MATEUSZ NIEC

POPULIST RHETORIC
OF POLISH POLITICAL PARTIES
IN 2014 EU ELECTIONS.
ANALYSIS OF TELEVISION SPOTS

Election campaign is the time when political parties’ propaganda activities are enhanced. Political parties run propaganda campaigns both in the “real world” (meetings with voters, door-to-door campaigns), and in media space (advertisements, TV/radio studios debates, interviews in the press). Election campaign in media space plays a significant role in winning voters in an instrumental way⁴. Mass media election campaign is becoming an increasingly attractive political spectacle (G. Deborn, G. Sartori), which draws voters’ attention. It is a source of knowledge for many and the source of power for its creators. Hence, naturally, a question of propaganda message’s attractiveness (form) emerges – what factors influence this attractiveness. Also the question of the message’s content is discussed – what seduces a voter? TV advertisements combine both elements of the message – the form and content – frequently being therefore, in my opinion, the topic of academic and journalistic considerations⁵. Television spots encapsulate several characteristics at a time: creativity, effectiveness, attractiveness.

The topic of this article is the analysis of political discourse of Polish parties taking part in European Parliament campaign in 2014. The subject of my research

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¹ Election campaign from historical perspective is discussed by M. Niec [in:] Kampania wyborcza – uwagi politologa o genezie idei, „Roczniki Nauk Społecznych” 3, 2012, No. 4, p. 11-32, whereas general theoretic issues are discussed by B. Dobek-Óstrowska, R. Wysniowski [in:] Teoria komunikowania publicznego i politycznego. Wprowadzenie, Wrocław: Astrum 2002; A. Antoszewski, M. Kołczyński and M. Mazur’s works focus on sociotechnical problems.

is populist discourse\(^3\), which I believe is characteristic of every election campaign. I wish to emphasise that I am undertaking the analysis of populist discourse, not the discourse of populist parties. I am interested in populist rhetoric, not populism\(^4\). Thus, all Polish political parties taking part in EU elections have been included in my research. Due to the subject of the article I have not undertaken to consider populism in a theoretic manner and source literature is limited.

In the research I have used the method of content analysis, applied and developed in Poland by Irena Tetelowska and Walery Pisarek. Message content analysis has been used for many years in press studies. At first, content analysis was applied to printed press research, later it was used in radio messages (stations) studies and television stations and broadcast studies, both in a quantitative and qualitative research\(^5\). According to Walery Pisarek, message content analysis in a broad sense is breaking the message into smaller elements or isolating features, characteristics and elements from a message, and classifying them according to the accepted system of categories\(^6\). According to Bernard Berelson, co-author of the above-mentioned research method “content analysis is ordinarily limited to the manifest content of the communication and is not normally done directly in terms of the latent intentions which the content may express nor the latent responses which it may elicit”\(^7\). The researcher points to the following features of content analysis: objectivity, regularity and quantification. Without describing the aforementioned features\(^8\), let us focus on objectivity. In Berelson’s

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\(^3\) Discourse, in R.Barthes’ understanding is the shift of interest from signifie to signifiant; in the article I assumed that discourse is giving meaning to a certain sphere of political life seen from an ideological perspective. R. Wodak and T. A. van Dijk, see discourse in similar categories, shifting the emphasis from politics to social life. See: P. ROCOEUR, _Model tekstu. Znaczące działania rozważane jako tekst_, [in:] A. JASINSKA-KANIA, L. NIJAKOWSKI, J. SZACKI, M.ZIOLKOWSKI (eds.), _Współczesne teorie socjologiczne_, Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Naukowe Scholar 2006, p. 1001-1019; T. VAN DIJK, _Badania nad dyskursem_, [in:] ibidem, p. 1020-1046; N. FAIRCLOUGH, R. WODAK, _Krytyczna analiza dyskursu_, [in:] ibidem, p. 1047-1056.


\(^5\) The study matter is manifest content, quantitatively researched, which is then interpreter and analysed in a qualitative manner.

\(^6\) W. PISAREK, _Analiza zawartości prasy_, Kraków: Ośrodek Badań Prasoznawczych 1983, p. 29.

\(^7\) B. BERELSON, _Content Analysis in Communication Research_, p. 18, quoted from: W. PISAREK, _Analiza zawartości prasy_, p. 30.

opinion, shared by Pisarek, “the categories of analysis should be defined so precisely that different analyst can apply them to the same body of content and secure the same results”\(^9\). Research rigour guarantees the decrease in journalistic polemics and increased importance of scientific discussion.

Berelson’s opinion was formulated in 1952 – at the beginning of television era and the “golden” years of American cinema and radio – a quite well developed media market. Hence, a question emerges, in what way can we apply the assessment of this American scholar to the current conditions? In 1983 Pisarek pointed to the significance loss of a part of research stipulations, especially those pertaining to manifest content analysis and quantitative measures\(^10\). He upheld this opinion in *Wstęp do nauki o komunikowaniu* (Introduction to Communication Study), a work from 2008, by quoting and commenting on Ole R. Holsti’s view, for whom every technique of concluding about a set of messages on the basis of a systematic and objective identification of their precise and characteristic features\(^11\) is a content analysis. According to Pisarek, the success of content analysis depends on the adopted classification system, a categorisation key\(^12\). Without discussing what should be considered manifest content – only that what is written and lexically understandable or rather that, what is imposing itself till the first reading\(^13\), we can share the opinion of a distinguished communication researcher from Poland, co-founder of Kraków press centre. To finish deliberation on content analysis let us quote Pisarek’s opinion on the above-mentioned method.

“Analysis of the content of periodical mass communication channels is currently, i.e. in the 21st century, the most important, perfect and most often used method of knowing and describing the content and form of message stream as the main element of this type of social communication”\(^14\). The method consists in analysing all political spots\(^15\), not only selected political advertisements\(^16\). The method’s authors are convinced that the absence of the necessity to make selection of content to be analysed (de facto the attempt’s absence) increases the degree of objec-

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\(^10\) W. Pisarek, *Analiza zawartości prasy*, p. 31-32.


\(^12\) W. Pisarek, *Wstęp do nauki o komunikowaniu*, p. 247. The concept of categorisation key was introduced to international science by Polish scholars.

\(^13\) The above-mentioned issue is the subject of analysis of R. Barthes and J. Derrida’s works.


\(^15\) I do not analyse Internet video collection in my research.

\(^16\) As I have performed my studies by myself, it has been impossible to study advertising breaks in a quantitative manner.
tivity and, furthermore, imposes teamwork, as the research material is vast. Content analysis is time consuming and expensive. Probably for these reasons it has been suggested to limit the research material (S. Kracauer, A.L. George), the view that has been accepted by scientific community.

While constructing the categorisation key, I have applied indicators developed by Paweł Przyłęcki, who undertook the research of Polish populism\(^\text{17}\). Przyłęcki used the method of Manifesto Research Group, who have developed quantitative content analysis based on the assumptions of David Robertson’s salience theory included in the work *A Theory of Party Competition*. MRG team method is, in my opinion, a variation of content analysis, a variation taking advantage of geometry’s output. The team’s analysts have developed an interesting method of analysing results.

What categorisation key did Przyłęcki propose? He distinguished the following indicators of populism: a/ political and economic sovereignty of Poland b/ Euroscepticism/ anti-European attitude c/ negative attitude towards Germany d/ anti-communism e/ anti-elitism and anti-intellectualism f/ reference to nation/people g/ land as the legacy of the Polish nation h/ justice/ social justice i/ reference to values and merits (God, tradition and history) j/ criticism of Polish Third Republic k/ criticism of the present order l/ concept of Polish Fourth Republic m/ proposal of change and new order n/ criticism of liberalism/liberal democracy o/ “third way” p/ welfare state r/ interference in free market\(^\text{18}\). In total, he named 17 indicators defining populism. I have adopted this categorisation key in my research.

I took quasi-sentence, which is equipped with a legible political meaning as an analytical unit. Longer statements are not formulated in political advertisements, there are rather elliptical sentences, one- or two-word slogans which carry meaning and bear political significance. The picture in a political advertisement does not perform informative function on its own, as it does in popular culture texts (in films, in photography), thus I categorise it as an immanent part of quasi-sentence, another sign or expression in the sentence. According to Tetelowska, we can distinguish the following research units in content analysis: words, topics (threads), articles (full press statements) or characters’ attitudes expressed by: frequency of occurrence, percentage of space size, the number of lines (or points) and sometimes the duration of a topic in the broadcast\(^\text{19}\). The subject of study is thus the


\(^{18}\) Ibidem, p. 119-122.

\(^{19}\) I. **TETEŁOWSKA**, *Zasady kategoryzacji zawartości dzienników (krytyka i propozycje)*, [in:] I. **TETEŁOWSKA**, *Szkice prasoznawcze*, p. 168.
duration of a topic and its thematic structure, the amount of times when one element of populism occurs in political advertisements of certain parties taking part in EU Parliament elections. Unfortunately, there is an important limitation, as there is no indication of the number of emissions of an advertisement within a break and the frequency of a given spot’s occurrence. Due to the fact that I performed my research on my own, it was impossible to determine the above-mentioned research issues, as such questions require a considerable research team.

The research was conducted during European Parliament election campaign, from 25 August to 24 May 2014.20 The President of the Republic of Poland ordered one-day elections to the European Parliament to be held on 25 May. Nine national committees were registered, including 2 electoral coalitions and 3 regional lists, which are not part of this analysis. The following electoral committees were registered, I give them in the order of numbers drawn: 1/ Zbigniew Ziobro’s Solidarna Polska (Solidary Poland) Electoral Committee, 2/ Voters Electoral Committee Ruch Narodowy (National Movement), 3/ Coalition Electoral Committee SLD-UP (electoral coalition), 4/ PiS Electoral Committee, 5/ Coalition Electoral Committee Europa Plus Twój Ruch (Your Move) (electoral coalition), 6/ Jarosław Gowin’s Polska Razem (Poland Together) Electoral Committee, 7/ Janusz Korwin-Mikke’s Nowa Prawica (New Right-wing) Electoral Committee, 8/ PO RP Electoral Committee, 9/ PSL Electoral Committee.

The results of the research will be reported in the order of electoral committees’ lists’ numbers. Due to editorial limitations and large amount of statistical material I will not discuss in detail each election spot nor will I present the method of counting nor point to each category. I will present the overall results of each committee study. For the same reason I have declined to present the results in a table. I will perform an overall analysis in the summary. While presenting each committee’s results I will indicate what spots have been analysed and the duration of each spot.

The research material is the television spots that were officially shown during the research period in national electoral broadcasts of each committee, posted on official sites of electoral committees. 35 television spots altogether have been analysed.

Zbigniew Ziobro’s Solidarna Polska Electoral Committee – emitted 3 television spots during the research period: The Best Team (44 s.), The Team (30 s.) and

20 De facto, the campaign begins earlier, already when the electoral lists are created and registered. Earliest, on 2 February 2014 SLD lists were presented. PO and PiS lists were presented on 22 March, PSL on 5 April, and the latest – on 12 April – Jarosław Gowin’s Polska Razem. The drawing of list numbers took place on 15 April.
Pole! (1 min. 30 s.). According to the adopted categorisation key, in 3 television spots, 13 out of 32 quasi-sentences that I marked were classified as populist expressions, i.e. 41%. The first spot featured 2 populist quasi-sentences (classified as category f), the second spot featured 4 populist quasi-sentences (classified as the following categories: o x2, p, g), the third spot featured 7 populist quasi-sentences (classified as the following categories: b x4, f x2, i). Overall, the following populist categories appeared (according to the frequency of occurrence): 4 times b (Euroscepticism/ anti-European attitude), 4 times f (reference to nation/people), g (land as the legacy of the Polish nation), i (reference to values and merits /God, tradition and history), o (welfare state), p (interference in free market).

Voters Electoral Committee Ruch Narodowy – emitted 3 television spots during the research period: Radical Change (56 s.), Abolish the Round Table (50 s.), One Nation Beyond Borders (30 s.). According to the adopted categorisation key, in 3 television spots, 14 out of 21 quasi-sentences that I marked were classified as populist expressions, i.e. 67%. The first spot featured 7 populist quasi-sentences (classified as the following categories b x2, i, f, l), the second spot featured 5 populist quasi-sentences (classified as the following categories: d, f, i, k, m), the third spot featured 2 populist quasi-sentences (classified as the following categories: f, i). Overall, the following populist categories appeared: 4 times i (reference to values and merits /God, tradition and history), 3 times f (reference to nation/people), 2 times b (Euroscepticism/ anti-European attitude), d (anti-communism), j (criticism of Polish Third Republic), k (criticism of the present order), l (proposal of change and new order), m (criticism of liberalism/liberal democracy).

Coalition Electoral Committee SLD-UP (electoral coalition) – emitted 3 television spots during the research period: Against Fear Policy (53 s.), Direction – Changes (48 s.) and Time for Changes (30 s.). According to the adopted categorisation key, in 3 television spots, 8 out of 26 quasi-sentences that I marked were classified as populist expressions, i.e. 31%. The first spot featured 2 populist quasi-sentences (classified as the following categories: h, k), the second spot featured 3 populist quasi-sentences (classified as the following categories: h x3), the third spot featured 3 populist quasi-sentences (classified as the following categories: h x2, o). Overall, the following populist categories appeared: 6 times h (justice/ social justice), k (criticism of the present order), o (welfare state).

PiS Electoral Committee – emitted 3 television spots during the research period: You Will Vote for them (30 s.), „Empty Space” Eulogy (30 s.) and PiS Spot (32 s.). PiS Electoral Committee’s popular spot was also the advertising song
Karol Karski (1 min. 15 s.), which was not emitted nationally, hence has not been indicated in the statistics. According to the adopted categorisation key, in 3 television spots, 11 out of 33 quasi-sentences that I marked were classified as populist expressions, i.e. 33%. The first spot featured 5 populist quasi-sentences (classified as the following categories: e x2, p x2, k), the second spot featured 2 populist quasi-sentences (classified as the following categories: a, f), the third spot featured 4 populist quasi-sentences (classified as the following categories: a, g, h, j). Overall, the following populist categories appeared: 2 times a (political and economic sovereignty of Poland), 2 times e (anti-elitism and anti-intellectualism), 2 times p (interference in free market), f (reference to nation/people), g (land as the legacy of the Polish nation), h (justice/social justice), j (criticism of Polish Third Republic), k (criticism of the present order).

Coalition Electoral Committee Europa Plus Twój Ruch (electoral coalition) – emitted 7 television spots during the research period: Landscape after Platforma (54 s.), Landscape after Platforma (the second option – J. Palikot is coming) (54 s.), No Smoking (16 s.), Ryszard Kalisz’s election spot (30 s.), Janusz Palikot and Ryszard Kalisz (46 s.), Enlightenment (46 s.), Canonisation (30 s.). According to the adopted categorisation key, in 7 television spots, 7 out of 72 quasi-sentences that I marked were classified as populist expressions, i.e. 10%. The first spot featured 2 populist quasi-sentences (classified as category k), the second spot featured 2 populist quasi-sentences (classified as category k), the third spot did not feature any populist quasi-sentences, neither did the fourth one nor the fifth one, the sixth spot featured 3 populist quasi-sentences (classified as category k), the seventh spot did not feature any populist quasi-sentences. Overall, the criticism of present order (k) appeared 7 times, other categories have not been identified.

Jarosław Gowin’s Polska Razem Electoral Committee – emitted 6 television spots during the research period: Imagine Poland Together (30 s.), Poland Together’s reply to PO and PiS spot (30 s.), Daddy has gone away (30 s.), We will Eliminate PIT (1 min 56 s.), Rainbow (48 s.), Christmas without Mummy (30 s.). According to the adopted categorisation key, in 6 television spots, 17 out of 62 quasi-sentences that I marked were classified as populist expressions, i.e. 27%. The first spot featured 3 populist quasi-sentences (classified as category e), the second spot featured 3 populist quasi-sentences (classified as the following categories: e x2, l), the third spot featured 2 populist quasi-sentences (classified as the following categories: a, e), the fourth spot featured 3 populist quasi-sentences (classified as category j), the fifth spot featured 4 populist quasi-sentences (classified as the following categories: i x2, a, f), the sixth spot featured 2 populist
quasi-sentences (classified as the following categories: e, f). Overall, the following populist categories appeared: 7 times e (anti-elitism and anti-intellectualism), 3 times j (criticism of Polish Third Republic), 2 times a (political and economic sovereignty of Poland), 2 times f (reference to nation/people), 2 times i (reference to values and merits /God, tradition and history), l (proposal of change and new order).

Janusz Korwin-Mikke’s Nowa Prawica Electoral Committee – emitted 2 television spots during the research period: A Short Spot (1 min.), European Parliament Spot (1 min. 49 s.). According to the adopted categorisation key, in 2 television spots, 8 out of 29 quasi-sentences that I marked were classified as populist expressions, i.e. 28%. The first spot featured 6 populist quasi-sentences (classified as the following categories: b x4, e, k), the second spot featured 2 populist quasi-sentences (classified as the following categories: a x2,). Overall, the following populist categories appeared: 4 times b (Euroscepticism/ anti-European attitude), 2 times a (political and economic sovereignty of Poland), e (anti-elitism and anti-intellectualism), k (criticism of the present order).

PO RP Electoral Committee – emitted 5 television spots during the research period: This is What Poland Needs Today (30 s.), Shame Makers (30 s.), Unity of Europe (30 s.), PO Election Spot on Smoleisk Anniversary (1 min. 9 s.), Europe’s Man (1 min.). According to the adopted categorisation key, in 5 television spots, 3 out of 34 quasi-sentences that I marked were classified as populist expressions, i.e. 8%. The first spot did not feature any populist quasi-sentences, the second spot featured 1 populist quasi-sentence (classified as category e), the third spot featured 2 populist quasi-sentence (classified as category a), the fourth and fifth spots did not feature any populist quasi-sentences. Overall, the following populist categories appeared: 2 times a (political and economic sovereignty of Poland), e (anti-elitism and anti-intellectualism).

PSL Electoral Committee – emitted 2 television spots during the research period: You!, Think! (NO pomyśl) (30 s.), Safety (55 s.). According to the adopted categorisation key, in 2 television spots, 6 out of 11 quasi-sentences that I marked were classified as populist expressions, i.e. 55%. The first spot featured 3 populist quasi-sentences (classified as the following categories: i x2, f), the second spot featured 3 populist quasi-sentences (classified as the following categories: a x2, i). Overall, the following populist categories appeared: 3 times: i (reference to values and merits /God, tradition and history), 2 times a (political and economic sovereignty of Poland), f (reference to nation/people).

When performing a comprehensive analysis of the material, let us rank electoral committees according to the share of populist expressions in their
political advertisements. The most populist advertising campaign for 2014 European Parliament elections in electronic mass media was run by Voters Electoral Committee Ruch Narodowy, whose 67% of statements (quasi-sentences) can be classified as populist, next come: PSL Electoral Committee – 55% of statements, Zbigniew Ziobro’s Solidarna Polska Electoral Committee – 41% of statements, PiS Electoral Committee – 33% of statements, Coalition Electoral Committee SLD Lewica Razem – 31% of statements, Janusz Korwin-Mikke’s Nowa Prawica Electoral Committee – 28% of statements, Jarosław Gowin’s Polska Razem Electoral Committee – 27% of statements, Coalition Electoral Committee Europa Plus Twój Ruch – 10% of statements and PO RP Electoral Committee – 8% of statements. Both electoral committees with the highest percentage of populist statements are built around political parties that refer to the basic populism indicator – nation/people (f), which may distort the picture. Furthermore, “i” indicator (reference to values and merits /God, tradition and history) rates high in the value hierarchy of both electoral committees, as it is part of a policy of a nationalist and people’s catholic party. PSL started competing with right-wing parties (PiS and SP) over the hearts, souls and money of voters from outside big cities, which is a tactical, and quite effective move.

High position of Zbigniew Ziobro’s Solidarna Polska Electoral Committee in the ranking of populist statements confirms this party’s social programme and sceptical attitude towards European Union. Solidarna Polska is clearly positioned on the political scene as a Eurosceptical social right-wing (high number of indicator b). The following four positions were occupied by committees with a similar populism rate, oscillating around 30% of statements, one third (between 33% and 27% respectively) – PiS Electoral Committee, Coalition Electoral Committee SLD Lewica Razem, Janusz Korwin-Mikke’s Nowa Prawica Electoral Committee, Jarosław Gowin’s Polska Razem Electoral Committee.

PiS Electoral Committee clearly aimed at expanding the electorate, attracting new voters through television election spots. That is why there were as many as 8 populist categories in 11 quasi-sentences ascribed to populist rhetoric. There is no single, clear message of the campaign. The party already has an established position and quite strong ideological identification. A different idea was presented by Electoral Committee SLD Lewica Razem, which clearly referred to the disadvantaged people. There were as many as 6 statements classified as category justice/social justice (h). Populist rhetoric has been connected with the programme message of social left-wing, with its loud outcry against social injustice.

The next two electoral coalitions are right-wing parties (according to their own identification) – Nowa Prawica and Polska Razem referred to populist slogans for
two different reasons. Janusz Korwin-Mikke’s Nowa Prawica Electoral Committee clearly evoked populist messages: anti-European attitude, political and economic sovereignty of Poland and anti-elitism, altogether 7 out of 8 populist slogans featured in television spots of the presented formation. The committee referred to national populism. Jarosław Gowin’s Polska Razem Electoral Committee presented itself as a right-wing voice of protest against Polish Third Republic. The following messages dominated this party’s spots: anti-elitism, anti-intellectualism, criticism of Polish Third Republic, political and economic sovereignty of Poland, referring to traditional values and a proposal of a clear change of government – in total 15 out of 17 populist statements. Polska Razem proclaimed a clear populist rhetoric, it protested in a loud voice against political status quo. Such strong a message might have resulted from the attempt to mark their identity and presence on Polish political scene. Polska Razem is a new formation, its reference to populist rhetoric may be interpreted as a tactical political move.

The last two committees: ideologically similar, Coalition Electoral Committee Europa Plus Twój Ruch and PO Electoral Committee referred least to political rhetoric. If in PO Electoral Committee’s case such activity may be understandable – PO has been the ruling party for several years, in case of Coalition Electoral Committee Europa Plus Twój Ruch such activities may be slightly surprising. It seems that both parties referred to intellectual electorate, the metropolitan middle class. Europa Plus Twój Ruch Electoral Coalition marked its presence by a sharp criticism of the present state of affairs, protest against the way the country is governed. From among populist slogans only the criticism of the present order (k) could be visible. Whereas in PO Electoral Committee’s television spots 3 populist statements appeared – criticism of political competition (anti-elitism) and emphasis on political and economic sovereignty of Poland.

Let us compare election results with the polls from the beginning and end of the European Parliament election campaign and let us try to conclude whether the propaganda campaign led to success. TNS Polska poll of 17 April 2014 (after electoral lists registration) showed the following support distribution: PiS – 31%, PO – 27%, SLD – 8%, E+ – 4%, PSL – 4%, Nowa Prawica – 3%, SP – 2%, Polska Razem – 1%, Ruch Narodowy – 1%, hesitant – 21%21. CBOS poll of 3-9 April 2014 reported the following results: PO – 29%, PiS – 21%, SLD – 6%, Nowa Prawica – 6%, PSL – 4%, Polska Razem – 4%, Europa +

– 2%, SP – 1%, Ruch Narodowy ≈ 0\(^{22}\), hesitant 27%\(^{23}\). There are significant differences between these two polls, I will refer to the poll conducted by CBOS.

CBOS poll of 8-14 May 2014 (the last one before European Parliament election) reported the following results, the percentage of change in comparison with the preceding moth’s poll is given in brackets: PO – 26% (+5), PiS – 21% (no change), SLD – 8% (+2), PSL -5% (+1), Nowa Prawica – 4% (-2), Europa + – 2% (no change), Polska Razem – 2% (-2), Solidarna Polska – 1% (-3), no data referring to Ruch Narodowy and hesitant people\(^{24}\); according to my estimate hesitant – 31% (+4), RN – ≈ 0 (no change).

We can formulate a thesis, referring to AIDA model\(^{25}\), that PO’s (+5) and SLD’s (+2) electoral campaigns were the most effective. At the same time, PO’s populism rate concerning television election spots was only 8%, in case of SLD Lewica Razem it was 31%. Parties, whose populism rate in television spots was the highest: Ruch Narodowy – 67%, PSL – 55% and Solidarna Polska – 41% recorded: a/ no increase in support, which according to AIDA model means a creativless campaign, b/ increase in support by 1%, a small effect of the campaign, and c/ decrease in support by as much as 3%, which means a wrongly developed electoral campaign. Other committees suffered a decrease in public support, which is rather suggestive of a wrongly developed campaign. Lack of knowledge of electoral campaign run in media different from television does not allow to draw further conclusions. The differences are very big and defy straightforward assessments at this stage of research. Furthermore, electoral campaign was conducted not only in television, but also in the printed press and social reality (meetings, rallies), which does not allow for a simple assessment.

Let us report the results of European Parliament elections of each committee in Poland. The following results were achieved (I quote them according to the rate of electoral success): PO – 32.13%, PiS – 31.78%, SLD Lewica Razem – 9.44%, Nowa Prawica – 7.15%, PSL – 6.80%, SP – 3.98%, Europa + – 3.57%, Polska Razem – 3.16%, Ruch Narodowy – 1.39%\(^{26}\).

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\(^{22}\) In polls it is reported 0 in such cases, I give ≈ 0 in the article.


\(^{24}\) The poll was conducted on 8-14 May 2014 by means of interviewing method, computer aided, sample 1074 people, adults, www.ewybory.eu/sondaz-cbos-do-parlamentu-europejskiego-20-05-2014 [available: 16 May 2014].

\(^{25}\) Model AIDA refers to the assessment of a campaign’s effectiveness and creativeness. See: J. Kall, \textit{Reklama}, Warszawa: PWE 1994. Advertising models and strategies are not subject of the analysis, I treat AIDA model as the basic one.

And the last issue, what was the dominant hierarchy of values and populist categories in the campaign? The following values/categories appeared the most often in television electoral campaign: 12 times j (criticism of Polish Third Republic), 11 times e (anti-elitism and anti-intellectualism), 11 times f (reference to nation/people), 11 times k (criticism of the present order), 10 times a (political and economic sovereignty of Poland), 10 times b (Euroscepticism/anti-European attitude), 10 times i (reference to values and merits/God, tradition and history).

Criticism of Polish Third Republic (j) and present order (k) in an electoral campaign is not a surprise, political parties usually postulate the change of state of affairs. Slogans referring to national values (categories a, b, f). Typically populist slogans (e, i) did not dominate in the campaign, and some categories (c, n) did not appear at all. Also category l – “Polish Fourth Republic” concept did not appear.

In my view, European Parliament campaign was not dominated by populist rhetoric. In all television spots a total percentage of 27% of quasi-sentences, which were classified as populist rhetoric appeared. What is more, typically populist slogans were not prevalent. I would ascribe the reason for such a state of affairs to the structure of electorate – metropolitan and well educated.

To sum up the research, one can see a clear weakness of the used categorisation key. Many slogans are not equivocally populist, reference to social justice or the nation’s sovereignty does not have to stem from populism, it may have a current political context. On the other hand, the key that has been used has a research tradition and refers to broader reflections is a good starting point for further study. Perhaps this key should be made more precise and sub-categories created. The research has not confirmed concerns about populist groups: the most populist party got 98,545 votes (1.39%) in the election, the majority of votes was cast on the party which referred to populist rhetoric to a small extent. Finally the last contestation – populist rhetoric is clearly a part of modern political tactics, winning voters. Groups which are new on the political scene or electoral coalitions, as well as parties entering fierce competition tend to use populist rhetoric with the effect described above. Because, as Francisco Goya pointed out, the sleep of reason produces monsters, and sometimes only human shrews, to use populist rhetoric.
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INTERNET SOURCES


RETYRYKA POPULISTYCZNA POLSKICH PARTII W EUROWYBORACH W 2014 ROKU. ANALIZA SPOTÓW TELEWIZYJNYCH

Streszczenie

Tematem artykułu jest analiza dyskursu politycznego polskich partii, biorących udział w kampanii do Parlamentu Europejskiego w 2014 r. Przedmiotem badań uczyniłem populistyczny dyskurs, w moim przekonaniu charakterystyczny dla każdej kampanii wyborczej. Przedmiotem badania zostały objęte wszystkie polskie partie polityczne, a nie tylko populistyczne. W badaniach
MATEUSZ NIEĆ

skorzystał z metody badawczej analizy zawartości przekazów, na grunt polski przeniesionej i twórczo dopracowanej przez Irenę Tetelowską i Walerego Pisarka. Początkowo analiza zawartości odnosiła się do badania prasy drukowanej, w późniejszym czasie metodę stosowano także w badaniach przekazów telewizyjnych.

Według badań, retoryka populistyczna wyraźnie jest wpisana w kontekst współczesnej taktyki politycznej, wyłapywania elektoratu. Sięganie po retorykę populistyczną uzależnione jest od taktyki politycznej. Badania nie potwierdziły obaw przed ugrupowaniami populistycznymi, najbardziej populistyczna formacja otrzymała najmniej głosów.

Słowa kluczowe: propaganda, populizm, analiza zawartości, kampania wyborcza.

POPULIST RHETORIC
OF POLISH POLITICAL PARTIES
IN 2014 EU ELECTIONS.
ANALYSIS OF TV SPOTS

Summary

The topic of this article is the analysis of the political discourse of Polish parties taking part in European Parliament campaign in 2014. The subject of my research is populist discourse, which I believe is characteristic of every election campaign. All Polish political parties have been included in the research, not only the populist ones. In the research I used the method of content analysis, applied and developed in Poland by Irena Tetelowska and Walery Pisarek. At first, content analysis was applied to printed press research, later it was used in television broadcast studies.

According to research, populist rhetoric is clearly a part of modern political tactics, winning voters. Using populist rhetoric is dependent on the political tactics. Research have not confirmed concern about populist parties, the most populist party received the smallest number of votes.

Key words: propaganda, populism, content analysis, election.