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REPLIES TO COMMENTS ON OMNISUBJECTIVITY

I am fortunate that so many talented philosophers have taken the time to study and comment on omnisubjectivity in this issue of *Roczniki Filozoficzne*. I am grateful to Bill Hasker, John Keller, Charles Taliaferro, Tim Mawson, Ryan Mullins, and Agnieszka Kijewska for their probing thoughts and challenging criticisms. In what follows, I will respond to points in their papers that especially piqued my interest, and will do my best to respond to objections, with the hope that these papers will attract the attention of other readers.

REPLY TO WILLIAM HASKER

Bill Hasker begins with a helpful defense of the position that omnisubjectivity must be a direct grasp of our subjective states. He observes that anything indirect would leave a "shadow area" between God's mind and our own. In the book, I accepted the argument of Aquinas that divine knowledge is not mediated, as it is for us. Indirect knowledge is less perfect than direct knowledge. But Hasker rightly adds that if divine knowledge is indirect, the medium by which God knows would itself be invisible to God, thereby compromising his omniscience. This is an interesting point and I thank Bill for it.

The fact that divine knowledge is not mediated by anything like percepts, concepts, language, or any other representational medium is important for a

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defense of the compatibility of omnisubjectivity and timelessness. As Hasker notes—even though I prefer that omnisubjectivity does not commit us to giving up divine timelessness—I am not wedded to that attribute. I believe that timelessness is more metaphysically exciting than temporality, but I do not see timelessness as essential to the concept of the Christian God. Hasker argues, however, that I am committed to rejecting timelessness if an omnisubjective God is *immediately* aware of each temporal subjective state.

In response, I would say that it depends upon what "immediate" means. I have interpreted it to mean "without mediation," but Hasker seems to be interpreting it to mean "at the same time." If God has an immediate grasp of your feeling or your sensation or thought, God is related to your conscious state by temporal simultaneity. That is a possible interpretation of lack of mediation, but it is not the only one, and a defender of timelessness would probably say that it begs the question. It is far from obvious that omnisubjectivity requires a temporally simultaneous grasp of creaturely subjective states. I agree that the sense of directness and immediacy required by omnisubjectivity is in need of explanation, but I would not rule out an account of the connection between the temporal realm and the timeless realm that is immediate in the sense needed for unmediated, perfect contact. I think that those philosophers who have defended the attribute of timelessness should be well-placed to examine the way a timeless God can grasp temporal conscious states directly and without mediation through an "invisible medium," as Hasker puts it. My position is that the defense of God's timeless grasp of temporal subjective states will not be much different than the defense of God's timeless grasp of temporal physical events.

Bill Hasker's second area of discussion is my treatment of the Incarnation. In a footnote, he says he agrees with me that each person of the Trinity has his own sequence of subjective states distinct from that of the other divine persons. I propose that we can coherently imagine having a single sequence of subjective states as one person, but with the power to have divine subjective states and the power to have human subjective states, arising from the possession of two natures. Hasker argues that the sequence of subjective states of Jesus Christ would seem to lack coherence if some states are divine and some are human. Does it seem incoherent to Jesus? It depends upon his memory. The problem Hasker raises is that if Christ remembers all previous subjective states, some of which are human, and some of which are divine, the contrast, and indeed, incompatibility, of these states would be confusing. I admit it would be confusing to *us*, but they would not necessarily be confusing to

Christ if his memory includes at all times his awareness of being both human and divine. Those states would be what he would expect.

Hasker's principal objection to my view of the Incarnation seems to be that it is committed to kenoticism, and kenoticism is incompatible with Chalcedonian Christology. I do not believe that I have a commitment to kenoticism since I do not suggest that the divine attributes of Jesus Christ are either lost or unable to be exercised. I suggest only that they are not exercised at the same time as Christ's human attributes. I do not know what would determine which attributes are exercised at which time. One possibility that seems reasonable is that Jesus Christ mostly had a sequence of human conscious states since that would not only make his states more coherent to himself, but more importantly, it would make him more coherent to other persons as he interacted with them. But Christ never lost his awareness of being divine, and exercised his divine powers occasionally, such as in the performance of miracles. On this interpretation, exercising divine attributes requires an act of will, but divine powers are never lost.

The alternative Hasker proposes is that there is a complete, uninterrupted sequence of divine subjective states possessed by the Son, and also a complete, uninterrupted sequence of human subjective states possessed by Jesus. That suggests to me that Jesus Christ is two persons, if I am right that subjectivity is the inside of a person. Instead, Bill proposes that the Son is aware of the subjective experiences of Jesus as "those experienced through my human nature," and I assume that the Son is also aware of the subjective experiences of Christ as "those experienced through my divine nature." So is there one *I* with two sequences of subjective states? I do not see an answer to that question in Hasker's suggestion which, of course, is necessarily brief. As one person, presumably there is one *I*. The picture I get from Hasker's proposal is that two distinct subjective sequences co-exist with a single subject. I would like to hear how that is supposed to work.

REPLY TO JOHN KELLER

I thank John Keller for his very careful investigation of a number of issues surrounding the topic of omnisubjectivity, including three forms of omnisubjectivity that he identifies: propositional omnisubjectivity, perspectival omnisubjectivity, and phenomenal omnisubjectivity. The form I defend in the book is phenomenal omnisubjectivity, but I found his discussion of problems with

propositional omnisubjectivity and perspectival omnisubjectivity illuminating. Keller's discussion of propositional omnisubjectivity is pertinent to the problem of knowledge of propositions containing the indexical "I," and it can be applied to a number of issues involving the nature of propositions.

In discussing phenomenal omnisubjectivity, Keller begins with my argument from omnipresence. As he notes, there are many senses of the word "in," and the sense in which God is in our subjective states cannot be spatial. But Keller says that God cannot be in our subjective states since many of our subjective states are wicked. That is what I call the moral objection to omnisubjectivity. My basic response is that being in our conscious states does not contaminate God. Being in a state of hate does not entail that God hates anybody. I quote Old Testament passages which refer to the anointing of profane vessels with holy oil. When the oil contacts the vessels, the oil makes the vessels holy, but the vessels do not make the oil profane. God is not diminished in any way by direct contact with the universe he created. If he didn't want to be touched by it, presumably he would not have created it. Touching evil does not make God evil.

Keller also discusses an argument I give that he calls the Argument from God's Essence. I argue that God sustains everything in existence, and to sustain our subjective states in existence, God must grasp them in the way they exist, namely, as first-person subjective states. But Keller says he does not see why it is not enough for God to have *some* grasp of x in order to sustain x in existence. Why is it necessary that God's grasp of your subjective state must be from your own 1st person viewpoint? My answer brings up one of the foundational points about subjectivity in my book. My position is that subjectivity is not just a point of view on something that could be viewed another way. A subjective state is something that exists in its own right. It is a real existent. For God to sustain it in existence, God must sustain it as the kind of thing it is. The kind of thing it is is first personal. So God must sustain it *as* a first personal experience. It follows that to sustain it as a first personal state, God must grasp that state in its first personal existence in order to know what to sustain. That is why Mary's third personal grasp of the color red while still in her colorless room is not good enough for Mary to grasp the first personal experience of red, and if we can imagine that Mary has God-like qualities of maintaining the experience of red in existence, she could not do that unless she grasped the first personal experience of red.

Keller helpfully combines several of my arguments into what he calls the Argument from Greatness. God is greater if he is omnisubjective, assuming

that omnisubjectivity is possible. Keller doubts that it is possible, and I agree that readers will probably not be convinced of that possibility unless we find one of the models of how God grasps our subjective states plausible. I intended each of my models to be a way that God could experience what we experience from our own point of view without being us. I would not say that any of those models is perfect, but I am hoping that they are good enough to jar our imagination to show us the possibility of omnisubjectivity. Perhaps they will lead some inventive philosopher to improve one of my models or to come up with a better one.

Keller discusses the connection between omnisubjectivity and the Incarnation, remarking that even if the Incarnation was necessary for omnisubjectivity, it was not sufficient. My view is that the Incarnation was neither necessary nor sufficient for omnisubjectivity. I argued that God always knew what it is like to be human, and what it is like to be particular humans, but God found out what it is like to be a specific human, Jesus Christ, in the Incarnation. Now I think that since God eternally knew what it would be like to be every possible creature, God eternally knew what it would be like to be incarnated as Jesus Christ. My hesitation about this claim was and is the problem of the ontological status of possible but non-actual selves. This is an issue I have not thought about sufficiently.

Keller proposes that if God had perfect second-person knowledge of what it is like to be his wife, that would constitute unlimited understanding, and would be a source of unlimited comfort to her. Nothing much would be added if God had a perfect first-person grasp of her subjective states, he says. I think a great deal would be added. God would be able to know her more perfectly, and for that reason, love her more perfectly. God would be able to judge her more justly and care for her more completely. Love, care, and judgment are made more perfect by perfect knowledge of what it is like to be her. The most perfect and complete knowledge is first-personal.

REPLY TO CHARLES TALIAFERRO

Taliaferro's brief paper shows his refreshing approach to philosophy, and I am happy that there is considerable harmony between his views and mine.

Taliaferro's clarification of the way I use the word "objective" will be helpful to some readers. He rightly says that I do not mean "what is the case" by the term "objective." It is important to me that subjective states are existent

things. In fact, I argue in the book that subjectivity is the foundation of the world. God is pure subjectivity. Objectivity came into existence when God created something other than himself. Objectivity is not a kind of thing, but a point of view, the view from an external viewpoint.

Charles briefly argues against my position that the idea of subjectivity did not appear until the modern era. He points out that in Greek tragedy and the Hebrew Bible, events do not make sense without reference to inner thoughts and action. I would certainly not deny that people had inner thoughts and motives since the beginning of history, and they are mentioned or implied in both historical documents and literature. My argument, originally given in my book *The Two Greatest Ideas* (2021), is that subjective states were not expressed in art until the Renaissance, or in literature until *Don Quixote*, and they did not have a place in philosophy until well after Descartes, although Descartes set the stage by focusing on the importance of the *I*. Mikhail Bakhtin brilliantly contrasts the Greek epic with the modern novel in describing the revolution in consciousness that accompanied the modern era. Persons became individuals, not just types. Bill Hasker gives a good example of that change in his paper in this issue. He remarks that if we compare *Son of Laughter*, a retelling of stories of the Biblical patriarchs by Frederick Bueckner, with the stories about the same figures in Genesis, there is a startling contrast. Bueckner's version adds vividness, internality, and individuality, features lacking in the Biblical narratives.

At the end of his paper, Taliaferro recommends the novel *All Hallows' Eve*, by Charles Williams, in which the little bads (my term) that we have committed or been subjected to can be cured after death. I thank Charles for the recommendation.

REPLY TO T. J. MAWSON

Tim Mawson offers very illuminating comments on omnisubjectivity in his characteristic imaginative style. He goes to the heart of the issue by defending the idea that subjectivity is a "thing," and is therefore a thing to be known. Of my three models, Mawson argues that the empathy model should be preferred over the other models since on the empathy model, God does not depend upon the creation for his omniscience, and it also permits God to know what he is creating when he creates. The other models do not do this. On the empathy model, God knows what the sensation of red is like even in worlds in which

nobody ever experiences red, and he knows it "prior" to the creation, whereas the perceptual model and the panentheist model apply only in worlds in which there are actual experiences of red. I agree that that makes the empathy model superior to the other two.

Mawson observes that imagining what it is like to see red should not be described as making an imaginative *copy* of a red qualia, given that it is important that God knew what it is like to see red before there were any red quale created. I thank him for that observation since I proposed the empathy model along the lines of human empathy, which is most naturally interpreted as making a copy of another person's feeling in one's imagination, and I sometimes use the word "copy" to describe this model. But if God created the sensation of red and knows what he created, it would be a mistake to say he was copying anything in the creation.

Perhaps the strongest objection to the empathy model is that it seems to imply that God actually feels what you and I feel when he grasps our subjective states. That would mean that God has immoral feelings (hate, spite) and feelings that are not immoral, but incompatible with divinity (sexual attraction, hunger). It is important for this model, then, that knowing what hate is like is not feeling hate. Mawson gives some helpful analogies to show how knowing what a subjective state is like need not involve actually having the state oneself. Against Hume, Mawson says that an idea is not the same as an impression, only fainter, and he gives the amusing example of recalling in one's imagination a painful headache one had yesterday, pointing out that that does not set one's recovery back a notch. Imagining pain need not mean feeling it.

Mawson offers other thought experiments to support the position that experiencing a subjective state is not necessary for knowing what the state is like. As he says, the Mary example might lead us astray by its apparent support for the empiricist idea that there is nothing in the mind that was not first in the senses. He then gives three variants of the Mary story. I was not convinced by the first variant. In that version of the story, Mary starts complaining that she only sees black and white, and she wants to see red. She can imagine what red looks like and wants to see it. When she does see it, she says "That's what I thought it would be like." It is hard for me to see how Mary could imagine color before she sees it, but I can imagine something similar. Perhaps she sees red in a dream. I have been doing research on dream consciousness, and it is fascinating to see how the creative imagination in the sleep stages while going

to sleep can produce images that have not been experienced before. At least, that is not outside the realm of possibility.

Mawson's second Mary story is more convincing. Mary is created with a lot of false memories of a life she never led, including sensations of red. That possibility seems to me to be within the range of permissible philosophical fantasy. An example closer to real life is Mawson's example of reading *Mein Kampf* and acquiring the ability to see the world through the eyes of Hitler, and to know what Hitler was feeling, without oneself feeling it. Not only does that seem possible, but it can also answer the moral objection that reading books or seeing movies that draw us into the point of view of an evil character does not necessarily make us evil, although Mawson warns us against what he calls "cognitive seepage."

Mawson's third Mary story is Love-Starved Mary in which Mary knows what love is before she experiences it. She is looking for it, and when she finds it, she knows that she found what she was looking for. It feels just like she thought it would feel. I found this half-way convincing. People do say "I want to know what love is," but they would not say that unless they already had some idea of what it would be like, enough to be eager to find it. But once they find it, they will probably say that it is better than they thought, or at least different in some ways. But even if it turns out to be exactly like what she expected, Mary will say that the real experience is better than her imaginative grasp of what it would be like. That must be true. Otherwise, we would all be perfectly content to live in our imagination.

What does this have to do with God? There might be a consequence I had not thought of until I read Mawson's description of Love-Starved Mary. Good experiences are better than the imaginative grasp of those experiences. (If that is right, it would also follow that bad experiences are worse than the imaginative grasp of them.) But if God experiences perfect blessedness, he does not merely know what it is like to be happy, joyful, loved, blessed, and all the other good experiences a being can have; God actually has those experiences. God does not live in his imagination, or experience any good feeling only in his imagination.

Mawson defends what I call counteractual subjectivity, or subjectivity that is possible but non-actual. God knows what seeing red is like even in worlds in which nobody ever experiences red. Now suppose that what red looks like to you differs from what red looks like to me. I argued that God can tell the difference in our experiences. But suppose also that neither of us ever sees red because neither of us was ever born. Would God know what red *would* look

like to you, and what red *would* look like to me, and how they would differ? That only makes sense if there is such a thing as a counteractual subject, a problem I mentioned in my response to Keller. That is a fascinating issue, and I hope to give it more attention in future work.

Finally, I would like to thank Mawson for his discussion of zombies. The fear of zombies proves the importance of subjectivity. I think that subjectivity is what makes persons who they are. It is what makes each person an irreplaceable individual, deserving of the kind of love no zombie can ever deserve. As Mawson says, we do not want to fall in love with a zombie.

RESPONSE TO R. T. MULLINS

Ryan Mullins says he is happy to accept the attribute of omnisubjectivity, but he tries to convince me that it is incompatible with classical theism, in particular, with the attributes of timelessness, immutability, and impassibility. Since my model of panentheism is not classical, and Ryan argues that the perceptual model must be rejected, he focuses on the empathy model, arguing that empathy and impassibility are incompatible, and therefore, omnisubjectivity is incompatible with classical theism.

The definition of impassibility given by Mullins is the attribute of being unaffected by anything external to itself. That means that an impassible God is not moved or affected in his beliefs, emotions, or actions, by anything creatures do or feel, although it would not be ruled out that God moves himself. Notice that if being moved or affected involves a change, then an immutable God cannot be moved by anything, internal or external, but Mullins does not maintain that the stronger notion of impassibility is a commitment of classical theism. Let's assume, then, that an impassible God can be moved by his own being.

In classical philosophy, an emotion was interpreted as a state of passion, a state of being moved by something, so an impassible being has no emotions. In ordinary human empathy, the empathizer is moved by the emotion of the person with whom she is empathizing, so if God is a perfect empathizer and is impassible, divine empathy cannot be like human empathy. It must be sufficiently different to preclude divine empathy from being a state of being moved, affected, caused by human conscious states. Can we imagine that possibility? Since impassibility is connected with timelessness, the image I get is something like this: All of God's states are timeless states. God timelessly has

beliefs. God timelessly feels emotions. God timelessly acts. God timelessly "responds" to human prayer, human needs, and human feelings. God does not change from a pre-responsive state to a responsive state. So consider one of God's contingent beliefs. God timelessly believes that you pray for guidance at a certain time. God timelessly decides to respond to the prayer in a particular way. God timelessly feels compassion for you. Is God affected by you in his feelings? No more than he is affected by you in his beliefs. If impassibility is interpreted as having no conscious states that depend upon the conscious states of creatures and the physical world, an impassible and timeless deity would be deprived of beliefs about human activities and the physical world. If defenders of timelessness can defend the idea that a timeless God can believe that everyday events in your life occur without jeopardizing his impassibility, then the same argument would defend the idea that a timeless God can feel compassion for you without jeopardizing his impassibility. A timeless God can timelessly have feelings as well as beliefs. If the problem with impassibility is that there is movement from a prior state to a later state, that problem does not arise for a timeless God. God can be immutably "moved" by his creation.

But it still seems to be the case that God is moved in the sense of having states that are dependent upon something external. His beliefs about what is going on in the world are dependent upon what is going on in the world. His feelings about what is going on in the world are dependent upon what is going on in the world. That is true. If God empathizes with us, that depends upon the fact that we exist and have states with which God can empathize. God can timelessly and immutably will to empathize with creatures, but his beliefs, feelings, and empathizing states are dependent upon what he changelessly wills to exist. God does not wait for somebody to feel pain and then empathize with them, as we do, God is timelessly keeping every conscious state in existence, just as he timelessly wills to keep all physical states in existence. The dependence of states of God on the creation is not a problem peculiar to divine emotions. It is the general problem that divine states of knowing and keeping in existence what he created depend upon the world he willed (and continues to will) to exist. If defenders of timelessness and impassibility can explain how a timeless God knows what time it is and what you are eating for dinner tonight, they can use the same moves to defend the way a timeless God timelessly feels compassion for you and timelessly empathizes with each of your conscious states. I will leave it to defenders of timelessness to do that. Maybe

they will succeed, and maybe they won't. Either way, I do not see that my attribute of omnisubjectivity has made their task harder.

But suppose that you are a hard-core classical theist who insists that God has no feelings. Would you need to deny omnisubjectivity? I say no. That is because I argue in the book that empathy is imaginative feeling, and imaginative feeling is not feeling. A perfectly empathetic grasp of your fear is not fear. Tim Mawson gives a series of analogies in this issue to defend that position. I might change my mind about that, but even if I do, I think that the arguments in the preceding paragraph answer the problem of impassibility and omnisubjectivity.

Whether or not God is timeless, Mullins' definition of empathy will not work for God. Human empathy is indirect and representational. We make a copy of another person's feeling or other conscious state in our imagination. But the classical theist will say that God does not know anything representationally. God does not copy a pre-existing state. Mawson clarifies that issue in his paper. God knew what every conscious state would be like "before" the creation, and in every possible world in which those states do not exist. The empathy model therefore cannot be pushed too hard. It is not what we do when we empathize. God had a perfect grasp of every subjective state even in the absence of those states. The way I would put it is that God's imagination is infinite, both in depth and in breadth. Imagination infinite in breadth is one that encompasses all possible subjective states. That cannot be having a state of grasping what it is like for Ben to have emotion E on the basis of grasping Ben having E, as given in Mullins' definition of empathy.

Mullins also responds to my argument in the book that temporal awareness of human suffering is at least as bad as timeless awareness of suffering. Mullins had previously argued that a timeless omnisubjective grasp of human suffering would be unbelievably horrible. God would be in a state of eternal suffering that never begins and never ends. I replied to that objection in the book by saying that timeless suffering is suffering in an eternal "now," which is eternally simultaneous with timeless joy and bliss. That does not seem as bad to me as suffering that lasts for a very long time, as it does on the model of a temporal God. But Mullins replies that temporal suffering ends, and it is followed by eternal glory that lasts forever on the other side of the eschaton. If the eschaton is an infinite amount of time, I see his point, but what about God's memory? I assume that God's memory is perfect, and a temporal God will forever remember suffering. No conscious state ever disappears in God's perfect memory. Is the memory of suffering also suffering? I have argued that

suffering in memory is not as bad as actual suffering, but it surely is not a good experience. I do not insist that a timeless omnisubjective grasp of suffering is less bad than a temporal omnisubjective grasp of suffering, but it surely is no worse.

A final argument Mullins makes is that the classical God with omnisubjectivity is irrational. He says that God's emotional life would be irrational if he "responds" to events in the 20th century before they have happened. This seems to be an objection to the idea of a timeless response to tensed facts. Again, this is a general issue about timelessness, not omnisubjectivity. If God timelessly responds to a prayer that has not happened, what is irrational about that? Omnisubjectivity means that God grasps events in the 20th century from the first-person perspective of beings who live in the 20th century, and he grasps them timelessly. That is no different from timeless knowledge or timeless decisions to act. As I have said, I am not going to defend timelessness, but others do and will probably continue to do so. My interest in defending the compatibility of a timeless God with omnisubjectivity is to show that omnisubjectivity does not aggravate an issue that defenders of timelessness need to address. If it turns out that timelessness is in fact incompatible with omnisubjectivity, then I would say that God is not timeless.

RESPONSE TO AGNIESZKA KIJEWSKA

In her paper on Cusanus's treatise *The Vision of God*, Agnieszka Kijewska presents the results of her probing study on the way Nicholas of Cusa's vivid description of God's creative perception can be interpreted as an example of the perceptual model of omnisubjectivity combined with the metaphor of light. Her many quotations and elucidations of Cusanus's thought provide the most compelling use of the perceptual model I have seen. What I find particularly helpful is the way Cusanus describes the climactic phase of the experience of seeing God in which "seeing God is the same as being seen by God." As I described the perceptual model in the book, the central problem is the separation of subject and object. Grasping a subjective state as an object misses what it is. But as Kijewska reads Cusanus, divine seeing is not vision as we imagine it because, she says, God is the "living mirror" which sees all things as they exist in themselves, embracing all possible points of view. The example of the painting of Christ whose vision moves with the spectator and which all spectators see as looking directly at them is a good one. I remember

the first time I saw such a painting in a monastery art gallery as a child, and it frightened me. I did not think of it as a mystical experience, but as the watchful eye of God on me, probably judging me. Being seen is not always experienced as something positive, something that draws us closer to the seer, but the theology Kijewska describes is one in which the Seer loves, providentially cares for, and keeps in existence everything he sees, in a kind of cosmic circle. I have not read *The Vision of God*, but Agnieszka's commentary has made me think that the perceptual model when taken to its metaphysical limit might be a helpful way to think of omnisubjectivity.

I would also like to thank Agnieszka for pressing the point that omnisubjectivity is an attribute that not only means that God grasps our subjectivity, but it also explains how it is possible for human beings by grace to participate in divine subjectivity. Omnisubjectivity is arguably a more basic attribute than any other because as a feature of the interiority of divine consciousness, it is the central aspect of all other attributes, each of which is a property of divine subjective states. I thank her for commenting on that aspect of omnisubjectivity. As far as I know, Agnieszka Kijewska is the only person to do so.

REPLIES TO COMMENTS ON OMNISUBJECTIVITY

Summary

In my paper I respond to comments regarding my book *Omnisubjectivity: An Essay on God and Subjectivity*.

Keywords: omnisubjectivity; God; discussion

ODPOWIEDZI NA KOMENTARZE DOTYCZĄCE WSZECHSUBIEKTYWNOŚCI

Streszczenie

W artykule odpowiadam na komentarze dotyczące mojej książki *Omnisubjectivity: An Essay on God and Subjectivity*.

Słowa kluczowe: wszechsubiektywność; Bóg; dyskusja