Possibilities for Divine Freedom

Simon Kittle

Abstrakt


O możliwościach Bożej wolności

W artykule przeprowadzam analizę trzech ujęć Bożej wolności. Staram się wykazać, że dwa teoretyczne ujęcia, które pojawiły się ostatnio i które próbują wyjaśnić Bożą wolność, nie odwołując się do koncepcji alternatywnych możliwości, nie osiągają postawionego sobie celu. Następnie pokazuję, w jaki sposób wizja Bożej wolności oparta na idei Roberta Adamsa, że Boża łaska oznacza, iż nie jest on zobligowany, by koniecznie stwarzać najlepszy z możliwych światów, jest zdolna wyjaśnić, w jaki sposób Bóg może być wolny, a zarazem doskonale dobry i rozumny.


Słowa kluczowe


wolność; wolna wola; Boża wolność; alternatywne możliwości

Pełny tekst:

PDF (English)

Bibliografia


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DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.18290/rf.2016.64.4-6

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