TRANSLATION
IN THE MOST REVERENT THEORY OF TRUTH:
A SELF-TRANSLATIVE ACT AS AN ILLUSION
OF CORRESPONDENCE

There is clearly an inescapable tension accompanying any discussion around the notion of truth. This is because, on the one hand, the concept is tacitly shrouded in a momentous philosophical hope. An allusion to the existence of something that would transcend the confines of human mind, an external reality in a stable, intersubjective form—a forever elusive goal of perpetual philosophical reflections. On the other hand, the idea is inseparably tied to the very centre of relativism—the human mind in its most individualised activity, namely that of judgement. This inherent conflict continually drives the quest for a satisfactory theoretical background of the concept, which has been sought by nearly every thinker in the history of philosophy. And perhaps precisely because the notion rests on these directly opposed ideas, this remains a philosophical riddle.

The following work aims to become one more attempt at specifying its theory, yet possibly with more modest pretensions. It will be here assumed that, just as in the case of all abstract concepts, the notion of truth is a kind of artefact—an evolving, man-made construct. Therefore, any investigation which would strive to discover and expound some supposedly ultimate meaning contained in the idea, might be considered as misguided, with no such original, semantic kernel actually existing. Instead, what seems perhaps a more viable project, is to offer yet another perspective from which the concept can be viewed, showing how such a perspective relates to others proposed so far, and highlighting its possible benefits. The concept here would remain a quite specific riddle—not
a puzzle to be put together into one correct picture, but rather a potential ground, a canvas that can be covered with various shapes and colours, capable of yielding an infinite number of interpretations. And the frame which this study would suggest to apply on the canvas is that of another construct, namely the idea of translation process. Such a combination is proposed in the hope that the resulting model will turn out to be attractively more concise than its competitive versions, as well as one which more effectively counters potential criticism.

1. TRANSLATION: KEY FEATURES OF THE PROCESS

What makes translation particularly appealing as a framework for the discussion around truth is ambiguity of the notion, for it encapsulates the idea of a certain activity as well as an end-product of this activity. It will be here assumed that it is possible to uncontroversially single out a number of general features which, if exemplified by a given phenomenon, allow one to call it translation. In order to support their validity, the chosen aspects will be also identified as present in various translation theories. Similarly to and in acknowledgement of the recently published excellent study by Kobus Marais (2019), the proposed brief characteristic will in the end have an eclectic nature, combining semiotic, hermeneutic and cognitive approaches, in order to raise awareness of the deep philosophical charge carried by the process.

1. Firstly, for translation to take place an active agent has to be involved. One would argue for such a condition, since the dynamism of the process requires an initial incentive in order to start—an agent, even if understood very broadly, seems necessary to provide such an impulse. In their absence, speaking of translation would arguably remain a mere metaphor (as for example in the case of conversions taking place within genetic code).

2. Since otherwise it would also be difficult to distinguish translation from another change or transformation, the agent should be conscious. It seems quite obvious that in translation studies, which centre around the practice of language and culture translation, the figure of a self-aware translator who is able to act knowingly and wilfully can be identified in the majority of theoretical approaches, since their early beginnings. From Schleiermacher (1813/2000), who spoke of a translator performing a movement either towards the author or the recipient of the translated material, to Benjamin (1923) who insisted that the process consisted in the translator’s finding an effect intended behind the original; from the translator’s “happy and creative” acts in literary translation underscored
already by Borges, to Ortega y Gasset (1937/2000), who viewed the practice as distinctive and “splendorous” precisely due to the “historical consciousness” it required in manipulating and matching different cultural aspects, to name but a few. Later studies such as the Skopos theory, showing translation as essentially purposeful action (Vermeir 1998), the polysystems theory which showed the process as a counter in a game of uneven relationships between communities holding different status (Even-Zohar 1979) or the recently developing cognitive approaches which analyse translation through a psycholinguistic framework (Halverson 2014; Risku 2012) seem to be more and more focused on the figure of a conscious translator. Such a condition does not immediately exclude instances of “translation” occurring in nature or performed by a machine, as long as certain further requirements would be met.

3. These may be formulated along the following lines. Within their consciousness, the subject should have at their disposal some instances of data of at least one more kind apart from the one they are facing. Most intuitively, the mind constitutes a mixture of data of various types. This is necessary for the agent to correlate these different kinds of media with one another, thus imbuing them with “meaning”—adding information by their mutual assignment. To illustrate: when perceiving a certain colour, apart from knowing an array of other possible hues, one should also keep in mind, for instance, the medium of sound, which would allow them to assign notes to colours. As a result, subjected to such a process, each perception that the individual may experience acquires a degree of what might be called an interpretative potential; there is a surplus of meaning ascribed to the substance it consists of. In still other words, the medium becomes unequivocal—or at least appears so to the agent. This ambiguity yields the next condition.

4. “Meaningfulness” of the data would signify to the individual that the medium contains an additional piece of information, going beyond what constitutes its physical substance. Taking an instance of this additional layer, one might call it a message encoded in the perceived phenomena. The presence of this ambiguous layer appears to be necessary, so that there could arise for the agent an incentive to begin deriving, extracting the encoded “message”. The fragment of medium which is being considered should in a way pose a cognitive problem.

5. An attempt to separate this added layer of signification would be another important element. It should be stressed that the agent’s intention is to extract the “message” as accurately as possible, to restore it exactly as it was applied to the medium in the first place. The process does not involve moving away towards impressions and associations it may provoke, nor to produce any kind of
variation, but to recreate the data itself. The source idea is to be recognised and recovered. Consequently, what should underlie the attempt is a need for equivalence, achieved not only by grasping the original “message”, but also rendering it together with the charge of any additional information with which it was imbued by the source medium.

6. This leads directly to the next assumption. Much as there has to be a desire for identity, an ideal equivalence can never be achieved; otherwise, the process cannot be called translation. In support for such a condition one might present the following argument. The subject is recreating information within their own consciousness, within the same medium as the one in which the message was contained or with the use of another. In all of these three cases, unless it is merely a repetition of the given data, the material used for its recreation has to be different—and that seems to necessarily exclude the possibility of obtaining the desired sameness.

7. From the above, one may derive a few more essential features of the process. So the subject is not reduplicating the information, but recreating it. This means that the activity which they undertake shares some characteristics with an act of creation—and one of them is choice. It necessarily requires the agent to review the repository out of which the target structure is to be built and decide which of the available alternatives is to be taken. One may draw here on a model proposed by Levy (1967), who compares the translative process to a series of steps in a game; a person proceeds by choosing from a specific number of possible solutions. What must be added as a crucial property of this choice is that, just as in the case of a creative act, while there can be external factors which prompt the subject to favour certain options over others, the ultimate decision originates within the individual. Hence the rules of the process are not in any way predetermined. Translation is performed through a series of decisions which are particular to the agent and its circumstances—they necessarily cannot be universalised.

8. Another highly important feature is the fact that the process involves not a disengaged act of perception, but one which is coupled with an element of judgement—when the agent is submitting effects of their choice for their own evaluation. But the activity is not purely creative in a sense of absolute freedom; there always remains a given external data, on which the new construction is to be modelled. So the judgement is formed as a result of comparison—at the moment of juxtaposing the created structure with its source, when their degree of similarity is being assessed. Bilczewski (2016) shows the act of comparison as necessarily taking place both at the level of apposed source and target structures,
as well as a higher level of their context (e.g. when comparing their cultural backgrounds) (307–314). Here one may also recall a wide-ranging study by Kadiu (2019), in which she draws on both Berman’s idea of literary translation being an act of self-reflexivity as well as Meschonnick’s analysis of machine translation, arguing convincingly for the human decision-making as underlying both types of processes. She stresses that in each case there should be recognised an element of critical reflection, an act of judgement which is formed in response to the essential uncertainty involved in the practice (71–144).

9. From the above, it seems logical to draw yet another property, even more obviously analogous to a creative act. When equivalence as an unattainable goal becomes the engine of the entire process, and additionally there are no universally definable rules regarding motivation of particular choices made along the way, the practice is essentially inconclusive. It does not have a terminating point together with the moment of creating a structure which could be objectively deemed correct. The endeavour may continue interminably, and it is only the subject’s decision—determined again by a degree of personal, arbitrary sense of satisfaction—that puts an end to the work considered as complete. Just as an artist who through their work unveils merely a fleeting fraction of the original richness and complexity of an idea that inspired their act, the translator always stops at only one of endless possible changes of the source. In Cassin’s (2014) view, this is precisely what the impossibility of equivalence consists in—not so much in paralysis of the process, but its constant perpetuation. This would expose translation as an essentially hermeneutical task—a characteristic that comes to light even more clearly from the perspective of an analysis proposed by Tylor (1971). He argues that the hermeneutical circle of interpretation is proper to any science which involves such components as meaning, the way this meaning is expressed as well as its being expressed “for or by a subject” (5)—naturally, translation process meets his criteria.

10. Finally, one more aspect of the activity should be mentioned. The initial condition which was required in order to be able to speak of translation was the presence of an agent. Yet it will be here also assumed that much as the consciousness of the subject is needed so that they are able to make certain choices, evaluate them or evoke the source data in their memory, it is not necessary for them to be aware of performing the entire procedure. It seems that the process may as well be carried out intuitively, may be part of a larger operation or only a part of it might be taking place with their full awareness. Just as a painter in their work manages to unwittingly capture resemblance to a specific landscape or atmosphere, the translative activity could have all the properties pointed
above—be initiated by a conscious agent, involve recalling a previously perceived data and their interpretation, consist in a creative attempt aimed at recovering the message by means of another medium, require making decisions and judgements, be indeterminate and inconclusive—and still remain subconscious.

Having set out such conditions for the process, it must be admitted that they themselves are far from clear-cut. Depending on their interpretation on the one hand and on detailed aspects of a given situation, it may be possible to have different classification of processes which are seemingly alike. One should therefore provide an example of both the phenomenon which fulfils the above criteria as well as one which fails to meet them.

Naturally, various transformations between and within natural languages would fit in the former category. A paraphrase or change from one language to another would naturally constitute an instance of translation. But one should view the process from a wider perspective, as in the famous Jakobsonian classification. There, apart from an intra- and interlingual translation, he also distinguished an intersemiotic type (JAKOBSON 1959)—one might consider an example involving a museum exhibit. Taking a photograph of a sculpture to be placed in an album documenting the exhibition does not seem to have the above properties of translation. Even though there is a deliberate attempt, the subject does not intend to recover some original meaning expressed through the work yet going beyond it, as well as to recreate its ambiguity. The action seems to be merely a symbolic representation via a different medium, a copy, a mechanical reproduction. Yet, if the work was to become a subject of ekphrasis—when a viewer of the exhibition recalls admiring the sculpture and wishes to describe the entire complexity of the experience, one might arguably classify such portrayal as translation.

The example above shows that what determines the fulfilment of conditions is strongly tied with how the data are approached and what is assumed to be the aim of the process; it is this stage that ultimately defines how a given activity should be classified. Therefore, as the final condition one should underscore that bearing in mind an inherent indeterminacy of translation, whether an action in question has a translative nature cannot be conclusively inferred from its outcome alone.

In view of the enumerated features, the ultimate purpose of the analysis can now be restated: it is to argue that there is an element which three classical versions of the correspondence theory have in common—namely, an inconscient act of translation form the source text of experiential data into a target text of a true statement.
2. RUSSELL: THE THEORY AND ITS CRITICISM

Despite a plethora of existing versions, any model that can be classified as a type of correspondence theory rests on three basic elements. There is a relation of correspondence and two entities which it is supposed to be binding, traditionally referred to as truth-makers and truth-bearers. These elements, referring to certain quite elusive phenomena within the world, require making a number of ontological assumptions. Hence, drawing on Kirkham’s (2001) typology, each such project constitutes to some extent also a metaphysical theory (20–21).

Commitment to a tripartite scheme already prefigures an unobvious construct, and Russell’s model confirms the expectation. At first glance, his theory develops seamlessly, but upon a closer look, its seams turn out to be thinly disguised. As the assumptions of his logical atomism may foreshadow, both on the side of truth-makers and truth-bearers, Russell would be portioning reality quite distinctly into entities as to the nature of which he himself changed views together with the development of his philosophy, perhaps deepening his understanding of their problematic nature.

The vision we find in the canonical Problems of Philosophy opens with three conditions required for any satisfactory theory of truth, which he expresses as unquestionable, and which define for his theory a specific ontological ground. Firstly, a proper account of truth has to provide an explanation for both truth and falsehood. What follows, according to him, reveals the nature of Russellian reality: “If we imagine a world of mere matter, there would be no room for falsehood,” and “it would not contain any truths’ either, since they are both ‘properties of beliefs and statements’” (RUSSELL, chap. 12). So there would have to be two realms constituting the world: the material one, to which truth-makers belong, and the one reserved for mental phenomena. Admittedly, the view Russell was later advocating was that of neutral monism (STUBENBERG and WISHON, 4.3), which holds generally that consciousness and physical matter are both different arrangements of the same material underlying the entire reality. Yet here, it is evident that at least on a certain level the division exists, with the two dimensions remaining separate. This is further confirmed by the third condition, according to which beliefs and statements must be dependent on something which lies outside of them (RUSSELL, chap. 12).

So the correspondence should be sought somewhere between these two dimensions. In order to specify its nature, on both sides Russell carves further structures. Initially, to refer to truth-makers and truth-bearers he employs the notion of a fact and belief respectively, soon providing a more detailed analysis for each.
The term ‘belief’, being philosophically enormously loaded, leads Russell to proposing his own model and nomenclature which becomes incorporated into his theory of truth (Kirkham 2001, 129). Believing was to consist in an occurrence of a certain relation which knitted together several “objects” into one “complex”. It comprised a subject (a judging mind) and terms (the entities which a given judgement concerned), all of them still to be found in the mental sphere. Recalling Russell’s famous example, in a belief held by Othello that Desdemona loves Cassio, Othello would be the subject who unites three terms into one “complex”: his conceptions of Desdemona, Cassio and the relation of loving which occurred between them. Russell highlights particularly that it was the act of believing which connected the elements, “cementing” the entire structure. Additionally, there was one more crucial property which the judging mind imparted to the belief. That was what Russell called a “sense”, “direction” or “order”. The subject was namely arranging elements of the complex in a particular way, so that it differed from other beliefs which might involve the same terms. And here appears the first hint at the role of language; the chosen “order” would later be reflected in the structure of a sentence expressing the given judgement.

At the same time, outside of the judging mind, another “complex” had to be found. It needed to involve the counterparts for the ingredients of belief. Russell does not preoccupy himself to a large extent with the problem of identifying these counterparts, nor does he comment on the tricky difference between their nature and what appeared in the subject’s mind. He states merely that it had to be a fact consisting of the same “objects”—in the case above, it would be Desdemona, Cassio and the relation of love between them—arranged together in the same “order” as they were in the belief.

When those two structures came together into being, they would ultimately allow for the final, desired relation to ensue—the relation of correspondence. And its presence would be what was adding to the judgement a property of truth. That is why the theory is often associated with the notion of congruence; Russell maintained that it was the structural resemblance between the belief and the corresponding fact that made belief true.

It should now be pointed out in what respects the model above may appear questionable. Having exposed its possible shortcomings, one could proceed to demonstrating how the inclusion of translation process might smooth away some of the difficulties.

Following Marian’s summary, a plethora of counterarguments can be grouped into three main categories (Marian 2015, 5). Firstly, such a definition of truth may be considered too narrow; the correspondence is called into question when
beliefs regard statements from a discourse for which there are no easily observable facts, such as for instance the domain of ethics. So from such a perspective, Russell’s theory would fail to accommodate basic intuition, which would prompt to consider certain judgements as naturally true or false, and yet it would be impossible to identify a “complex” confirming their truth-value.

It can be also argued that the theory which defines truth as correspondence with facts is vacuous or comes down to stating a platitude. Davidson (1969) for instance convincingly elaborates on how the notion of fact makes the theory circular, leading to an “ontological collapse” (this is known as “the slingshot argument”). Explaining facts through the idea of truth yields a vicious circle. And on the other hand, if one tries to single out facts by pointing to their constituents, as Russell appears to be doing, then the possibility of logical substitution of equivalent sentences as well as coreferential terms may in the end amount to concluding that each expression of a true belief corresponds to one great fact; a totality of everything that occurs. This makes the account of truth clearly inadequate (752).

At the same time, the theory might be considered too vague, with such an objection directed towards any of its three basic elements. Turning again to facts, Quine (1987) argues that they are not so much redundant as fictitious, “projected from true sentences for the sake of correspondence” (213). The notion of belief appears equally elusive; along with other terms belonging to the field of folk psychology, it was famously attacked by Churchland (1981), who advocated eliminativism with their regard, claiming that this entire conceptual framework was an artificial theory, a set of concepts which were incapable of describing accurately the intricate workings of human mental processes (67–90). And finally, the very relation of correspondence may be deemed inexplicable. In Russell’s analysis it is founded on structural resemblance. But in On Propositions: What They Are and How They Mean, he himself states that although the two corresponding entities are both “equally solid and equally actual facts”, propositions, which constitute for him the content of beliefs, are “composed of images with a possible admixture of sensations”, while facts beyond the human mind “may be composed of anything” (37). If so, then it seems difficult to imagine a structural similarity between sensations and for instance tangible objects.

A particularly insightful criticism was formulated by Geach (1957), who spoke against Russell’s account of relations. He observed that the relation involved in the act of judging would have to change each time for beliefs that differed with regard to the number of constituents present in the believed proposition (47–50). Worse still, in the case of compound or general propositions, the relations within them would have to be showing how exactly they combined the terms
(how they evinced the Russellian “sense” or “order”); so they could not simultaneously be the relations towards the judging mind or presenting themselves before it (51–52). Even though Russell is known to have acknowledged the problem, he did not propose a successful response (Prior 1967).

There also remained the problem of falsehood, an account of which was expressly required from the outset. In The Philosophy of Logical Atomism as truth-makers for the false propositions Russell (1918) suggested the existence of negative facts, which he nevertheless refrained from defining, as they were to be ultimate and irreducible (44–46). His proposal has already been slammed on various grounds (see e.g. Oaklander and Miracchi 1980). But even if one admits negative facts into the ontological repository, then as Prior (1967) points out, this would entail having real objective falsehoods as their constituents, which even Russell himself was reluctant to accept. And if such facts together with their ingredients were introduced, then what proof would there be that they constituted the exact opposite of true facts (as the theory required), and not simply some additional ontological category?

Taking into account all the recalled arguments, one may conclude that the analysis is not so much erroneous as requiring specification and a link which would tie its elements into a coherent unity. For, ultimately, the model provokes the following questions.

How can the dynamism of a judging relation in Russell’s description be so strangely detached from the activity of the mind itself? How can the order, i.e. the “sense” of this relation be ascertained in any other way than by being recognised by the subject? Why not say rather that it is the agent who makes the arrangement? Furthermore, Russell (1918) notes that the content of belief is originally a proposition composed of images based on memory (37–38); so what becomes the source of the structure imposed on the image? What rules or schemata prompt the arrangement? Similarly, how can the “sense” occur at the same time in a fact—a complex of which the mind is not a constituent? And how can its order be governed by the same rules and patterns? This problem resounds even more gravely, if one considers negative facts: were they taken as theoretical constructs, their structure would appear even more dependent on how the subject shaped them. Finally, to bring out the problem signalled above, suppose the relevant fact becomes somehow already identified. How can one posit the presence of similarity between the two structures without the subject’s mental involvement in the congruity relation? If, as Russell admits, “all our knowledge of truth is infected with some degree of doubt” (1912, chap. 12), would not such admixture expose the property of truth’s inevitable dependence on the mind?
3. THE PLACE OF TRANSLATION IN RUSSELL’S THEORY

These questions already point to the direction which the analysis should take instead. Let it now be shown how recognising the idea of translation implicit in Russell’s theory changes his model. Since the following study does not extend to the further problem of knowledge and its conditions, the proposed description will focus on what happens when an individual is already met with the “corresponding fact”.

Initially it should be observed that if one recalls the definition of similarity between two physical phenomena, they can be labelled as alike if it is possible to carry out a conversion from the values describing the characteristics of one into the other, a transformation from a system of units organising one medium to those found in another (Sedov 2011, “Similarity theory”). So for each pronouncement of similarity there turns out to be taking place a specific process.

What process is occurring in Russell’s analysis? It starts with the subject being exposed to a certain portion of external information, which results in their having in mind an instance of mental data; in Russellian terms it is the “image-proposition”, a fragment of memory. Be it visual or “mixed with sensations”, it would not possess any meaning in itself, had it not been granted by the agent. So the subject needs to impart “a sense” to the data, structuring it in a particular way. Since he or she presents this “sense” to themselves in a linguistic form (as a “word-proposition”), it is primarily language that would be providing patterns along which the structure would be carved. That is how the first “complex” becomes created, bound by a relation established and made meaningful by the individual.

Subsequently, the agent acquires further, perceptual data. These may be an amalgam of forms, accessed through various channels (auditory, visual, tactile etc.)—they constitute the second Russellian “complex”. Faced with such a blend, the subject searches for ways in which the structure they hold in their mind can be applied to the perceived compound (they expect the presence of certain meaning and wish it to be equivalent). Since the data show no order in themselves, and no tendency to be structured in one way or another (have an endless interpretative potential), ultimately it is the subject who chooses how to impose on them one of the possible “orders” (selecting its elements from the repository of meaningful patterns belonging to the medium of their consciousness) and it is they who affirm suitability of the chosen pattern (through an act of indeterminate judgement). Thus the data become organised, certain boundaries and elements within them are delineated, so that as a result one may claim to be dealing with a distinguishable
fact. Through such imposition, by affixing the meaning to the acquired perceptual input, the individual creates for themselves a relation between the two “complexes”, which they deem a relation of similarity. What seems most important however, is that they consider the structures as congruent, since in fact it is they who arrange both “orders”.

The features pointed in the formulation above seem to confirm that the process meets criteria of translation. The external medium to which the “fact complex” belongs can be viewed as a kind of source text, an original instance of data. Having in itself no unequivocal objective meaning, being regulated with no universally measurable system, it remains inherently ambiguous. It is approached by the agent looking for a certain “sense”, a particular structure that would match their “belief complex”. So within the amalgam they search for regularities which they would consider suitable. But in the end, the elements they find and consequently the “order” they perceive are ones they delineate themselves. That is why the “sense” of belief and the “sense” of fact appear congruent—since they are both construed by an active, translating individual. The “complex” imposed on the original medium can be therefore understood as a target text, in that it is linguistically articulated, modelled on the external source data and aimed at rendering it with utmost accuracy. Such a process—constructing the “order” within the truth-bearer medium and applying it to the medium of truth-maker, striving to recover the external source, but recovering only already possessed patterns of meaning—concludes when equivalence is thought to be discovered between both “senses”. Yet with them both being creations of the individual, that is in fact when the agent becomes deceived by similarity which they themselves have spun. The ultimately established relation of correspondence enables them to ascribe to the “belief complex” a property of truth—which turns out to be an effect of inconscient self-translation.

At this final point the question may be asked, why are the two orders usually perceived as having distinct origins, and why is the agent as if unwittingly construing the meaning two times? It seems unavoidable, precisely because in the end, consciousness of the subject remains only one sort of medium, through which any potential other can be access; so both in the case when it is assumed that apart from the mind there exists an external reality to which truth-makers would belong, as well as in any other case their consciousness remains a prism. Similarly, the medium of truth-makers would also constitute only one closed system. And it seems necessary that at least two such mediums are needed if the phenomenon of “sense” is to occur or if any relation of reference is to take place; there has to be at least two categories, so that they could start to be mutually
ascribed. The question why the agent remains unaware of their own role in acknowledgment of similarity may be explained by the fact that usually they do not remain mindful of an unescapeable grid which their own consciousness imposes. But recognising one’s role is not impossible; after all, Russell’s remark that every truth remains “infected with some degree of doubt” hints precisely towards such a realisation.

In this way the Russellian theory of truth reveals its translat ive ground. What are the advantages of such an articulation? Most of all, it allows one to retain Russell’s assumption that there must be a division into “the world of mere matter” and the realm of beliefs, without purporting at the same time that there can be any kind of structural similarity between them. It explains the source of both “orders” as created by the individual.

Furthermore, with them being dependent on the mind, the theory might also account for truth-value of propositions belonging to problematic fields of discourse. For example in ethics, instead of adopting the contestable moral realism, one may still point to the correspondence occurring between structure of a given proposition and certain internal dispositions (so for instance, rather than looking for a fact validating a statement that “Lying is wrong”, the property linguistically ascribed to “lying” can be seen as reflecting the feeling of revulsion which accompanies the conception of the act—resulting in the perception of structural similarity).

As for the vacuity objection, the theory could hardly be accused of obviousness, if one accepts that in its essence there is an unknowingly conducted process of translation, wherein the rules of substituting logically equivalent sentences or coreferring terms do not have to hold. Moreover, for those who would consider the notion of belief as vague and inadequate in describing mental phenomena, there could still be corresponding regularities between the two orders, with them both traceable back to language patterns, the conceptualisation of which seems less questionable than the possibility of isolating mental phenomena such as judgements.

And finally, regarding the problem of falsehood, this model does not require postulating inexplicable entities such as negative facts, as well as does not necessitate commitment to objective falsehoods as their constituents. It offers a solution more in the spirit of Wittgenstein. For each proposition and its negative counterpart, the truth-making instance of data would be the same fragment of external reality (so recalling the Russellian example, both for the proposition “Socrates is dead” as well as “Socrates is not dead”, it would be the dead body of Socrates that gave them truth-value), only in the case of false statements, one would not come to the approval of correspondence (attempting to translate the belief, one would
not delineate a satisfying target “complex”). After all, for both true and false propositions, it was the subject who ultimately decided whether equivalence was satisfactory. The consequence of such a view would be that the assertion of falsehood is just as inconclusive and “infected with doubt” as truth—but such a corollary could hardly be accused of conflict with intuition.

Enriched by the idea of “inconscient self-translation” the proposed model has nevertheless leaned visibly towards relativism. The proceeding sections will further develop this problem, proving hopefully that combining the two theories need not necessarily yield a scheme which would be entirely idealist. Having then located translation in Russell’s analysis, one may now turn to the thought of Moore, which follows shortly, and which even further attests to the presence of the process in the correspondence idea of truth.

4. MOORE—A PLACE LEFT FOR TRANSLATION

Moore’s early account of truth contained in “The Nature of Judgement” and “Truth” came to be identified as the so-called identity theory. Yet he later changed his views radically, hence the following work will focus directly on the revised version presented in *Some Main Problems of Philosophy*.

There, even more visibly than Russell, Moore meanders around the key elements of truth assertion, as if half noticing their underlying dynamism, trying to readjust their definitions, only to in the end conclude in a typically Moorean, cavalier fashion, that there are parts of his theory the explanation for which he cannot provide; nevertheless the analysis must be correct. As a result, his model becomes similar to the Russellian one, but less fine-grained. Moore also chooses beliefs and facts as truth-bearers and truth-makers respectively, but denies the existence of propositions, disposing thereby of the “complex” inside the individual. And he seems latently brought to such denial by the problem of non-existing falsehood.

In his view, belief was as if empty; it was merely a mental act, the same regardless of what was believed. Its linguistic descriptions in a form of a statement which made it different from others might sometimes—namely in the case of false beliefs—not be a name for anything which existed. And if it sometimes might be so, then by Ockham’s razor, one should probably assume that it is the case at all times (Moore 1953, 264–65). So propositions in the sense of the content of beliefs disappeared, and their linguistic formulation became a vacuous name, as it were. Moore acknowledges the resulting gap, claiming
that the only proper thing which distinguishes a given belief is its connection with an actual fact, belonging to external reality. Crucially, he notes that the fact carries the same name as the belief—this is exactly what they share.

As a consequence of such a common factor, Moore ascribes to every belief a specific property, which is being bound to the relevant fact by a relation of “referring”. And this relation leads him to provide his definition of truth—for a true belief is such that “the fact to which it refers is” (267, emphasis in the original). In this way, explaining the mechanism of “referring” becomes vital for elucidation of truth. But here comes another gap. Moore openly admits that he can neither define nor completely analyse the relation. Nevertheless, he claims we know it and are “perfectly well acquainted with it”. Let his words be highlighted here: “we have [the relation] before our minds; for you cannot try to determine the nature of, or to compare with other things, a thing which you have not got before your mind” (260). That is why he claims that it is possible to intuitively understand his account of truth, even though the notion was not perhaps disassembled to its most fundamental components (268). And although there is supposed to be no “unambiguous” name for the relation, Moore provocatively suggest to call it correspondence.

One more final aspect should be underscored in Moore’s description, which goes against his openly held views, yet which seems to be inevitably following from his characteristic of beliefs. In his view, they do not appear to be true or false independent of an individual. The property of truth or falsehood appears together with their assertion. He gives an example of his friend believing that he has gone away: “In merely asserting that ‘I have gone away’, we are not attributing any property at all to this belief—far less a property which it shares with other true beliefs. We are merely asserting a fact…. Plainly I might have gone away, without my friend believing that I had; and if so, his belief would not be true, simply because it would not exist” (276). So the relational property of truth is added together with the subject’s act of naming a given judgement, as in “It is true that Moore has gone away”—it is not a timeless feature waiting to be discovered. Such a conclusion seems natural if one defines propositions exclusively by means of a particular mental act.

The scheme appears rather contrived; on Moore’s account, there are two gaps left explicitly without further explication: the structure of belief and the nature of “referring” relation. One may therefore question the model with the following problems. How should the emptiness of belief’s “name” be understood? How is it possible that this name—a juxtaposition of linguistic terms put together by the individual—immediately and on its own constitutes a connection with a specific
fragment of reality (in the case of true beliefs), or connects the belief with a fact which does not exist (as in false ones)? Where does the “name” of the fact come from? In what way are we “already acquainted” with the correspondence relation? Is this relation particular to the phenomenon of truth-making or perhaps one’s acquaintance with it suggests that one already knows it from other circumstances which may be regarded as analogous? It should be now demonstrated how employing the idea of translation helps to address these questions.

5. TRANSLATION AS CREATING THE RELATION OF REFERENCE

Since it was the problem of false beliefs that prompted the removal of propositions and yielded an incomplete scheme, one ought to redraw the theory precisely on the basis of such an example.

Thanks to Moore’s intuition that there is no such an artificial complex of objects as the mind and elements of its judgement, his analysis already gets the proper bearing. The process starts together with a belief which consists in a mental activity of the subject who approaches an amalgam of data found within the external world (a medium with interpretative potential). In the perceived medium they expect to be embedded a certain piece of information (using Moore’s example, it would be for instance his friend wishing to know whether Moore departed or not). From their linguistic repository of meaning the subject chooses a given pattern to combine a sentence (a creative act)—this would be organising the medium in a specific way. The imposed pattern becomes a “name” of the belief (for instance a statement “Moore has gone away”), and at the same time the chosen structure delineates a specific frame within the medium, drawing the boundaries of a fact, which thereby obtains the same “name”. In this way, there is indeed no such an ideal, separate entity as a proposition on the one hand and the fact to which it refers on the other, but merely a piece of external information being given a “name” that constitutes both the judgement and the fact.

Let it be therefore considered what happens when the belief gains the “property” of falsehood. As pointed above, a given judgement would not possess it on its own, regardless of the individual; the phenomenon of falsehood— and truth likewise—emerges together with the subject’s assertion. Initially then, as in the case of Russell’s model, the data belonging to external world become a form of source text. The translating agent attempts to apply the pattern of meaning held in their mind to the perceived medium, so that the information contained there could be
recovered as accurately as possible (and equivalence was achieved, in the sense that the belief could accurately reflect the actual state of affairs—whether Moore has gone away or not). But this “original text” is already being approached through the label of belief’s “name” which also simultaneously frames the fact. So the subject may be trying to adjust the pattern and submit the effects of these adjustments to their own evaluation; but how they choose to match the pattern and when they decide to conclude the process is dependent in the end entirely on their subjective verdict. Any objective “congruence” or “match” is not possible, in that they never actually get a direct, “unbiased” access to the original medium, already approaching it through the created frame. In other words, they are looking for a match with something which they themselves created; both the meaning patterns as well as the belief’s and fact’s “name” which was constructed out of these patterns.

The moment they acknowledge that the label does not satisfactorily reflect the data, they realise that equivalence cannot be achieved, and the closest they can get to recovering the information is by “renaming” the belief as false (in the example above it would be “It is false that Moore has gone away”). In this way, the belief simultaneously turns into a target text, which renders the message contained in the medium as faithfully as possible (by communicating that, according to the subject’s arbitrary judgement, its pattern cannot be in any way satisfyingly aligned with the structure of the medium).

Falsehood would then be the meaning added to the description of the agent’s translativa activity, an addition to the “name”, signalling merely that they did not decide to proclaim equivalence between the source and the target medium. For each translation process the exact semantic content of that addition would be different, as each such an attempt would involve different kind of rejection. The same can be said about the delineated frame of a “false fact”—it would not be any kind of non-existent object, but a “name” which now stands for a specific action. Conversely, attaching to the belief the notion of truth would mean that the individual decided to create a target structure which they deem equivalent to the source data. To shed more light on such a perspective, one might recall here Brender’s (2017) analysis of the agent’s movement in space and reflection that results from it. He highlights that through shifts in perception which can be understood as a form of translation, the subject themselves enacts meaning in the world, and it is only their “symbolic conduct” that “opens for the first time the question of truth and objectivity” (167).

Such a reformulation has several advantages. It reveals the sense in which we are “already familiar” with the relation of correspondence—the idea not only
turns out to be one's own activity of unaware translation, but moreover, as in the Russellian model, it involves translation between structures conceived by the individual themselves. Furthermore, applying the translational framework, the two gaps left within Moore's theory become accounted for, and additionally, their explanation seems less ontologically committing; it does not call for further elaboration on the nature of entities such as properties, relations or non-existent facts.

Yet clearly, any such a solution does not come without a cost. It may be argued that clarifying the above aspects only replaced them with further controversies. The inevitable questions arise; how can one regard equivalence as dependent entirely on the subject’s ordinance? Is not such an account strikingly unintuitive, with the concept of truth being employed almost at random? Does the creative process of translation not call precisely for explaining what would be the incentives that prompt certain choices rather than others? If the activity would be in the end a form of self-translation, how could one ever come to the assertion of falsehood? Does the model not become now entirely idealist? Is there indeed no access to the original medium?

These dilemmas lead directly to the third version of the theory developed by Austin, the analysis of which will possibly help to answer the above questions as well as address those that impair the model of correspondence as congruence in general.

6. AUSTIN: RECOGNITION OF ARBITRARINESS

The essence of Austin’s proposal was expounded in a surprisingly brief essay “Truth” (1979), where he drafts a version of correspondence theory, aiming primarily to strip it off its most contentious claim—the structural resemblance between truth-makers and truth-bearers.

He develops the analysis upon a few crucial, far from unarguable assumptions. Echoing Russell, he states that to talk about truth there need to be at least two dimensions: a repository of symbols and the reality which they are to describe (4). And although he claims that the latter may include the former, at least to some degree they have to remain distinct, since the former is employed to carry meaning (6). Moreover, in order to be “right or wrong” the symbolic medium not only may, but actually must be entirely artificial; natural signs or different forms of replications may only be to a various extent reliable or accurate, but it does not make sense to consider them as correct or incorrect (8). And the third particularly significant assumption was that the world has to be characterised by the existence
of similarities—to which Austin immediately adds that at least “we must observe” them. It remains ambiguous whether such a terse remark was a supplement or correction; it was perhaps partly to retreat from any strong ontological premises, and also to reinforce his approach which remained strongly focused on the individual.

It is this individual who upon acknowledging similarity between the observed patterns, divides them into types and accordingly, in the symbolic system which they use to describe the world, they also introduce certain regularities. This gives rise to what Austin calls “descriptive conventions”—correlating “sentences” with types of situations. But as he observes—in a footnote, though the comment seems crucial—whether an event can be classified under a given type of sentences is not “a purely natural relation”. Therefore, the classification requires the subject’s judgement. When they decide that similarity is sufficient, they employ a general “sentence” to refer to a particular state of affairs, making thereby a “statement”, whose meaning thereby becomes specific. This is how “demonstrative conventions” arise; by combining “statements” with particular (“historic”) situations. In the end, a “statement” is true when an event which is being referred to by a “demonstrative convention” indeed belongs to a type which is ascribed to it by a “descriptive convention” (9).

Such a definition allows one to notice a few key features from Austinian concept of truth. Entirely dependent on the established convention, truth would be an artificial construct just as the symbolic medium within which it is created. Secondly, its creation is not only subordinate to general conventions, but to the subject’s choice at any moment the concept is evoked—a decision essentially arbitrary, since as Berdini (n.d.) points out, “it is in principle impossible to foresee all the possible circumstances which could lead us to modify or retract a sentence” (section 2a, “Meaning of Truth”). And finally, as he also adds, together with falsehood the two notions do not constitute exclusive, binary opposites, but rather fall under the same category as adjectives like ‘vague’, ‘concise’ or ‘exaggerated’, which means that they “come in degrees or dimensions” of their applicability to a given situation (11).

In this way, the inconvenient postulate of structural similarity is disposed of. But to quote Strawson, the theory raises at least just as many questions as it answers (1950), the most pressing of which are best summed up by Kirkham (2001). “What precisely are the conventions and how do they work?… How exactly does a statement refer to a particular state of affairs? Can a statement fail to refer to any state of affairs? Can a declarative sentence fail to describe any type of state of affairs?” (127) He also asks whether a statement could be correlated with
a situation which does not obtain (such as for instance an event of a round square standing on a mantel). Strawson (1950/2013) enquires further as to how the theory would accommodate general statements, which do not seem to refer to any particular situation.

So one may finally reflect—are there any rules that govern the subject’s classification of an event under a given type? Is their choice indeed entirely arbitrary or can the process be somehow generalised? How does the subject single out what Austin interchangeably calls state of affairs, events and historic situations? Can the theory still hold if one forgoes the assumption that similarities are an inherent feature of the world?

7. TRANSLATIONAL ORDER
WITHIN CONVENTIONAL CHAOS

The analyses of Russell and Moore should have already pointed to the line of reasoning which will now be assumed, with Austin’s theory as presented above clearly revealing the underlying process of translation.

Austin’s own example of a “sentence” may serve as an illustration, considered only in a little less typical circumstances. Let it be assumed that an individual who sees a photograph, on the frame mat of which there is a small picture of a woman who appears proud and independent—a situation which they subsequently describe with words “The cat is on the mat”. They then hold their statement to be true. What happens is that there is an active agent equipped with one sort of medium—their consciousness, containing a certain repository of symbolic patterns, out of which they may form “sentences”. Next, they approach another kind of medium intent on describing it, insofar as they have an expectation that it includes a piece of information to which some of the patterns will be applicable.

But like in the models above, the medium of external world as such is not in any way structured or imbued with meaning. No boundaries between “events” are set, and more importantly, none of its fragments is repeated or identical with any another. The chosen example of a woman on a frame demonstrates it distinctly; even if the situation in question involved an actual animal sitting on a piece of fabric, it would still remain entirely unique and inimitable. A potential similarity with any other fragment of the medium becomes imposed only by the subject, who searches for it, having in mind certain repeatable templates (the “descriptive conventions”). Though, unlike Russell and Moore, Austin (1954) avoids the notion of “fact” and uses the term “state of affairs”, for him they both
refer to particulars, and he does not escape thereby the problem of how such an entity is singularised in the first place. And what seems quite certain is that as in the case of previous analyses, it is thanks to the possessed patterns that the agent may distinguish “states of affairs”, “events” or “situations”.

Accessed then only through such a prism, the external medium becomes again a form of original, source text. In the act of describing the constructed “state of affairs” and using the phrase “The cat is on the mat” the subject will be carrying out the process of translating this general “sentence” into a particular “statement”. He or she will be changing its generality into specificity, filling its interpretative potential with concreteness. They will be making a number of subjective choices, settled in the end with a personal judgement. For instance they will deem it enough to possess the feature of haughtiness and independence in order to be called a ‘cat’. Or they will consider it enough to use the word ‘mat’ instead of a more precise ‘frame mat’, referring to a decoration of the photograph. And perhaps both of these decisions will be made with a view to achieving a humorous effect and recovering thereby a certain comicality of the perceived situation. This is how the “demonstrative convention” would work—by showing the way in which the subject interprets the template of “sentence”, translating it into particular circumstances.

The finally uttered “statement” can be therefore understood as a target text. It becomes connected with its source by virtue of translational equivalence—the Austinian correspondence as correlation—the moment when the individual proclaims it to be true. It is this proclamation that the notion of truth would stand for, signifying a process of translating successfully completed. In accordance with what was pointed initially among the features of the process, its outcome remains largely unpredictable, which echoes Austin’s own words: “there are no limiting rules as to what we might or might not say” in given circumstances (1940). Similarly to the models analysed above, although the external reality is necessarily involved in the sense of truth (as the defenders of correspondence theories may insist), the precise content of what the notion describes is in no way determined by the external medium, dependant instead exclusively on the agent’s choices. For the reality is accessed already as a certain construct, and so the process of establishing truth would still remain invariably a form of self-translation. Accordingly, the subject would consider a given “statement” as false if they did not find the observed particulars includable in the generality of the “sentence”. In this sense, falsehood would also signify the agent’s process, this time deemed as not completed in a satisfactory way.

In one more respect, the Austinian model reveals its translativ character. It should be noticed that the “conventions” which are decisive for constitution
of truth cannot be created by a single individual. They emerge from a common
cognitive effort of a larger community, which determines both what “types” they
would distinguish within their language, as well as which of their applications
would be considered acceptable. The point resonates even further in the way
Austin formulates his ultimate definition. Namely, a “statement” “is said to be true”
in specific circumstances (5, emphasis in the original). Therefore, truth appears as
a proclamation of validity of a given “demonstrative convention” uttered or ex-
pressed by some group of individuals. This also makes the concept akin to the
practice of translation, which is usually performed not only for the translator
himself, but from an original text existing within a source community into a pro-
duct for a target audience, and it is largely the way it functions within both these
groups and their agreement that permits to say that equivalence was achieved.

Finally, a question may be raised concerning the “descriptive conventions”: are they not formed prior to the “demonstrative” ones? And if so, it may be
objected that what “sentences” stand for is not entirely arbitrary, that these con-
ventions were determined not by individuals, but precisely by the types and simi-
larities present within the external world. While it would be vastly inappropriate
to try to present here a theory of how language was formed, since the problem
clearly extends far beyond the scope of this study, it might still be argued that
the relation between patterns originating in the mind and the perceptual material
which they structure has always been reciprocal. A considerable number of stu-
dies emphasise that it seems rather misguided to try to point out what was
precedent, with the mind and the object of its perception constituting a mutually
sensitive unity. Russon (2017) writes that perception as “apprehension of the truth
of the world” is essentially a creative performance, consisting in reality’s open-
ness to the subject’s activity (21), to their “transformative contributions” (28).
Conversely, Maclaren stresses how the institution of meaning in the world
reciprocally changes also the subject themselves, precisely due to the creativeness
of their perception, which ensures that whatever they establish always goes
beyond their initial intentions (73). From such a perspective, the types
and similarities on the basis of which “descriptive conventions” were established
would also be introduced by the subject, and moreover, as a result of carrying out
a constant process of creative translation.

In this way, both conventions which for Austin determine truth and falsehood
would be grounded in translation process, by virtue of which the unknowingly
carved structures are turned into their consciously validated counterparts. The pos-
sible benefit of such a supplement to his theory is that it provides an explanation
of the mechanism behind conventions, and with this being identified as a trans-
lative activity, the theory becomes more uniform—both in itself as well as in relation to the previously analysed accounts.

Now it also seems easier to address the questions posed by Strawson and Kirkham. The “statement” not so much refers to a given state of affairs, but rather constitutes it; they are one and the same lens of the individual’s perception. This also means that it cannot “fail” to refer to any event, as it may potentially become a template for any chosen fragment of the medium. Whether it actually would, depends only on the agent’s decree. Accordingly, a “sentence” cannot fail to describe any type of situation, since such a description was the very reason for its creation by the individual. Generalisations or “sentences” containing contradictions (“a round square standing on the mantel”) cease to pose a problem, in that the individual conceives both of them as well as of the structure with which they are correlated.

8. CONCLUSION

On the face of it, the three analysed models differed in the way they explained the concept of truth; Russell viewed it as a relation of structural congruence between beliefs and facts, Moore insisted on beliefs and facts having the same “name” which yielded between them a familiar sense of connection, and Austin understood truth as inclusion of specific situation under a relevant type determined by conventions. Yet each proposal entailed similar theoretical obscurities. They necessitated postulating dubitable entities such as properties, relations, facts and beliefs, whose precise nature and origins were left without explanation (e.g. negative facts in Russell, acquaintance with correspondence relation in Moore, and the mechanism governing conventions in Austin). Each strived to present truth as a phenomenon independent of an individual and determined in large part by external reality, yet upon closer examination each account was implicitly dynamic and relied on the actions of the subject, so that in the end, truth turned out to be a variable outcome of their creativity, rather than a self-contained, unchangeable ideal emerging from outside of them.

In the end, the three accounts turned out to be underpinned by the same process of translation. It consisted in the agent’s building a number of mental patterns, subconsciously projecting them upon the medium they interacted with, only to later consciously recover them, in the act of which they perceived accordance they ultimately called truth. In this sense, correspondence as translational equivalence does occur between two psychical elements, rather than be-
tween a mental entity and a physical object, which makes the account close to the one proposed by Brentano (1973). Tying the notion with the idea of translation allowed one hopefully to present the theories as more coherent, and thereby also to impart translation itself with additional prominence.

Eventually, the study exposed an additional, paradoxical property of truth. It should namely be observed that when an outcome of creative process becomes labelled as “translation”, it signals that such a creation has a derivative character; that it is essentially imperfect, insofar as it necessarily differs from the original, constitutes its transformation which, since in the context of translation process any changes are undesirable, one might call distortion. So the notion of “truth” would be inheriting all these features. Applying it, one would be indicating not the accuracy of one’s description, but precisely the opposite—the fact that whatever receives the label is secondary, inaccurate, distorted. And as the study showed, with translation entailing such an unconscious involvement in the approached medium, evoking the concept of truth would testify to the detachment from reality, rather than its embrace.

At the same time, when ascribed to truth, the double meaning which translation retains—both as a process and as its outcome—merges into an expression of a dynamic, constantly improved whole. Thereby, the necessary imperfection of truth may be accepted, because the idea is acknowledged as a sign of an incessant human attempt to refine and deepen their vision of the world.

Contrary to objections which might likely be raised, the recognised process did not yield the theories entirely relativist or idealist. Although the external reality does not determine either the form of mental phenomena or their expressions, to which the concept of truth would be ascribed, the outside medium does provide necessary material for the subject’s creative manipulation. Through the agent’s involvement in such manipulation they become partially constitutive of both the medium of their consciousness as well as that of external world. Together with blurring a boundary between them, the term ‘truth’ must necessarily lose a sense of independent objectivity one might seek in it. But in translational framework, the mind-independent reality can be understood as analogous to the original—as a stable anchor, which even if beyond reach, it is nevertheless the truth’s indispensable, ever-present source.
REFERENCES


TRANSLATION IN THE MOST REVERENT THEORY OF TRUTH:
A SELF-TRANSLATIVE ACT AS AN ILLUSION OF CORRESPONDENCE

Summary

Being the most intuitive and yet perhaps most contestable of all, the correspondence theory remains an axis around which the philosophical debate on truth incessantly spins, with indefiniteness remaining as its main propelling force. The following work presents one more interpretative attempt; it will be argued that each classical contemporary version of the theory incorporates an idea of translation process. For this purpose, initially one was specified what notion of translation should be applied here by enumerating its key features. Next, three classical models were examined—those proposed by Russell, Moore and Austin—in such a way as to expose the place of translation in each analysis. Consequently, the research both provide an element which unifies them and highlight the significance of translation for the philosophical inquiry into the concept of truth.

Keywords: truth; intersemiotic translation; Russell; Austin; Moore

PROCES TŁUMACZENIA W NAJCZCIGODNIEJSZEJ TEORII PRAWDY.
AKT SAMO-TRANSLACJI JAKO ILUZJA RELACJI KORESPONDENCJI

Streszczenie

Choć niewątpliwie najbardziej intuicyjna, a jednocześnie prawdopodobnie najbardziej sporna teoria korespondencyjna stanowi nadal oś, wokół której toczą się nieustające spory filozoficzne na temat pojęcia prawdy, a ich zasadnicza nierozstrzygalność wydaje się jej napędzać. Niniejsza praca stanowi kolejną próbę wyjaśnienia problematyckiej relacji korespondencji. Celem autorki jest obrona tezy, iż niemal każde z klasycznych, współczesnych ujęć owej teorii zawiera w sobie element procesu tłumaczenia. Na początku zatem zostało sprecyzowane samo pojęcie przekładu i sposób użycia go w niniejszym artykule. Wymienione są więc główne cechy pozwalające sklasyfikować daną czynność jako translację. Następnie analizie zostały poddane trzy modele zaproponowane przez Russella, Moore’a oraz Austina, w taki sposób, aby wyeksponować rolę przekładu w każdym z nich. Ostatecznie został wskazany element łączący owe interpretacje, jak również podkreślono wagę procesu przekładu w filozoficznej refleksji nad ideą prawdy.

Słowa kluczowe: prawda; tłumaczenie intersemiotyczne; Russell; Austin; Moore

Informacja o Autorze: Mgr Giulia Cirillo—Polska Akademia Nauk, Instytut Filozofii i Socjologii; adres do korespondencji: IFiS PAN, ul. Nowy Świat 72, 00-330 Warszawa, Polska; e-mail: giulia.cirillo1@gmail.com; ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0001-6292-2842.