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KNOWLEDGE IN FORMING THE PUBLIC SPHERE

The analyses presented in the article are formed upon a classical definition of knowledge according to Plato, which is a justified true belief. Rather than rejecting the definition as irrelevant for contemporary interpretations, particularly from the sociological perspective, it is considered an important starting point for sociological analyses. This is so especially when knowledge is considered to be a postulative objective in such rationalisation of social life that answers the needs of referring to knowledge. The array of strategies in forming the public sphere on the basis of knowledge is related to the division between *episteme* knowledge and *doxa* knowledge, as well as true and false knowledge.

Episteme is the knowledge that is certain, guaranteed and justified by the standards of objectivism, on the other hand, *doxa* is uncertain knowledge based on subjective beliefs. This distinction that stems from Plato's epistemology, determined the understanding of states (*polis*) as the ruling of wise men and philosophers who reached the truth (*aletheia*) and built competences to lead people from the cave in which shadows (*doxa*) are considered to be the reality. The same illusions of demos are contrasted with the truth of more and more difficultly recognised reality as such¹.

This understanding of knowledge is challenged with a dialectic strain between the practice of protecting the true knowledge and intruding false knowledge. This concerns such a strain in which the knowledge is true as a logical value, sanctioned only by its negation which is considered false. The true

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¹ B. Russell, *Szkice sceptyczne*, tłum. A. Kurlandzka, Łódź: Helfa 1996, p. 144 [*Sceptical Essays*, London: Routledge 1985].

knowledge is supported by various institutions which, depending on historic conditions, sanction it according to the binding criteria.

1. RATIONALISTIC AUTHORITARISM

The perspective of forming social sphere according to the requirements of knowledge is based here on protecting the true knowledge against the claims of the appearances. Social reality adopts a form of structures and processes demanding a solid ground of reliable knowledge that can be obtained by holding precise criteria of truth. This supports a conservative rule of discovering threats and preventing degeneration of the stability in social life.

The starting point is the development of *episteme* and *techne* spheres, but in opposition to *doxa* sphere, which is deprived of the influence of *poesis*. *Doxa* is the illusion of “apparition”, an illusion that is made by word and image and substitutes the real world. When Plato intends to know the thing that is within his range, he turns back from it and distances from it, further than the stars and from these ideal regions he turns to it to notice what reasonable things can be said and what is deprived of them². Plato searches for the sources of true cognition, by giving selected statements a universal and unchanging character. The proper reality is what is *rational*, what is presented in numerical relations as a symmetry, mostly in music and astronomy³.

With the strive for strictness and certainty of knowledge by maximising language precision, you paradoxically distance yourself from the thing that should be termed with better names, to search for things that correspond to the precision of the uttered terms. The things which fit the terms were named beings by Parmenides, ideas by Plato and forms by Aristotle. Virtually the whole history of ancient and medieval philosophy is the history of terms of things which search for things that are thought thereof⁴. Such an approach is the first stage of forming the public sphere by knowledge. The house of truth is being erected with the need to erect it and protect the prerogatives of its inhabitants. They could not be numerous as they need to have objective intellectual values and language competences that transcend even individual attributes. Their po-

² J. Ortega y Gasset, *Ewolucja teorii dedukcyjnej. Pojęcie zasady u Leibniza*, Gdańsk: Wydawnictwo słowo/obraz terytoria 2004, p. 115.

³ H.G. Gadamer, *Język i rozumienie*, tłum. P. Dehnel, B. Sierocka, Warszawa: Fundacja Aletheia 2003, p. 145.

⁴ Ortega y Gasset, *Ewolucja teorii dedukcyjnej*, p. 55.

sition is determined by the access to the truth ensured by natural and supernatural powers (e.g. St. Augustine's gift of faith).

Knowledge can be easily distinguished from conceptions, whenever it undermines equality, liberty, innovativeness, mediocrity, infirmity and fallibility from the perspective of Idea, Goodness, Truth, Beauty, Wisdom and Philosophy. This is where we find the interpretation of obtaining true knowledge by casting doubts among those defending colloquial understanding of ideas. However, predominant approach is epistemology, which sanctions authoritative character of cognition with optimistic conception of reaching light and clear truth (Platonic theory of anamnesis) and pessimistic negation of reaching the truth by everybody (Platonic metaphor of cave)⁵

In these approaches the spiritual has innate ability to commune with the absolute truth of the ideal world, yet due to material location within a man, it is influenced by appearances which weaken and destroy this innate ability. This connection is used to draw conclusions that undermine cognitive, moral, customary or political abilities of ordinary people and to impose such a point of view that is available for a few wise men only. At the same time, every-day reality, evanescence and their natural obviousness is only an unreal illusion created by people and the abstract of mind, which are considered to be conventional, are subjected to natural regulations of the ideal order.

This view is acceptable provided the term is naturally broadened to cover the sphere of men's moral and public activities. Then the external world, which is empirically available, is considered to be an unreal convention imposed by senses. Thus, the man is deprived of both the freedom to construct own statements about the world and natural points of reference that allow for independent verification of the truthfulness of the statements. In the above concept of cognition and authoritativeness in reaching true knowledge in mythical and religious thinking is accompanied by absolutism and authoritarianism of rational gaining true and certain knowledge. One intends to form a universal criterion that will permanently eliminate falsehood from discussion by revealing the source of truth⁶. Consequently, this may lead to burying in secondary issues, substituting one authority with another and fly into pure ab-

⁵ K.R. Popper, *Mit schematu pojęciowego. W obronie nauki i racjonalności*, tłum. B. Chwedeńczuk, Warszawa: Książka i Wiedza 1997, p. 214 [*The Myth of the Framework: In Defence of Science and Rationality*, London: Routledge 1994].

⁶ K.R. Popper, *Droga do wiedzy. Domysły i refutacje*, tłum. T. Baszniak, Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Naukowe PWN 1999, p. 32-33 [*Conjectures and Refutations: The Growth of Scientific Knowledge*, New York: Harper and Row 1963].

straction and speculation. What guarantees the truthfulness of these views is the super-empirical world that transcends critical discussion.

Such type of thinking in a dangerous manner can be reinforced by adopting Manichean rule of fight between true, good, city of God (*civitas dei*) and falsehood, evil city of devil (*civitas diaboli*). This is a method of judging critically the history but also a style of thinking in which God and devil are substituted by biologically good and evil races, good and evil classes – proletariat and capitalists⁷. The strive to discover the source of true knowledge, which is also a driving force in human and divine scope, leads to proving rationality and objectivism from individual problem situations and giving them universal character.

2. MODERNIST TECHNOCRATISM

The second approach is the effect of enlightenment subversion which led to the substitution of the knowledge based on pre-scientific authority with the knowledge based on scientific authority. The religious and metaphysical type of *episteme* was substituted by scientific *episteme*. In order to avoid the illusion and delusions, R. Descartes proposes constructing own images of reality, making the unity of science the first methodological premise. Instead of having multiple disciplines reflecting and copying the world of real things in our minds, Descartes speaks of building or imagining own world. Additionally, in 16th c. T. Hobbes, N. Machiavelli and F. Bacon, among others, contradict postulative knowledge on human nature with realistic knowledge⁸. In the Enlightenment, in both continental current of post-Cartesian rationalism and empirical Anglo-Saxon current, people tried to learn from mind the criterion of complete and true knowledge that reflects the nature of the world. The realism of reasonable knowledge was contradicted to falsified images of the world, formed by religion and churches, authorities and tradition, metaphysics, social and political institutions as well as political *ancien régime*⁹.

⁷ K.R. Popper, *W poszukiwaniu lepszego świata. Wykłady i rozprawy z trzydziestu lat*, tłum. A. Malinowski, Warszawa: Książka i Wiedza 1997, p. 167 [*In Search of a better World: Lectures and Essays from Thirty Years*, New York: Routledge, London 1992].

⁸ L. Strauss, J. Cropsey, *Historia filozofii politycznej. Podręcznik*, tłum. P. Herbich i in., Warszawa: Fundacja Augusta hr. Cieszkowskiego, Fronda 2010, pp. 300-441 [*History of Political Philosophy*, 3rd edition, Chicago and London: The University Chicago Press 1987].

⁹ J. Szacki, *Historia myśli socjologicznej. Wydanie nowe*, Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Naukowe PWN 2002, pp. 80 n.

Enlightenment manner of treating reason as a source of authority that justifies human knowledge grants science an authoritative character at the cost of religious and metaphysical statements and obtains a position of the only critical way of conceiving the world. This is commenced in the process of blaming a man for mistakes that result from lack of liberating the reason from mythical content in religion and metaphysics that is crowned with scientific positivism but attempts to modify them by critical discussion¹⁰. The avoidance of this aspect of thinking was deepened with immersing meta-scientific reflection in the chaos of non-criticisable reflections on the source of knowledge, in which the causes of human fallibility were searched for. In positivism the accusations were addressed to theological and metaphysical speculations, in neo-positivism – against any statements that are not based on perception, in phenomenology – against separating the things and feelings, in analytical philosophy – against separating the world from the research on the meaning of the language¹¹. These concepts lose the ability to solve problems in a critical manner for the indirect criticism of scientific statements. The predominance of thinking in the categories of bucket theory of cognition lead to futile discussions on which data are more empirical and allow the verification of scientific statements¹².

In the above grasps, it was concluded that the world is full of mistakes, made by misleading powers of the soul and sanctioned by unverified authorities, which were popularised and validated by naivety, laziness and the passage of time. Therefore, it is the role of reason to uproot the mistakes, falsehood and nonsense¹³. A. Comte identifies the studies of spiritual development of humanity from theological phase (fictional), through metaphysical (abstract), up to scientific (positive), i.e. from fiction to science, understood as down-to-earth understanding of facts. The stages were attributed with specific forms of social life: feudal and church, revolutionary and finally, scientific and industrial phase. The stages of human development and forms of social life are the negations of the previous ones, but are not definite overcoming them. Contrary to the trends of scientific specialisation, the predictions bring human

¹⁰ Popper, *Droga do wiedzy*, p. 219.

¹¹ Ibidem, pp. 36 n.

¹² K.R. Popper, *Świat skłonności*, tłum. A. Chmielewski, Kraków: Wydawnictwo Znak 1996, pp. 60-61 [*A World of Propensities*, Bristol: Thoemass Antiquarian Books 1990].

¹³ P. Hazard, *Kryzys świadomości europejskiej 1680-1715*, tłum. J. Lalewicz, A. Siemek, Warszawa: Państwowy Instytut Wydawniczy, pp. 117-118.

development to the construction of scientific and customary system that has the power to unify the society in the same way as religion does¹⁴.

The situation of change in the framework of large intellectual reshuffle towards a new ideological programme is presented by K. Backer as the reception of the authority of the Bible and the church and keeping naive faith in nature and reason¹⁵. Then, on this basis and with reference to philosophic and utopian conception of F. Bacon, H. de Saint Saimon's¹⁶ industrial advancement, in T. Veblen's *Engineers and the Price System* the rule of technocrats is proposed. This is the system of power, whose rules are determined by neutral and objective criteria taken directly or indirectly from such disciplines are economy, management, law or engineering¹⁷. It emphasises the need of ruling by expert-managers, who, due to the needs for strategic planning in economy, defence and the development of research analyses, simulations of processes, are able to solve problems more efficiently than traditional entities of the political life – the people (democracy) and civil servants (bureaucracy)¹⁸.

These establishments constitute the foundations of numerous contemporary theories, which are expressed in D. Bell's concept of post-industrial society. In these concepts diagnoses and postulates concerning the factual or demanded rule of engineers are formed. In experts' opinions, these are ideological premises that are the mixture of scientific categories and other non-scientific categories that resemble "*such religious categories as initiation, sacrum and mission*"¹⁹. Considering science as a tool for understanding the rules of social life gives professionals the power of managing the order but conse-

¹⁴ A. Comte, *Rozprawa o duchu filozofii pozytywnej. Rozprawa o całokształcie pozytywizmu*, tłum. B. Skarga, W. Wojciechowska, Warszawa: Państwowe Wydawnictwo Naukowe 1973, p. 584.

¹⁵ C.L. Becker, *Państwo Boże osiemnastowiecznych filozofów*, tłum. J. Ruszkowski, Poznań: Zysk i S-ka Wydawnictwo 1995, p. 28-29 [*The Heavenly City of the Eighteenth-Century Philosophers*, Yale University Press 1932].

¹⁶ I. Berlin, *Zmysł rzeczywistości. Studia z historii idei*, tłum. M. Filipczuk, Poznań: Zysk i S-ka Wydawnictwo 2002, pp. 71-72 [*The Sense of Reality. Studies in Ideas and their History*, Straus and Giroux: Farrar 1998].

¹⁷ L. Winner, *Autonomous technology: Technics-out-of-control as a theme in political thought*, Cambridge, MA and London: The MIT Press 1977, pp. 144-165.

¹⁸ B. Momani, *Recruiting and Diversifying IMF Technocrats*, „Global Society” 19(2005), No 2, pp. 167-168.

¹⁹ J. Kurczewska, *Technokraci i ich świat społeczny*, Warszawa: Wydawnictwo IFiS PAN 1997, p. 311.

quently may lead to negating not only democratic order but also the possibility of building social order on knowledge²⁰.

3. POSTMODERN DEMOCRATISM

In Enlightenment tradition, knowledge was used to build a new social order based on belief in cognitive value of reason and senses that provide insight into the nature of the world and allow living in accordance with the rules outlined by science. Condemnation of the darkness of the past was an attempt to change the social order, what was enough to destroy and change into another one to build a better future²¹. However, it was D. Hume to shake the foundations of this Enlightenment construction, which seemed to have associate the coherent rules of empiricism with the belief in innate order, moral utilitarianism and the belief in man's mission to happiness; the image of reason as a creation of the nature with the belief in independence of the reason²².

Consequently, what is indicated by the master of postmodern style of thinking, M. Foucault, Kant in his essay "*What is Enlightenment?*" searches for events that brought us to self-establishment and recognising ourselves as the subjects of what we do, say and think. According to this interpretation, the criticism of the thinker from Królewiec, are neither quests for universal structures of all cognition, nor all possible moral actions but are the discussion of all discourses articulating what we think, say or do as historic data. This does not serve the purpose of concluding what is impossible to do or conceive on the basis of the form of who we are, what is doable and what is impossible to conceive. However, commencing the discussion from the fortuitousness of human nature indicates that we will live, act, and think differently from the way we live, act and think now²³.

²⁰ Por. K. Popper, *Spoleczeństwo otwarte i jego wrogowie*, t. I-II, Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Naukowe PWN 2001 [*The Open Society and Its Enemies*, t. I-II, London: George Routledge & Sons 1945]; A. Jabłoński, *Budowanie społeczeństwa wiedzy. Zarys teorii społecznej Karla R. Poppera*, Lublin: Wydawnictwo KUL 2006.

²¹ P. Hazard, *Myśl europejska w XVIII wieku od Monteskiusza do Lessinga*, tłum. H. Suwała, Warszawa: Państwowy Instytut Wydawniczy 1972, p. 28.

²² L. Kołakowski, *Główne nurty marksizmu. Powstanie – rozwój – rozkład*, Londyn: Wydawnictwo Aneks 1988, p. 42.

²³ M. Foucault, *Filozofia, historia, polityka. Wybór pism*, tłum. D. Leszczyński, L. Raśniński, Warszawa–Wrocław: Wydawnictwo Naukowe PWN 2000, p. 289.

Different thinkers point to the roots of forming the reason, knowledge and science threatening a man and its culture, as already mentioned M. Foucault²⁴ and, on the other hand, John Paul II²⁵. In such different discussions, the authors point to the threats to social order by technological, market and civilisation determinisms. In this approach two logics or styles of describing the reality – scientific and humanistic – are contrasted. It is proposed to recognise the sources of domination of scientific type rationality and socio-political reasons for this domination. The reflection is of emancipation character that forms basis for new institutional solutions that allow obtaining the level of freedom that is guaranteed by the public opinion on the mechanisms of rationality of the social life. The surplus of technical solutions in science causes that most decisions and choices that are characteristic for human social activities are not rationally analysed and are doomed to irrationality²⁶.

Revealing the rationality of social structures and processes with scientific advancement C. Wright Mills presents its product as a Cheerful Robot that is contrasted with reason- and liberty-based development whose ideal is the Man of Renaissance. It is urgent to deal with the proliferation of Cheerful Robots, which threatens democratic society. It is necessary to transform unaware and pleased masses into the public that is able to notice problems. This is a challenge of building democratic order based on social movements taking up important discussions on chances for development in a given social context and having real impact on their structural transformation²⁷.

Analysing the contribution of knowledge in the development of the society, one cannot ignore the phenomenon of „tyranny of safety”, which is the basis of seeing changes from instrumental to more political acquisition of power. This may also be presented as transformation from the strategy of learning from somebody to learning with somebody. Learning with somebody suggest an active and conscious process of dialogue and sharing, that synthesises the contents into new knowledge. This allows for overcoming classical technocratic reality of authoritative knowledge of experts and the relations based on

²⁴ M. Foucault, *Choroba umysłowa a psychologia*, tłum. P. Mrówczyński, Warszawa: Wydawnictwo KR 2000, p. 130.

²⁵ Jan Paweł II, *Pamięć i tożsamość. Rozmowy na przełomie tysiącleci*, Kraków: Wydawnictwo Znak 2011, p. 16.

²⁶ J. Habermas, *Teoria i praktyka. Wybór pism*, tłum. M. Łukasiewicz, Z. Krasnodębski, Warszawa: Państwowy Instytut Wydawniczy 1983, pp. 357-369.

²⁷ C. Wright Mills, *Wyobrażenia socjologiczne*, tłum. M. Bucholc, Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Naukowe PWN 2007, pp. 261-276 [*The Sociological Imagination*, New York: Oxford University Press 1959].

rejecting this knowledge a priori. At the same time, this leads to pluralistic conception proving the importance of multiple knowledge, both expert's and partner's. However, diversity also means the relations that are based on force. A. Zybertowicz associates violence with reaching consensus pointing to the fact that such relations are more basic in the society than so called objective facts. The practice of violence is thus as important as conceptual cognition (including scientific cognition), as it was historically formed in the modern times²⁸.

The liquidation of disproportions between the efficiency and totality of scientific and technical rationality and the weakness of democratic and communicative rationality that guarantees the understanding and social order is a solution to this unfavourable influence of knowledge on public order. The hope is in new social movements, which represent all the citizens, especially those who are excluded, who take up real fight in accordance with the rules of group identity, opposition and the whole²⁹. The research on different societies show that the more stable the society the more inclined they are to identify with commonly shared feelings, objectives and beliefs. Thus, this is all about the internalisation of rule and values which are important in a given society, so that their following was not considered as violence.

4. PROBLEM CONSTRUCTIVISM

The last of the analysed approaches to the influence on public sphere indicates program practices of protecting *doxy* as a source of true knowledge from imposing *doxy* as false knowledge. The dynamism of relations between knowing and creating new ideas is truly limited to the level of process "which happens in a given community"³⁰. A network approach or systemic, self-reflecting constructions of identity from the scraps of different contents, which are more and more difficult to combine, become predominant. The same knowledge that is a collection of subjective conceptions must find justification for itself, which goes beyond any standards of coherence with the reality,

²⁸ A. Zybertowicz, *Przemoc i poznanie. Studium z nie-klasycznej socjologii wiedzy*, Toruń: Uniwersytet Mikołaja Kopernika 1995, p. 353.

²⁹ J. Szymczyk, *Specyfika nowych ruchów społecznych*, w: *Wartości – interesy – struktury społeczne*, ed. J. Szymczyk, Lublin: Norbertinum 2010, pp. 72-73.

³⁰ A. Szahaj, *Ironia i miłość. Neopragmatyzm Richarda Rorty'ego w kontekście sporu o postmodernizm*, Warszawa: Fundacja na Rzecz Nauki Polskiej 1996, p. 70.

possibility to achieve success internal coherence of statements or even its major backing. In spite of organising a forum standardising the validation of knowledge in achieving consensus in dialogue or discussion, even if by gaining the support of majority, the case is to build favourable climate, especially among opinion-making groups in different environments.

Humanistic concepts by Dilthey i E. Spranger are departing and other concepts included in understanding-intelligibility (transcendentalists, transcending, intellection) and in phenomenological understanding. On the other hand, the methods of considering understanding as a metaphoric strain of thoughts (biomorphic, anthropomorphic, subjective or personal) become predominant as, *sensu largo*, discursive process, as capturing the causal-functional relationship, as semiotic analysis of reason-bounded statements, semiotic and aesthetic analysis, or finally as semiotic-pragmatic analysis³¹. Instead of searching for the possibility to approximate the truth by negating and tracing the sources of disruptions in cognitive condition of man, we witness the rehabilitation of doomed to infamy by enlightenment and public opinion real conditions of man's cognitive thrust into reduction of the complexity of the surrounding world. The advancing competition between different *dox* is the competition of different types of semiotics, rhetoric, narrations, signals, slogans, which are often juxtaposed on the basis of different binary codes.

This is why, according to M. Archer, among others, each human being relies on the multitude of knowledge embodying the areas of our sensibility which are internally related to different types of objects This gives basis to non-linguistic knowledge defined with terms of silent information, skills and know-how, additionally expressed by the idea of "embodied knowledge as a real knowledge" and including regulative element. In this manner the order that is key to human subjectivity emerges, what is not considered or included in the whole natural order or in social order. The corresponding knowledge is based on the scheme: problem-solution. Scientific research and other types of human discoveries always stem from the situations perceived as problems or aimed at solving them. Know-how is the most important type of knowledge, which determined the ability of its realisation. A pianist has know-how which results from his hard work at a piano and may bring him to the virtuosity and the abilities which cannot be destroyed or passed on to others. Polynesians

³¹ S. Majdański, *Problemy asercji zdaniowej. Studia pragmatyczne*, Lublin: Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL 1972, pp. 164-175.

who discovered lands in the Pacific Ocean 3.500 years ago had navigation know-how, even though their view of the world was completely wrong³²

It is practical knowledge, based on invention and using cultural artefacts that makes people different from animals. This knowledge is a form of *tacit Knowledge*, with capital K, due to its role in understanding the reality in action. It is always related to human carnality and as the *knowledge from somewhere* rather than the element of unbiased scientific observations. The bodily being, a man, verified the thing from his/her own perspective, which is the starting point for action, perception and cognition. Many elements of human knowledge were not filtered through meanings that are part of discursive order. Practical knowledge authentically reveals part of reality, which transcends linguistic limitations. In realistic approach language must concern something that is developed by referring to independent reality in relation to which it gains its own meaning. Thus, there must be a non-linguistic access to reality which is primary to the possessiveness of language. If expressive use of language concerns also things or their states, there must be some practice of emotional perception of the world, which necessarily precedes our ability to expressing feeling with the language. Language only plays a role in further development of a "person", who emerged from him-/herself, and later determines his/her identity by conversation³³.

According to the N. Luhmann's theses of operative constructivism any knowledge is the effect of an ongoing process of "inseparable mixture of real reality and fictional reality"³⁴. The reality of the world is not questioned, however, it is not considered to the subject but an unattainable horizon of discourse in a given system. From the secondary perspective, i.e. the observations of the observers during their observations („observation of cognitive operations of other systems”), the possibility to differentiate the conditions of objects' existence disappears. Reality is the indicator of efficient controls of cohesion in the system by giving it sense (*sense making*)³⁵. Such understanding of reality does not provide any privileged point of view but indicates the need to acknowledge relatively autonomous images of the world constructed in different systems. Their coordination is the clash of different schemes of own observations the result from the accepted method of

³² M. Archer, *Being Human: The Problem of Agency*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2000, pp. 160-181.

³³ *Ibidem*, pp. 160-190.

³⁴ N. Luhmann, *Realność mediów masowych*, Wrocław: Wydawnictwo GAJT 1991 s.c. 2009, p. 86.

³⁵ *Ibidem*, pp. 11-12.

coding the boundary between the system and the environment. This is how the difference between the world as such and the world observed in given systems vanishes. Primary reality is the reality of fictions built upon different systems which justifies its existence in constant consideration of its different implementations. Reality means a critical clash (e.g. distinction from the environment, reduction of the coherence in the surrounding, increase in system complexity, operational closure) of our own system contents with what is not their content. Being critical means the ability to react to what negates the identity of systems that was achieved (irritation of systems) and imposes the processing that adapts to the requirements of external environment.

CONCLUSION

The present article outlines four basic perspectives of forming the public sphere by knowledge:

1. Protection of *episteme* as true knowledge from interference of *doxy* as false knowledge – **rationalistic authoritarianism**.

2. Protection of *episteme* as true knowledge from interference of other *episteme* as false knowledge – **modernist technocratism**.

3. Protection of *doxy* as true knowledge from interference of other *episteme* as false knowledge – **postmodern democratism**.

4. Protection of *doxy* as true knowledge from interference of other *doxy* as false knowledge – **problem constructivism**.

The differentiations can be understood in the context of historic development (history of ideas), however, the scope of systemic self-reflection that is inscribed into discourse practices is more important. The first is based on metaphysical and ethical differentiation between what agrees with the reality and is available for selected groups or individuals and what is an unjustified set of mass's conceptions. The second is a higher level of meta-scientific and meta-logical self-reflection that urges to use only one type of scientific rationality as the true one, in opposition to anything that is not science. The third type of self-reflection – semiotic and symbolic – claims that justification and its criticism are the only forms of symbolic violence, which public opinion should be protected from. The fourth type of self-reflection – hermetic-networking and systemic – strives to show the relationships of knowledge that build social identity. Depending on the level of self-reflection, there are changes in ideas of *episteme* – truth (1), science –

pseudo-science (2), symbolic violence (3) and *doxa* – conception, public opinion (3), and identity – social dispersion.

Each of these perspectives own its own theoretical and methodological tools of presenting own image of the world and rationalising the public sphere to requirements of specific types of knowledge. The text is written from the fourth perspective, considering author's reflections as definition of social identity that prevents dispersion. This is a cosmopolitan perspective according to U. Beck's ideas, i.e. attempting to provoke discussions in the spirit of universal sociological heritage, close to the set of presuppositions which, according to J. Alexander, lie at the foundations of sociological reflection.

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Summary

The analyses presented in the article are formed upon a classical definition of knowledge according to Plato, which is a justified true belief. The array of strategies in forming the public sphere on the basis of knowledge is related to the division between *episteme* knowledge and *doxa* knowledge, as well as true and false knowledge. This understanding of knowledge is challenged with a dialectic strain between the practice of protecting the true knowledge and intruding false knowledge. This concerns such a strain in which the knowledge is true as a logical value, sanctioned only by its negation which is considered false. The true knowledge is supported by various institutions which, depending on historic conditions, sanction it according to the binding criteria.

WIEDZA W KSZTAŁTOWANIU SFERY PUBLICZNEJ

Streszczenie

Analizy zawarte w tym artykule oparte są na klasycznej definicji wiedzy, zaczerpniętej od Platona, zgodnie z którą jest ona: prawdziwym i uzasadnionym przekonaniem. Wielość strategii kształtowania sfery publicznej na podstawie wiedzy połączona została z podziałami na wiedzę *episteme* i wiedzę *doksa* oraz wiedzę prawdziwą i wiedzę fałszywą. Na takie rozumienie wiedzy nałożono dialektyczne napięcie między praktyką ochrony wiedzy prawdziwej a praktyką narzucania wiedzy fałszywej. Chodzi o takie napięcie, zgodnie z którym wiedza jest prawdziwa, jako wartość logiczna sankcjonowana jedynie tym, że jej przeciwieństwem jest wiedza uznawana za fałszywą. Za wiedzą prawdziwą stoją różne instytucje, które w zależności od uwarunkowań historycznych odpowiednio ją sankcjonują zgodnie z obowiązującymi kryteriami.

Słowa kluczowe: wiedza, sfera publiczna, władza, autorytet, konstruktywizm.

Key words: knowledge, public sphere, power, authority, constructivism.