting individual. As Hołub argues, Wojtyła reformulates and enriches the classical notion of the subject according to the knowledge gained in modern and contemporary thought. “Wojtyła is convinced that we need something more to bring out the richness and complexity of the person. Thus, he introduces the concept of the personal subject. It is not a separate structure as if attached to *suppositum*, but it is deeply rooted in the latter. In other words, *suppositum* is a basis for the personal subject and is manifested in that; but for the latter to come to be the essential role is also played by experience” (HOŁUB 2021, 50).

According to Wojtyła, the metaphysical subjectivity of a human being is distinguished from the subjectivity of other beings by the fact that it is personal, which is manifested from both within and without. The relationship with consciousness is fundamental for the personal subject viewed from within, as it is thanks to this relationship that the concrete man experiences himself as a subject and thinks of himself as “I” (HOŁUB 2021, 63). The personal subject viewed from without is distinguished by his rational nature and his action (*operari*) proper to it, which is an act (WOJTYŁA 2021b, 474–75). On the one hand, an act allows the subject to integrate all the dynamisms inherent in him; on the other hand, through an act as a decision, he self-determines himself and most fully expresses his freedom and his attitude to the world of values. Along with self-determination, other qualities of the subject, i.e., self-possession and self-governance, are also manifested. Rational nature grants the hallmark of universality—and thus of “humanity”—to the action of the human subject; at the same time, by means of self-determination, it allows him to realise his own individuality to an extent unavailable to other beings. In summary, according to Wojtyła, through an act the human subject manifests to the outside world his rational nature, self-determination (freedom), autonomy, uniqueness, and unrepeatability. These properties reveal the fundamental difference between subjects who are conscious agents of their actions, and subjects who also act but who are deprived of that agency which results from self-determination. The concepts of “somebody” and “something” are the cognitive expression of this difference; according to Wojtyła, these concepts reflect the intuitive distinction between beings that exist in a personal and non-personal mode (WOJTYŁA 2021a, 176).

Although Wojtyła’s main interest is the person as an individual subject, he does not neglect the person’s social dimension and discusses the relational and

social aspect of the person's activity. Following philosophers of dialogue, he emphasises the importance of the "I"—"you" relationship and draws attention to a wider range of interpersonal relationships that make up social life. The relationship between the "I" and the "you" as the "other 'I'" is a reciprocal manifestation of the personal subjectivity of the people who enter this relationship, which reveals the transcendence and search for self-fulfilment of each of them. In such a situation, this reciprocal relationship between people becomes an authentic subjective community, which can and should be deepened and developed towards an interhuman "we" (*communio personarum*) (WOJTYŁA 2021b, 492–99). For Wojtyła, there is a difference between this "we" of the interpersonal communion and the "we" of society as an interpersonal community, which Arendt analyses in greater detail. According to Wojtyła, this communion and this community interpenetrate and condition each other. The social community is oriented towards the realisation of the common good. In the relation of all particular "I" to the common good, man can and should obtain confirmation of his personal subjectivity by having his agency recognised. Only a community that makes this possible deserves to be called a community. When, by acting together with others, man performs "true acts" and fulfils himself in them, his cooperation takes the form of participation (WOJTYŁA 2021a, 396). The antithesis of participation is alienation, which prevents man from fulfilling himself in some aspect of community formation. Alienation occurs when a person excludes himself or is excluded by others from the process of cooperation of a community as a subject. A similar alienation in the I-you relationship occurs when the "you" as the other "I" is lost and replaced by "you" as "the other" who becomes alien or hostile. Alienation thus distorts a community and ultimately also harms the person as a subject of action. For this reason, how a person participates in an acting community belongs to the realm of morality and is subject to moral evaluation (WOJTYŁA 2021b, 511–12).

Wojtyła shows that man is not a subject isolated from reality and from other persons but acts in community with others and for others. Interpersonal relationships do not invalidate the fundamental subjectivity of the person in existence and action, which social subjectivity and social action only complement. Although—as a result of man's cooperation with others—the relational subjectivity in the form of "we" is granted to this or that community of persons (it is real), it exists only by virtue of individual subjective existence. In the strict sense, for Wojtyła, the first and proper subject of action is the person as an individual (WOJTYŁA 2021a, 394).

4. INDIVIDUALS AS SUBJECTS OF ACTION

Arendt's approach to the subject of action is more complex than Wojtyła's. For him, the communal aspect of action is merely an addition to individual action, while for her, action is public in itself. According to Arendt, the very specificity of action, which is "the only activity that goes on directly between man without the intermediary of things or matter", situates the individual subject among other subjects (VILA-CHÃ 1994, 478). Arendt sharply contrasts the public dimension of actions of people as individuals with actions of people as the universalised subject to which philosophers usually refer. As she observes, it is "men, not Man, [who] live on the earth and inhabit the world". Her conviction of the dissimilarity of human subjects and the dissimilarity of their mode of action ultimately leads her to adopt a nominalist view on the possibility of universalising the image of man (essence) and his mode of action (nature). Behind action, understood by Arendt (1998, 180) as the manifestation of one's presence in the public sphere, there is always a concrete individual who is its author: "Action without a name, a 'who' attached to it, is meaningless" because, as Tsao (2002, 104) points out, "there is nobody there to tell the story about." Inscribed in the public sphere is the plurality and diversity of individual "who" as subjects. For Arendt these subjects are much more relativised and socially conditioned than for Wojtyła; although they preserve their individuality, they undergo certain anonymisation, which Tchir (2017, 16) explains explicitly: "Arendt posits the individuated actor, not as a sovereign and self-transparent subject whose action expresses an authentic individual essence, but as a decentered and ecstatic 'who' that, in plurality with others, reveals meaningful dimensions of the shared world and of one's specific current and historical situation."

Although for Arendt the individual is a subject of action that is not as ontically strong and as distinct from others as for Wojtyła, neither is this subject as deeply submerged in community and as dependent on community as in collectivist conceptions. What distinguishes the human subject are speech and action (VILA-CHÃ 1994, 478). These activities are conditioned by two essential characteristics of human subjects: equality and distinction. Equality is a necessary condition for people to communicate and understand each other, while distinction is a condition for using speech and action in order to be understood by others. The plurality of human subjects that make up a community and the impossibility of universalising their individual action makes Arendt direct her interests towards the public sphere. She does not deny that individual subjects are the agents of their actions, but she is interested in what happens in the public sphere, where

“people are willing to announce their projects, lay claim to their deeds, and give others a stake in how they turn out” (TSAO 2002, 104). Thus, it is the public sphere, politics, and social life that become the fundamental object of her interest and analyses. Arendt sharply opposes recognising that humanity—which is an abstraction—is a subject of action, including the subject of political action. On this issue, she enters into discussion with Marx’s conception. In order to avoid misunderstandings, she distinguishes between the human species (“man-kind”) and humanity (“mankind”) as a whole which covers the sum total of all human beings (ARENDR 1998, 43). She adopts this approach also in her understanding of history, in which it is not mankind that is a subject of action but in which there are many individual subjects of action (“actors” and “speakers”). Interestingly, she notices the error of treating a community as a certain whole not only in collectivist conceptions but also in liberal thought. In her opinion, the notion of the interest of society as a whole—to which liberal economists refer—is based on treating it as the unity of society, when in fact “social activity is the result of the intentions of several individuals” (44). A similar problem relates to the notion of a division of labour, in which it is assumed that society is a single subject and that its needs are met by individual subjects as part of a collective. Arendt thus steers towards a realist view of a community as a secondary and relational subject composed of individual subjects. Mankind or society are not subjects of action, labour, politics, or history. Granting them subjectivity and making them independent in various contexts related to action is considered by Arendt to be wrong.

The distinctiveness of subjects in social action raises the question of the unity of society. According to Arendt, the community of action of distinct human subjects is constituted by two things: first, its public character, which results from the fact that in politics the human subject directly affects other subjects—unlike in other human activities, including practical ones, such as art; second, by its orientation towards the same object, which is other people. “Under the conditions of a common world, reality is not guaranteed primarily by the ‘common nature’ of all men who constitute it, but rather by the fact that, differences of position and the resulting variety of perspectives notwithstanding, everybody is always concerned with the same object” (ARENDR 1998, 57–58). Arendt rejects the concept of community as a collective subject of action but at the same time recognises community as the subject of the condition. The “human” condition is not the condition of man conceived as a species of man as an individual, nor is it the condition of people who live in a particular geographical area at a particular time. The human condition, as understood by Arendt, refers to a community that

is conceived in a somehow universalised way and that covers different human collectivities at a given time. This means that Arendt only to a certain extent succeeds in abandoning the universalist image of man, namely the image of man as a subject of cognition and action that emerges from a broadly understood philosophical tradition.

Both Arendt and Wojtyła agree that people as individuals are the real subjects of their actions, but they take different approaches to the subjectivity of the existence and action of communities. Wojtyła recognises the reality of the interpersonal community of I–you and the reality of social subjectivity built by relational subjects that exist and act only by virtue of the ontic subjects that constitute them. By emanating common action as relational subjects, particular individuals manifest their personal—hence individual—agency. For Arendt, social subjectivity is merely an abstraction. Wojtyła argues that, through cooperation, subjects can create an interpersonal communion, while Arendt posits that subjects create a common space of presence and activity.

CONCLUSIONS

Both Arendt and Wojtyła were astounded by the obviousness of human freedom and affirmation, recognizing its manifestations in self-determination (Wojtyła) and speech and action (Arendt). Arendt's and Wojtyła's conceptions share the conviction that action is a particular expression of human activity thanks to which human beings can be better understood, according to the scholastic principle that action follows being (*agere/operari sequitur esse*). Wojtyła sees in this principle the key to a better understanding of man and to a phenomenological description of the classical image of man—his rational nature and his personal status. Based on the contemporary belief in the non-existence of human nature in the classical sense, Arendt sees in analyses of political action the key to the description of the human condition. Thus, two fundamental dimensions of human action are outlined to which human nature and the human condition respectively correspond: ontic (Wojtyła) and socio-political (Arendt). For Wojtyła, nature means humanity, which distinguishes man from other beings because of the rationality of his nature. Man's nature allows him to act with the power of his cognition and his decisions, which manifest his agency and freedom as an individual subject. For Wojtyła, nature—as the source of action proper to man—is something permanent and immutable. Arendt is interested in the human condition, that is, the human mode of existence which depends on the fixed

conditions of human existence, such as life and death, and on changing cultural and social realities. Both Arendt and Wojtyła sought to overcome the limitations of the categories developed in philosophical and political thought to describe human beings and their actions. Their concepts also harmonize in terms of the political understanding of personality as the full development of man through authentic participation (Wojtyła) and through words and deeds (Arendt) in joint action.

The complementarity of Wojtyła's and Arendt's concepts shows that in understanding the human subject and his actions, it is necessary to go beyond the oppositions of person and individual, condition and nature, which dominate contemporary philosophy, and, consequently, to go beyond the opposition of ethics and politics. The distinction between different levels of analysis, so important in the field of cognition, should not lead to a fragmentation of the image of human existence, both in terms of being and action.

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Summary

The purpose of this article is to compare the conceptions of the subject of action and of human nature and condition as seen by Hannah Arendt and Karol Wojtyła. Wojtyła, in accordance with the Thomistic tradition, focuses on the person as the author of moral action ("act"), through which his nature (humanity) and unique mode of existence are manifested. Arendt, on the other hand, emphasises the importance of individual subjects through action demonstrating their presence in the public sphere. In opposition to the concept of nature, the German philosopher emphasises the importance of the condition as a human mode of existence subject to both permanent and changing external conditions. Although Arendt's and Wojtyła's concepts differ significantly, they share an interest in human action, and their visions of nature and condition complement each other.

Keywords: Hannah Arendt; Karol Wojtyła; human nature; human condition; acting person; acting subject; human action

DWIE KONCEPCJE ROZUMIENIA PODMIOTU DZIAŁANIA:
ARENDT I WOJTYŁA

Streszczenie

Celem niniejszego artykułu jest porównanie koncepcji podmiotu działania oraz natury i kondycji człowieka według Hannah Arendt i Karola Wojtyły. Wojtyła, zgodnie z tradycją tomistyczną, skupia się na osobie jako sprawcy działania moralnego („czynu”), poprzez które przejawia się jej natura (człowieczeństwo) i wyjątkowy sposób istnienia. Arendt natomiast podkreśla znaczenie indywidualnych podmiotów poprzez działanie demonstrujących swoją obecność w sferze publicznej. W opozycji do koncepcji natury niemieckiego filozofa podkreśla znaczenie kondycji jako ludzkiego sposobu istnienia podlegającego zarówno stałym, jak i zmiennym warunkom zewnętrznym. Choć koncepcje Arendt i Wojtyły znacznie się różnią, łączy je zainteresowanie ludzkim działaniem, a ich wizje natury i kondycji wzajemnie się uzupełniają.

Słowa kluczowe: Hannah Arendt; Karol Wojtyła; natura ludzka; kondycja ludzka; osoba działająca; podmiot działający; działanie ludzkie